CVE-2026-50214: /v1/Plan Service Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-50214 Overview

CVE-2026-50214 is a critical authentication weakness affecting the /v1/Plan service, which manages network access plans. The service relies on a single shared global API token for all administrative operations. Any party in possession of this token can invoke administrative endpoints without per-user authentication or authorization checks. Attackers leveraging the shared credential can arbitrarily create zero-cost network access plans, bypassing commercial controls and provisioning unauthorized access. The flaw is classified under [CWE-345] (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) and is exploitable over the network without user interaction.

Critical Impact
Remote, unauthenticated attackers can create zero-cost network access plans by reusing a shared global API token, undermining the integrity of the plan service.

Affected Products

/v1/Plan service endpoint (Acer-related network access plan service per vendor advisory)
Administrative API consumers relying on the shared global token
Downstream billing and provisioning systems consuming plan records

Discovery Timeline

2026-06-04 - CVE-2026-50214 published to the National Vulnerability Database
2026-06-04 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-50214

Vulnerability Analysis

The /v1/Plan service exposes administrative operations such as plan creation, modification, and listing behind a single static API token. The token is shared across all administrative callers and is not bound to a user identity, scope, or tenant. Any caller presenting the token receives full administrative privileges over the plan catalog.

The vulnerability falls under [CWE-345] because the service treats possession of the shared secret as proof of authority. It performs no additional verification of the request originator or the integrity of the requested operation. An attacker who recovers the token, whether through log exposure, client reverse engineering, or insider leakage, gains complete administrative control over network access plan provisioning.

Root Cause

The root cause is a design decision to authenticate administrative requests with a global bearer token rather than per-principal credentials. The service lacks role-based access control, request signing, and audit binding to a specific identity. Without these controls, the API cannot distinguish between legitimate administrators and an attacker replaying the token.

Attack Vector

The attack vector is network-based and requires no user interaction. An attacker submits HTTP requests to the /v1/Plan endpoint with the shared token in the authorization header. The attacker can then create zero-cost plans, granting free network access to arbitrary subscribers. The vulnerability affects confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the plan service. Refer to the Acer Community Article for vendor-supplied technical context.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-50214

Indicators of Compromise

Unexpected POST requests to /v1/Plan endpoints originating from unfamiliar source addresses or geographies.
Plan records with zero-cost pricing fields created outside documented administrative workflows.
Reuse of the global API token from multiple distinct client identifiers in rapid succession.

Detection Strategies

Correlate API gateway logs with billing system records to surface plan creations that lack a corresponding business justification.
Alert on bursts of administrative API calls from non-allowlisted source addresses.
Track token usage entropy: a static token used from many geographies in a short window is a strong abuse signal.

Monitoring Recommendations

Forward API gateway, authentication proxy, and plan service logs to a centralized analytics platform for retention and review.
Build dashboards that track plan creation rate, cost distribution, and originating source addresses.
Enable anomaly detection on administrative endpoint traffic and review alerts daily until the shared token is retired.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-50214

Immediate Actions Required

Rotate the shared global API token and restrict its distribution to a minimal set of operators.
Restrict network access to /v1/Plan administrative endpoints using allowlists or private network segmentation.
Audit all plans created since the token was issued and revoke any unauthorized zero-cost entries.

Patch Information

Consult the Acer Community Article for vendor remediation status. Replace the shared global token with per-principal credentials, enforce role-based access control on the /v1/Plan service, and require request signing or short-lived OAuth tokens for administrative operations.

Workarounds

Place the /v1/Plan service behind an authenticating reverse proxy that enforces per-user identity and mutual TLS.
Disable administrative endpoints when not actively in use and re-enable them only during change windows.
Implement server-side policy that rejects plan records with a zero-cost field unless approved through an out-of-band workflow.

bash

# Configuration example: restrict /v1/Plan to internal management network
# (illustrative reverse proxy snippet)
location /v1/Plan {
    allow 10.0.0.0/24;       # management subnet
    deny  all;
    proxy_set_header X-Client-Cert $ssl_client_s_dn;
    proxy_pass https://plan-backend.internal;
}