Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-57183 Overview
CVE-2026-57183 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Scoold, a Q&A and knowledge-sharing platform for teams. Versions prior to 1.69.1 allow an attacker holding either app_secret_key or para_secret_key to forge a JSON Web Token (JWT) that is accepted by /api/config and /api/stats without a registered API-key jti claim. The forged request is mapped to the hardcoded administrative API_USER, granting access to sensitive configuration data and server logs. These endpoint checks execute even when scoold.api_enabled is set to false. The weakness is classified under [CWE-287: Improper Authentication].
Critical Impact
An attacker who obtains either signing secret can read sensitive configuration, access server logs, and reach privileged configuration functionality, even when the API is disabled.
Affected Products
- Scoold versions prior to 1.69.1
- Scoold /api/config endpoint
- Scoold /api/stats endpoint
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-15 - CVE-2026-57183 published to NVD
- 2026-10-15 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-57183
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw resides in checkApiAuth() within src/main/java/com/erudika/scoold/utils/ScooldUtils.java. The method contains special-case branches for /api/stats and /api/config that call isValidJWToken() against JWTs signed with app_secret_key or para_secret_key. Unlike regular API tokens, these branches do not require a registered API-key jti claim and bypass the standard token validation path. On a successful signature verification, the request is unconditionally mapped to API_USER, the hardcoded administrative principal.
Two compounding issues amplify the risk. First, the special-case branches run before the isApiEnabled() check, so disabling the API through scoold.api_enabled=false does not block exploitation. Second, a standard login-session cookie cannot reach these code paths, so the vulnerability specifically rewards possession of a signing secret rather than a valid user session.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper authentication logic that treats signature validity as sufficient proof of administrative authority. The handler should have required a registered jti, verified that API access is enabled, and gated configuration endpoints on configEditingEnabled() before granting API_USER privileges.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires network access to the Scoold instance and prior knowledge of either app_secret_key or para_secret_key. An attacker crafts a JWT signed with the leaked secret and sends it in the Authorization: Bearer <token> header to /api/config or /api/stats. The server authenticates the request as API_USER and returns configuration data or server statistics, including log excerpts.
// Patch excerpt from ScooldUtils.java (commit de018c17)
String apiKeyJWT = Strings.CS.removeStart(req.getHeader(HttpHeaders.AUTHORIZATION), "Bearer ");
if (req.getServletPath().equals("/api/ping")) {
return API_USER;
-} else if (req.getServletPath().equals("/api/stats") && isValidJWToken(apiKeyJWT)) {
- return API_USER;
-} else if (req.getServletPath().startsWith("/api/config") && isValidJWToken(apiKeyJWT)) {
- return API_USER;
-} else if (!isApiEnabled() || StringUtils.isBlank(apiKeyJWT)) {
+} else if (!isApiEnabled() || StringUtils.isBlank(apiKeyJWT) ||
+ (req.getServletPath().startsWith("/api/config") && !CONF.configEditingEnabled())) {
throw new UnauthorizedException();
}
return validateTokenOrThrow(apiKeyJWT);
Source: GitHub Commit de018c17
Detect Identity Attacks the Moment Authentication Fails
Singularity™ Identity surfaces credential misuse, lateral movement, and privilege escalation in real time, so you can contain the breach before it spreads.
Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-57183
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected HTTP GET or POST requests to /api/config or /api/stats with Authorization: Bearer headers from unknown source IPs.
- Successful API responses on these endpoints while scoold.api_enabled is set to false.
- Audit log entries attributing configuration reads or edits to API_USER without a corresponding registered API key jti.
Detection Strategies
- Inspect web server and reverse proxy logs for requests to /api/config* and /api/stats and correlate against the authorized API-key inventory.
- Monitor configuration-change events in Scoold for actions performed by API_USER outside of normal administrative workflows.
- Alert on JWT bearer tokens presented to /api/config or /api/stats when the jti is missing or not present in the registered key store.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Ingest Scoold application and access logs into a centralized logging pipeline for retroactive hunting of /api/config and /api/stats requests.
- Rotate app_secret_key and para_secret_key and monitor for authentication attempts using previously issued tokens.
- Track outbound data volumes from the Scoold host to detect bulk configuration or log exfiltration.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-57183
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Scoold to version 1.69.1 or later, which removes the special-case authentication branches for /api/config and /api/stats.
- Rotate both app_secret_key and para_secret_key if there is any suspicion of secret exposure.
- Review audit logs for prior access to /api/config and /api/stats and treat any unexplained access as a potential compromise.
Patch Information
The fix is released in Scoold v1.69.1. Commit de018c17 removes the unconditional API_USER mapping for the two endpoints and requires configEditingEnabled() for /api/config. Commit e527d4da refactors the token checks via isDeniedAccessToAPI() and limits short-lived service tokens signed with appSecretKey to /api/stats only. Full details are in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-6q9q-cqq5-hvmq.
Workarounds
- Block /api/config and /api/stats at an upstream reverse proxy or web application firewall until the upgrade is applied.
- Restrict network access to the Scoold management interface to trusted administrative networks only.
- Store app_secret_key and para_secret_key in a dedicated secret manager and limit access to the smallest possible set of operators.
# Example nginx configuration to block the vulnerable endpoints
location ~ ^/api/(config|stats) {
return 403;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

