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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-57175

CVE-2026-57175: Python Social Auth SAML Auth Bypass Flaw

CVE-2026-57175 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Python Social Auth SAML backend that allows attackers to hijack victim accounts through malicious identity linking. This article covers technical details, affected versions, and patches.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-57175 Overview

CVE-2026-57175 is an authentication vulnerability in Python Social Auth, a widely used social authentication and registration library. Versions prior to 5.0.0 of the social-core package fail to validate SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) responses against previously issued AuthnRequest identifiers. The SAML backend accepts unsolicited assertions at the Assertion Consumer Service (ACS) endpoint. An attacker holding a valid account on a trusted Identity Provider (IdP) can link their SAML identity to an authenticated victim's local account during account association flows. Successful exploitation grants the attacker persistent access to the victim's account via SAML login. The flaw is categorized as improper authentication [CWE-287].

Critical Impact

Attackers with valid IdP credentials can hijack victim accounts by binding their SAML identity to a logged-in user's session during account association.

Affected Products

  • Python Social Auth social-core prior to version 5.0.0
  • Applications using the SAML backend with authenticated account association
  • Downstream frameworks integrating social-core SAML flows

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-09-24 - CVE CVE-2026-57175 published to NVD
  • 2026-09-25 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-57175

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the SAML backend of social-core. SAML's Web Browser SSO Profile requires the Service Provider (SP) to issue an AuthnRequest with a unique ID, then validate that the subsequent SAML Response's InResponseTo attribute matches a stored request ID. Python Social Auth omits this binding check at the ACS endpoint. The backend processes any well-formed, signed assertion from a trusted IdP without correlating it to a request initiated by the application. This weakness enables an IdP-Initiated Response Replay against the account association workflow, where the victim is already authenticated locally and the application attaches an incoming SAML identity to the current session.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing validation of the InResponseTo field against stored AuthnRequest IDs. The SAML specification treats this check as mandatory for SP-initiated flows to prevent response injection. Without it, the backend cannot distinguish between a response generated for the current user and one captured or crafted by an attacker from their own IdP session.

Attack Vector

The attacker first authenticates to a trusted IdP using their own valid credentials and obtains a signed SAML assertion. The attacker then convinces an already-authenticated victim to visit a crafted URL that submits the attacker's SAML response to the application's ACS endpoint. Because the victim is logged in and the account association flow is active, the application links the attacker's SAML identity to the victim's local account. The attacker subsequently signs in through SAML and inherits the victim's privileges. Exploitation requires user interaction and a valid IdP account, which is reflected in the elevated attack complexity.

No verified public exploit code is available. See the GitHub Security Advisory for technical details.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-57175

Indicators of Compromise

  • SAML responses received at the ACS endpoint without a corresponding outbound AuthnRequest logged by the application.
  • Account association events where the newly linked SAML NameID differs from the IdP identifier historically used by the account owner.
  • Successful SAML logins immediately followed by profile, email, or MFA changes on recently associated accounts.

Detection Strategies

  • Audit application logs for social_auth_usersocialauth table inserts tied to the SAML provider and correlate with session identity.
  • Compare SAML Response InResponseTo values against any locally stored request IDs; absence of correlation is a strong signal.
  • Flag assertions whose IssueInstant predates any outbound AuthnRequest from the same session.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose logging of the SAML backend and ship events to a centralized SIEM for correlation.
  • Alert on multiple account association attempts from a single source IP targeting different user sessions.
  • Monitor IdP logs for assertions issued to the application's ACS URL that are not preceded by a matching AuthnRequest.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-57175

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade social-core to version 5.0.0 or later, which enforces validation of SAML responses against stored AuthnRequest IDs.
  • Audit existing SAML identity associations and revoke any that cannot be attributed to a legitimate user-initiated flow.
  • Force re-authentication for accounts that performed SAML association during the exposure window.

Patch Information

The maintainers fixed the issue in social-core version 5.0.0 by storing issued AuthnRequest IDs and validating incoming SAML responses against them. Refer to the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-vq6g-g6c7-5f2j for the complete patch and upgrade guidance.

Workarounds

  • Temporarily disable the authenticated account association feature in applications that cannot immediately upgrade.
  • Restrict the SAML backend to login-only flows and remove the ability to link additional SAML identities to existing accounts.
  • Require step-up authentication, such as password re-entry or MFA, before processing any SAML account association request.
bash
# Upgrade social-core to the patched release
pip install --upgrade 'social-auth-core>=5.0.0'

# Verify installed version
pip show social-auth-core | grep -i version

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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