CVE-2026-62435 Overview
CVE-2026-62435 is a race condition [CWE-362] in the Xen hypervisor's grant table implementation. The flaw affects the code path that switches grant table version 1 (v1) to version 2 (v2). Switching from v1 to v2 reduces the number of valid grant references because the shared entry structure grows while the shared table itself does not change size. Code that drops and re-acquires the grant table lock incorrectly assumes these size properties remain stable across the unlocked window.
Critical Impact
A malicious guest can trigger inconsistent grant table state, resulting in information disclosure and potential denial of service against the hypervisor host.
Affected Products
- Xen Project hypervisor with Grant Table v2 support
- Systems that permit guest-initiated grant table version switching
- Virtualization hosts running affected Xen releases (see Xen Project advisory XSA-501)
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-07-28 - CVE-2026-62435 published to NVD
- 2026-07-28 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-62435
Vulnerability Analysis
The Xen grant table subsystem allows guests to share memory pages with other guests or the hypervisor. Grant Table v2 introduced a richer shared entry structure and separate status frames. Because v2 entries are larger than v1 entries, the number of grants that fit in the fixed-size shared table drops when switching v1 to v2.
The vulnerable code holds the grant table lock, then intermediately drops and re-acquires it. During that unlocked window, another CPU can complete a version switch. When the original code path resumes, it operates on stale assumptions about the number of valid grant references. This can lead to out-of-bounds access or inconsistent lookups against grant metadata.
Root Cause
The root cause is a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) flaw in grant table lock management. The affected functions cache invariants derived from the current grant table version, release the lock for a subordinate operation, and then reuse those cached invariants without re-validating them. Xen Security Advisory 501 documents that the v1 to v2 path corresponds to CVE-2026-62435 while the v2 to v1 path is tracked as CVE-2026-62436.
Attack Vector
A guest with permission to manage its own grant table can invoke the GNTTABOP_set_version hypercall concurrently with other grant table operations. By racing version switches against grant reference lookups, the guest forces the hypervisor to reference grant slots that no longer exist under the new version layout. Refer to the Xen Project Security Advisory 501 for the authoritative technical description.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-62435
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected Xen hypervisor log entries referencing grant table version transitions or grant reference errors
- Guest VMs issuing repeated GNTTABOP_set_version hypercalls in rapid succession
- Hypervisor crashes or BUG_ON traces originating in common/grant_table.c
Detection Strategies
- Audit hypervisor logs (xl dmesg) for anomalous grant table warnings or assertion failures
- Monitor guest hypercall frequency for outliers in grant table version-switch operations
- Correlate guest-triggered hypervisor faults with grant table subsystem stack traces
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward Xen hypervisor logs to a centralized logging pipeline for longitudinal analysis
- Baseline normal grant table operation counts per guest and alert on statistical deviation
- Track host uptime and unexpected reboots that may indicate hypervisor-level denial of service
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-62435
Immediate Actions Required
- Apply the patches referenced in Xen Security Advisory XSA-501 as soon as they are available for your distribution
- Inventory hypervisor hosts running Xen and confirm grant table v2 support is enabled before assessing exposure
- Restrict untrusted guest workloads on hosts that cannot be patched immediately
Patch Information
Xen Project has published fixes through Xen Security Advisory 501. Consult the Xen Project Security Advisory 501 for the patch series, affected version ranges, and vendor-specific backports from downstream distributions such as Debian, SUSE, and Citrix Hypervisor.
Workarounds
- Configure guests to use grant table v1 exclusively where operationally feasible
- Limit which guests are trusted to run on shared hosts until patches are deployed
- Isolate multi-tenant workloads on separate physical hosts to reduce cross-guest race exposure
# Verify Xen version and grant table configuration on the host
xl info | grep -E "xen_version|xen_commandline"
# Review hypervisor log for grant table anomalies
xl dmesg | grep -i "grant"
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

