Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-56388 Overview
Apache bRPC contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in its Redis server command parser. The parser accepts an empty RESP (REdis Serialization Protocol) array as a command header instead of rejecting it as malformed input. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach a bRPC server with Redis service enabled can send an empty array header followed by a bulk string. This triggers an out-of-bounds write in the parser and crashes the process. The flaw is reached during protocol parsing, before command handling or authentication occurs.
Critical Impact
Remote unauthenticated attackers can crash any bRPC process exposing the Redis service by sending a short malformed RESP message, resulting in denial of service.
Affected Products
- Apache bRPC versions prior to 1.18.0
- Deployments with ServerOptions.redis_service enabled
- bRPC servers accepting Redis protocol traffic from untrusted clients
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-56388 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-56388
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability lives in RedisCommandParser::ConsumeImpl, which handles RESP array headers inside the bRPC Redis protocol implementation. The parser rejected negative RESP array counts but did not reject a count of zero. When the parser received an empty array header, it resized the internal command argument vector _args to zero elements and continued parsing additional RESP tokens from the stream.
When a subsequent bulk string arrived, the parser attempted to store it at index zero of the now-empty vector. The only guard protecting this index access was a CHECK macro intended to abort the process on failure. In build configurations where fatal log statements do not immediately abort, execution continued past the failed check and wrote to _args[0], corrupting memory beyond the vector bounds. This condition maps to [CWE-252] Unchecked Return Value, as the parser does not properly validate the sanity check before performing the indexed write.
Root Cause
The root cause is incomplete input validation combined with an unreliable runtime assertion. The parser treated an empty RESP array as a syntactically acceptable command header. The downstream CHECK on the vector index was expected to abort execution if the array was empty, but this assumption does not hold across all build and logging configurations.
Attack Vector
An attacker needs only network reach to a bRPC server listening with the Redis protocol enabled. The attacker sends a RESP payload beginning with *0\r\n to declare an empty array, followed by a bulk string such as $3\r\nFOO\r\n. The parser accepts the empty array header, zero-sizes the argument vector, parses the bulk string, and performs the out-of-bounds write. No authentication, prior session state, or user interaction is required. See the Apache mailing list discussion for additional detail.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-56388
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected crashes or restarts of bRPC server processes exposing the Redis protocol port
- Core dumps referencing RedisCommandParser::ConsumeImpl or indexed writes into _args
- Inbound RESP traffic containing *0\r\n array headers followed by bulk string payloads
Detection Strategies
- Inspect packet captures or network telemetry for RESP messages beginning with an empty array header (*0\r\n) targeting bRPC Redis endpoints
- Monitor service supervisors and orchestration platforms for repeated restart events on bRPC processes
- Correlate process termination events with concurrent inbound TCP sessions to the Redis service port
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose protocol logging on bRPC Redis listeners during triage to capture malformed RESP commands
- Alert on crash loops or non-zero exit codes from bRPC services under process managers such as systemd or Kubernetes
- Track source addresses that establish connections to Redis-enabled bRPC servers and immediately disconnect after sending small payloads
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-56388
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Apache bRPC to version 1.18.0 or later, which rejects empty RESP arrays and replaces the internal CHECK with an explicit parse error
- Identify all deployments that set ServerOptions.redis_service and inventory their network exposure
- Restrict network access to bRPC Redis listeners so that only trusted clients can reach the service
Patch Information
The fix is included in Apache bRPC 1.18.0. The upstream change is tracked in apache/brpc pull request 3354. The patch rejects empty RESP arrays as invalid Redis commands and replaces the internal index CHECK with an explicit parse error, so malformed command streams cannot fall through to an indexed vector write.
Workarounds
- Disable ServerOptions.redis_service on bRPC servers that do not require Redis protocol support
- Place bRPC Redis endpoints behind a network allowlist or private VPC segment, blocking untrusted sources
- Terminate Redis traffic at an upstream proxy that validates RESP framing and rejects empty array headers before forwarding
# Verify installed Apache bRPC version and confirm 1.18.0 or later
grep -R "BRPC_VERSION" /path/to/brpc/include/butil/
# Example iptables rule to restrict access to the Redis service port
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -s 10.0.0.0/8 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -j DROP
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

