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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-57183

CVE-2026-57183: Scoold Q&A Platform Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-57183 is an authentication bypass flaw in Scoold Q&A platform that allows attackers with signing secrets to forge administrative tokens and access privileged functions. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-57183 Overview

CVE-2026-57183 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Scoold, a Q&A and knowledge-sharing platform for teams. Versions prior to 1.69.1 allow an attacker holding either app_secret_key or para_secret_key to forge a JSON Web Token (JWT) that is accepted by /api/config and /api/stats without a registered API-key jti claim. The forged request is mapped to the hardcoded administrative API_USER, granting access to sensitive configuration data and server logs. These endpoint checks execute even when scoold.api_enabled is set to false. The weakness is classified under [CWE-287: Improper Authentication].

Critical Impact

An attacker who obtains either signing secret can read sensitive configuration, access server logs, and reach privileged configuration functionality, even when the API is disabled.

Affected Products

  • Scoold versions prior to 1.69.1
  • Scoold /api/config endpoint
  • Scoold /api/stats endpoint

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-15 - CVE-2026-57183 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-15 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-57183

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw resides in checkApiAuth() within src/main/java/com/erudika/scoold/utils/ScooldUtils.java. The method contains special-case branches for /api/stats and /api/config that call isValidJWToken() against JWTs signed with app_secret_key or para_secret_key. Unlike regular API tokens, these branches do not require a registered API-key jti claim and bypass the standard token validation path. On a successful signature verification, the request is unconditionally mapped to API_USER, the hardcoded administrative principal.

Two compounding issues amplify the risk. First, the special-case branches run before the isApiEnabled() check, so disabling the API through scoold.api_enabled=false does not block exploitation. Second, a standard login-session cookie cannot reach these code paths, so the vulnerability specifically rewards possession of a signing secret rather than a valid user session.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper authentication logic that treats signature validity as sufficient proof of administrative authority. The handler should have required a registered jti, verified that API access is enabled, and gated configuration endpoints on configEditingEnabled() before granting API_USER privileges.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the Scoold instance and prior knowledge of either app_secret_key or para_secret_key. An attacker crafts a JWT signed with the leaked secret and sends it in the Authorization: Bearer <token> header to /api/config or /api/stats. The server authenticates the request as API_USER and returns configuration data or server statistics, including log excerpts.

java
// Patch excerpt from ScooldUtils.java (commit de018c17)
 String apiKeyJWT = Strings.CS.removeStart(req.getHeader(HttpHeaders.AUTHORIZATION), "Bearer ");
 if (req.getServletPath().equals("/api/ping")) {
     return API_USER;
-} else if (req.getServletPath().equals("/api/stats") && isValidJWToken(apiKeyJWT)) {
-    return API_USER;
-} else if (req.getServletPath().startsWith("/api/config") && isValidJWToken(apiKeyJWT)) {
-    return API_USER;
-} else if (!isApiEnabled() || StringUtils.isBlank(apiKeyJWT)) {
+} else if (!isApiEnabled() || StringUtils.isBlank(apiKeyJWT) ||
+        (req.getServletPath().startsWith("/api/config") && !CONF.configEditingEnabled())) {
     throw new UnauthorizedException();
 }
 return validateTokenOrThrow(apiKeyJWT);

Source: GitHub Commit de018c17

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-57183

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected HTTP GET or POST requests to /api/config or /api/stats with Authorization: Bearer headers from unknown source IPs.
  • Successful API responses on these endpoints while scoold.api_enabled is set to false.
  • Audit log entries attributing configuration reads or edits to API_USER without a corresponding registered API key jti.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect web server and reverse proxy logs for requests to /api/config* and /api/stats and correlate against the authorized API-key inventory.
  • Monitor configuration-change events in Scoold for actions performed by API_USER outside of normal administrative workflows.
  • Alert on JWT bearer tokens presented to /api/config or /api/stats when the jti is missing or not present in the registered key store.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Ingest Scoold application and access logs into a centralized logging pipeline for retroactive hunting of /api/config and /api/stats requests.
  • Rotate app_secret_key and para_secret_key and monitor for authentication attempts using previously issued tokens.
  • Track outbound data volumes from the Scoold host to detect bulk configuration or log exfiltration.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-57183

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Scoold to version 1.69.1 or later, which removes the special-case authentication branches for /api/config and /api/stats.
  • Rotate both app_secret_key and para_secret_key if there is any suspicion of secret exposure.
  • Review audit logs for prior access to /api/config and /api/stats and treat any unexplained access as a potential compromise.

Patch Information

The fix is released in Scoold v1.69.1. Commit de018c17 removes the unconditional API_USER mapping for the two endpoints and requires configEditingEnabled() for /api/config. Commit e527d4da refactors the token checks via isDeniedAccessToAPI() and limits short-lived service tokens signed with appSecretKey to /api/stats only. Full details are in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-6q9q-cqq5-hvmq.

Workarounds

  • Block /api/config and /api/stats at an upstream reverse proxy or web application firewall until the upgrade is applied.
  • Restrict network access to the Scoold management interface to trusted administrative networks only.
  • Store app_secret_key and para_secret_key in a dedicated secret manager and limit access to the smallest possible set of operators.
bash
# Example nginx configuration to block the vulnerable endpoints
location ~ ^/api/(config|stats) {
    return 403;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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