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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-55875

CVE-2026-55875: Helium Student Planner SSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-55875 is a server-side request forgery flaw in Helium student planner that enables authenticated users to force requests to internal services. This article covers technical details, affected versions, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-55875 Overview

CVE-2026-55875 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Helium, a free online student planner for classes, homework, grades, and notes. Authenticated users can submit arbitrary URLs to the POST /feed/externalcalendars/ endpoint. The application validates only URL syntax before passing the value to urllib.request.urlopen, allowing the server to issue outbound requests to attacker-chosen external or internal hosts. The flaw is tracked as [CWE-918] and is fixed in version 2.2.60.

Critical Impact

Authenticated attackers can force the Helium server to issue outbound HTTP requests to internal services and infer host and port reachability from distinct response patterns, enabling internal network reconnaissance.

Affected Products

  • Helium platform (HeliumEdu/platform) versions prior to 2.2.60
  • helium/feed/services/icalexternalcalendarservice.py component
  • fetch_ical_conditional periodic refetch routine

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-15 - CVE CVE-2026-55875 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-16 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-55875

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the external calendar subscription feature. When an authenticated user posts a URL to /feed/externalcalendars/, the validate_url helper checks only URL syntax. The service then calls urllib.request.urlopen on the supplied value and persists it for periodic refetching by fetch_ical_conditional.

Because no destination filtering is applied, the server fetches arbitrary hosts on behalf of the attacker. Different response conditions, including an uncaught http.client.RemoteDisconnected exception raised when the target speaks a non-HTTP protocol, let the attacker distinguish open ports and reachable internal services from closed or filtered ones.

The advisory notes that the Elastic Container Service (ECS) credentials path is task-specific and unpredictable, so direct secret retrieval is not demonstrated. The confirmed impact is forced outbound requests and internal service reconnaissance.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing destination validation. validate_url performs only syntactic checks and does not resolve the hostname or reject private, loopback, link-local, reserved, or multicast addresses before the request is issued.

Attack Vector

An authenticated attacker submits a crafted URL pointing at an internal address or non-HTTP service. The server fetches the URL immediately and again on each refetch cycle, returning observable differences in error behavior that reveal host and port state.

python
# Patch excerpt from helium/common/utils/httputils.py (version 2.2.60)
import http.client
import ipaddress
import logging
import socket
import urllib.request
from typing import Union
from urllib.error import URLError
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from urllib.request import Request

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10


def _check_ssrf(url: Union[str, Request]) -> None:
    """
    Resolve the hostname in ``url`` and raise :class:`URLError` if any resolved
    address is private, loopback, link-local, reserved, or multicast.
    """
    raw_url = url.full_url if isinstance(url, Request) else url
    hostname = urlparse(raw_url).hostname

    if not hostname:
        raise URLError("Invalid URL: missing hostname")

Source: GitHub Commit f0de5c9

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-55875

Indicators of Compromise

  • POST /feed/externalcalendars/ requests from authenticated accounts containing URLs that resolve to private, loopback, link-local, or metadata addresses such as 127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.0/8, 169.254.169.254, or ::1.
  • Outbound connections from the Helium application host to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or non-HTTP ports (for example 22, 3306, 6379).
  • Repeated http.client.RemoteDisconnected or URLError entries in application logs tied to external calendar fetches.

Detection Strategies

  • Review access logs for calendar submission requests with hostnames that resolve inside the server's own network boundary.
  • Correlate fetch_ical_conditional scheduler activity with egress firewall logs to identify requests crossing into internal subnets.
  • Baseline normal external calendar destinations and alert on new, high-cardinality, or RFC1918 targets.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable egress filtering on the Helium host and log every denied outbound connection for review.
  • Capture and retain application-level stack traces for calendar fetch failures to detect reconnaissance patterns.
  • Monitor the external calendar submission endpoint for abuse by low-privilege or newly created accounts.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-55875

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade the Helium platform to version 2.2.60 or later, which introduces the _check_ssrf host validation routine.
  • Audit existing records in the external calendars store and remove entries whose URLs resolve to internal, loopback, or metadata addresses.
  • Rotate any credentials that may have been exposed to the Helium application host while the vulnerable version was running.

Patch Information

The fix is delivered in release 2.2.60 of HeliumEdu/platform. The patch adds helium/common/utils/httputils.py, which resolves the hostname and raises URLError if the address is private, loopback, link-local, reserved, or multicast. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-2f83-94pv-v3f5 and the GitHub Commit f0de5c9 for full details.

Workarounds

  • Restrict outbound network access from the Helium application host to only the domains required for legitimate calendar providers.
  • Disable the external calendar subscription feature until the upgrade can be applied if egress controls are not available.
  • Place the application behind an egress proxy that rejects requests to RFC1918, link-local, and cloud metadata addresses.
bash
# Example egress restriction using iptables to block cloud metadata and private ranges
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 169.254.169.254 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 172.16.0.0/12 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 192.168.0.0/16 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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