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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-63158

CVE-2026-63158: Omnispace Agora Project Auth Bypass Flaw

CVE-2026-63158 is an authentication bypass flaw in Omnispace Agora Project allowing attackers with stolen bcrypt hashes to impersonate users. This post covers the technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-63158 Overview

CVE-2026-63158 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Omnispace Agora Project versions before 26.10.0. The flaw resides in the legacy AGORAP_LOG and AGORAP_PASS cookie mechanism, which treats a user's stored bcrypt password hash as a directly replayable bearer credential. An attacker who obtains the stored hash can set these cookies and authenticate as the corresponding user without ever knowing the cleartext password. The vulnerability enables full impersonation of any account, including administrators, and classifies as a pass-the-hash issue tracked under CWE-836.

Critical Impact

Any attacker holding a stolen bcrypt hash from the user database can authenticate as that account, including administrators, by setting two cookies on an HTTP request.

Affected Products

  • Omnispace Agora Project versions prior to 26.10.0
  • Deployments relying on the legacy AGORAP_LOG/AGORAP_PASS cookie authentication flow
  • Self-hosted Agora Project collaboration portals exposed to untrusted networks

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-13 - CVE-2026-63158 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-13 - Last updated in NVD database
  • Release 26.10 - Fixed version published on the agora-project GitHub repository

Technical Details for CVE-2026-63158

Vulnerability Analysis

Agora Project's legacy session handler reads two client-supplied cookies, AGORAP_LOG (the username or login identifier) and AGORAP_PASS (the stored bcrypt hash), and compares the cookie value directly against the database record. If the submitted hash matches the stored hash, the session is established. This design converts a one-way password hash into a reusable bearer token.

Because the comparison succeeds on the hash itself rather than on a verified password, bcrypt's computational cost provides no defense. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-836: Use of Password Hash Instead of Password for Authentication.

Root Cause

The root cause is a design flaw in the legacy cookie-based authentication path. Developers used the stored credential (bcrypt hash) as both the server-side verifier and the client-side proof of identity. Any process that leaks the hash, including SQL injection, database backup theft, or insider access, grants persistent, password-equivalent access to every affected account.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the Agora Project web application and prior possession of the target user's stored bcrypt hash. An attacker crafts an HTTP request with Cookie: AGORAP_LOG=<username>; AGORAP_PASS=<bcrypt_hash> and submits it to any authenticated endpoint. The server treats the request as a valid session for the specified user. No multi-factor challenge, password re-entry, or token rotation intervenes. See the VulnCheck advisory for additional technical context.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-63158

Indicators of Compromise

  • HTTP requests to Agora Project endpoints containing AGORAP_LOG and AGORAP_PASS cookies originating from unexpected IP addresses or geographies.
  • Session establishment events for administrator accounts without a preceding POST to the login form.
  • AGORAP_PASS cookie values that match bcrypt hashes known to be present in prior database leaks.

Detection Strategies

  • Instrument the web application or reverse proxy to log cookie names and source IPs for every authenticated request, then alert on AGORAP_PASS usage.
  • Correlate successful logins against failed form-based authentication to flag sessions that bypass the standard login flow.
  • Review database access logs for recent SELECT statements that return the password hash column outside of normal authentication activity.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward web server, WAF, and application logs to a centralized analytics platform and build detections for the legacy cookie names.
  • Monitor for privilege-sensitive actions (user creation, role changes, data export) performed by accounts that have not completed an interactive login.
  • Track anomalous session durations and IP changes for administrator accounts.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-63158

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Agora Project to version 26.10.0 or later using the official 26.10 release.
  • Invalidate all existing sessions and force password resets for every account, especially administrators.
  • Rotate the bcrypt hashes by requiring users to set new passwords, rendering any previously leaked hashes unusable.
  • Audit database access and backup locations for signs of hash exfiltration.

Patch Information

The maintainers addressed the vulnerability in Agora Project release 26.10. The fix removes the legacy AGORAP_LOG/AGORAP_PASS cookie authentication path so that stored hashes are no longer accepted as bearer credentials. Deployment details are available on the Agora Project website and the GitHub release page.

Workarounds

  • Block requests containing the AGORAP_PASS cookie at the reverse proxy or WAF until the upgrade is applied.
  • Restrict access to the Agora Project portal to trusted networks or VPN clients while remediation is in progress.
  • Enforce strict database access controls and encryption at rest to reduce the likelihood of hash exposure.
bash
# Example nginx rule to strip the vulnerable legacy cookies at the edge
map $http_cookie $sanitized_cookie {
    default $http_cookie;
    ~*AGORAP_PASS "";
}

server {
    listen 443 ssl;
    server_name agora.example.com;

    location / {
        proxy_set_header Cookie $sanitized_cookie;
        proxy_pass http://agora_backend;
    }
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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