Skip to main content
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-59357

CVE-2026-59357: Cloud Foundry UAA Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-59357 is an authentication bypass flaw in Cloud Foundry UAA versions 4.5.0 to 79.6.0 that allows attackers to establish unauthorized sessions via OIDC token manipulation. This post covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-59357 Overview

CVE-2026-59357 affects Cloud Foundry User Account and Authentication (UAA) versions v4.5.0 through v79.6.0. The flaw is an insufficient verification of data authenticity issue [CWE-345] in the external OpenID Connect (OIDC) login callback. When a UAA zone is configured with a self-referential OIDC identity provider, the callback accepts a supplied id_token parameter directly instead of requiring the OAuth authorization-code exchange. An authenticated UAA user can submit a valid UAA access token or a cross-client ID token as the id_token parameter and establish a browser session mapped to a local shadow account.

Critical Impact

Authenticated users can bypass the OAuth authorization-code exchange and obtain sessions tied to shadow accounts whose group memberships may include administrative scopes such as clients.write.

Affected Products

  • Cloud Foundry UAA v4.5.0 through v79.6.0 (inclusive)
  • UAA zones configured with a self-referential OIDC identity provider
  • Deployments where shadow accounts hold administrative scopes

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-06 - CVE-2026-59357 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-10-06 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-59357

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw lives in the external OIDC login callback path of Cloud Foundry UAA. The callback is designed to receive an authorization code from a remote OIDC provider and exchange it for tokens at the provider's token endpoint. In a self-UAA configuration — where the configured OIDC issuer exactly matches the zone's own /oauth/token endpoint — the callback instead accepts an id_token passed directly as a parameter. UAA then treats that token as a valid assertion of identity without binding it to the self-OIDC relying-party client. The resulting browser session inherits the privileges of the mapped shadow account, which may carry administrative scopes.

Root Cause

UAA fails to verify that the supplied id_token was issued as an ID token for the specific self-OIDC relying-party client. The audience (aud) and user_id claims are not validated against the originating token's intended consumer. Any valid UAA JWT — including a plain access token with only uaa.user scope, or an ID token minted for an unrelated client such as cf — is accepted.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires three preconditions: a valid UAA user JWT, a valid browser login state for the target zone, and a self-referential OIDC provider configuration. The attacker initiates the external OIDC login flow and submits a token they already possess as the callback's id_token parameter. UAA establishes a session tied to the shadow account mapped from the token's claims. The attacker then operates with the scopes assigned to that shadow account.

No verified exploit code is available. Refer to the Cloud Foundry Blog on CVE-2026-59357 for additional technical context.

Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails

Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.

Stop Identity Attacks

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-59357

Indicators of Compromise

  • Successful external OIDC callback requests that include an id_token parameter but no corresponding authorization code parameter.
  • UAA audit events showing session establishment through a self-referential OIDC provider whose issuer matches the zone's own /oauth/token endpoint.
  • Shadow account logins where the originating token's aud claim does not match the self-OIDC relying-party client ID.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect UAA access logs for callback hits to the external OIDC endpoint that bypass the standard code-exchange sequence.
  • Correlate issued session cookies with the client ID of the original token to identify audience mismatches.
  • Review identity provider configurations across all UAA zones to flag any provider whose issuer resolves to the zone's own token endpoint.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose audit logging on UAA login and token endpoints and forward events to a centralized analytics platform.
  • Alert on new or modified OIDC identity provider configurations within production UAA zones.
  • Monitor shadow account group membership changes, particularly additions of scopes such as clients.write, scim.write, or uaa.admin.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-59357

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Cloud Foundry UAA to a version newer than v79.6.0 that contains the fix for CVE-2026-59357.
  • Audit all UAA zones for OIDC identity providers whose issuer matches the zone's own /oauth/token endpoint and remove or reconfigure them.
  • Review shadow accounts mapped from self-UAA OIDC providers and revoke unnecessary administrative scopes.

Patch Information

Cloud Foundry has published remediation guidance in the Cloud Foundry Blog on CVE-2026-59357. Operators should upgrade UAA to a release that enforces authorization-code exchange and validates the aud claim against the self-OIDC relying-party client.

Workarounds

  • Remove self-referential OIDC identity provider configurations until the UAA upgrade is applied.
  • Restrict shadow account group memberships to the minimum scopes required for business functionality.
  • Rotate UAA signing keys and invalidate existing sessions after remediation to evict any pre-existing abusive sessions.
bash
# Review UAA identity providers for self-referential OIDC configurations
uaac curl /identity-providers?rawConfig=true | \
  jq '.[] | select(.type=="oidc1.0") | {origin, issuer: .config.issuer, tokenUrl: .config.tokenUrl}'

# Example: remove a problematic identity provider by origin key
uaac curl -X DELETE /identity-providers/<provider-id>

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

Experience the Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

See how the world’s most intelligent, autonomous cybersecurity platform can protect your organization today and into the future.