CVE-2026-58468: NocoBase SSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-58468 Overview

CVE-2026-58468 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability [CWE-918] in NocoBase through version 2.1.20. The flaw resides in the serverRequest wrapper used by workflow request nodes, custom request action buttons, and the AI plugin. Authenticated administrators can supply malicious URLs that cause the NocoBase server to issue arbitrary outbound HTTP requests. Attackers can target loopback addresses, RFC-1918 private ranges, and cloud instance metadata endpoints to perform internal reconnaissance and steal IAM role credentials.

Critical Impact
Attackers with administrator privileges can pivot into internal networks and extract cloud instance metadata credentials, enabling privilege escalation into the underlying cloud environment.

Affected Products

NocoBase versions through 2.1.20
NocoBase workflow request nodes and custom request action buttons
NocoBase AI plugin using the serverRequest wrapper

Discovery Timeline

2026-07-07 - CVE-2026-58468 published to NVD
2026-07-08 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-58468

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability exists in packages/core/utils/src/server-request.ts, which centralizes outbound HTTP requests issued by NocoBase server-side features. Multiple components including workflow automation nodes, custom action buttons, and the AI plugin route requests through this wrapper. The wrapper did not restrict destination hosts, allowing arbitrary URLs to be resolved and fetched by the server.

Authenticated administrators can supply URLs pointing to internal hosts. The server then executes those requests from its own network position, bypassing perimeter controls. This behavior enables port scanning, service fingerprinting, and interaction with cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254.

Root Cause

The serverRequest helper lacked host validation and DNS resolution checks before dispatching HTTP requests. Without an allowlist enforced through SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELIST, the function accepted any hostname that resolved to loopback, private, link-local, or unique-local address ranges. It also accepted well-known metadata hostnames such as localhost and metadata.google.internal.

Attack Vector

An authenticated administrator configures a workflow request node, custom request action, or AI plugin endpoint that points at an internal target. Common targets include the AWS Instance Metadata Service at http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/, GCP metadata at http://metadata.google.internal/, and internal service ports on 127.0.0.1 or RFC-1918 hosts. The server issues the request and returns response data through the workflow output.

typescript

// Security patch in packages/core/utils/src/server-request.ts
import ipaddr from 'ipaddr.js';
import axios, { AxiosRequestConfig, AxiosResponse } from 'axios';
import type { LookupAddress } from 'dns';
import { lookup } from 'dns/promises';

const ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS = new Set(['http:', 'https:']);
const SSRF_RISK_IP_RANGES = new Set(['loopback', 'private', 'linkLocal', 'uniqueLocal', 'unspecified']);
const SSRF_RISK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost', 'metadata.google.internal']);
const DNS_LOOKUP_WARNING_TIMEOUT = 1000;
const warnedSsrfRiskTargets = new Set<string>();

// Match a hostname (already confirmed to be a valid IP address) against a
// set of SSRF-risk categories using ipaddr.js range classification.

Source: NocoBase commit 5706fb4

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-58468

Indicators of Compromise

Outbound HTTP requests from the NocoBase server process to 169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal, or 100.100.100.200.
Server-originated connections to loopback (127.0.0.0/8) or RFC-1918 ranges outside expected integrations.
Workflow execution logs containing request nodes with URLs targeting internal hosts or link-local addresses.
Unusual AI plugin activity referencing non-public endpoints.

Detection Strategies

Inspect NocoBase workflow definitions and custom request actions for URLs referencing internal, loopback, or metadata addresses.
Correlate NocoBase process network telemetry against an allowlist of expected external API endpoints.
Alert on any DNS resolution from the NocoBase host that returns a private or link-local IP address.
Review audit logs for administrator accounts creating or modifying request nodes and AI plugin configurations.

Monitoring Recommendations

Enable and enforce the SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELIST environment variable and monitor startup warnings when it is absent.
Forward NocoBase application and network logs to a centralized SIEM for outbound request analysis.
Deploy egress filtering at the host or network boundary to block traffic to cloud metadata endpoints from the NocoBase server.
Track administrator account activity for anomalous workflow or plugin configuration changes.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-58468

Immediate Actions Required

Upgrade NocoBase to a release beyond 2.1.20 that includes the serverRequest SSRF hardening from pull request #9966.
Configure SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELIST with an explicit list of allowed outbound destinations for workflows and plugins.
Audit existing workflow request nodes, custom action buttons, and AI plugin endpoints for internal or metadata URLs.
Restrict NocoBase administrator accounts to trusted personnel and enforce multi-factor authentication.

Patch Information

The fix landed in commit 5706fb48d9bbe190f9e0044c6d5c87fc5b68c7f1 via pull request #9966. Version 2.1.18 added a warning when SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELIST is not configured. Refer to the VulnCheck Security Advisory and GitHub issue #9962 for additional context.

Workarounds

Block outbound traffic from the NocoBase server to 169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal, and other cloud metadata endpoints using host or network firewall rules.
Deny egress from the NocoBase host to RFC-1918 ranges except for explicitly required integrations.
Use IMDSv2 with hop-limit 1 on AWS instances to prevent metadata credential theft from application-level SSRF.
Place NocoBase behind an outbound proxy that enforces destination allowlisting.

bash

# Configuration example: enforce outbound allowlist for NocoBase
export SERVER_REQUEST_WHITELIST="api.partner.com,hooks.example.net"

# AWS: enforce IMDSv2 with hop-limit to mitigate metadata exposure
aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options \
  --instance-id i-0123456789abcdef0 \
  --http-tokens required \
  --http-put-response-hop-limit 1 \
  --http-endpoint enabled