CVE-2026-50207 Overview
CVE-2026-50207 is a high-severity local vulnerability where the system Binder boundary accepts unverified pass-through AT commands. Local applications can issue arbitrary AT commands to the baseband, allowing them to read baseband files or disable cellular connectivity. The flaw stems from missing input validation and improper path handling at the inter-process communication (IPC) boundary, classified as [CWE-22] Path Traversal. Exploitation requires only local access and low privileges, with no user interaction.
Critical Impact
A low-privileged local application can read sensitive baseband files and disable cellular connectivity, undermining device confidentiality, integrity, and availability of mobile communications.
Affected Products
- Mobile devices exposing AT command pass-through via the system Binder interface
- Baseband modem subsystems reachable through the affected Binder service
- Downstream OEM builds that inherit the unverified pass-through path
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-06-04 - CVE-2026-50207 published to NVD
- 2026-06-04 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-50207
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides at the system Binder boundary that brokers AT command requests between userspace applications and the baseband processor. The boundary forwards caller-supplied AT command strings to the modem without verifying the command set, target file paths, or required privileges. A local application can therefore issue commands that traverse paths into baseband storage or that toggle radio state. Because the Binder service exposes this functionality to standard application contexts, an attacker does not need root or signature-level access. The result is unauthorized file disclosure from the baseband and a usable denial-of-service primitive against cellular connectivity.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing allow-list validation and path canonicalization on AT command payloads received over Binder. [CWE-22] applies because file-targeting AT commands accept relative or traversal sequences that escape the intended baseband resource scope.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is local. A malicious or compromised application installed on the device opens the Binder interface, crafts AT command strings, and submits them through the pass-through API. The baseband processes the commands as if they originated from a trusted source. No additional authentication, prompt, or user interaction is required.
No verified proof-of-concept code is publicly available. Refer to the Acer Community Knowledge Base Article for vendor context.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-50207
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected loss of cellular signal or radio state changes correlated with third-party application activity
- Application processes invoking the AT command Binder interface outside of telephony stack components
- Read accesses to baseband file paths originating from non-system UIDs
Detection Strategies
- Audit Binder transactions to the telephony or RIL service for callers that are not part of the platform telephony stack
- Inspect installed applications for permissions or API usage targeting AT command interfaces
- Correlate cellular state transitions (radio off, SIM reset) with foreground or background application events
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable telephony subsystem logging and retain modem state change events for forensic review
- Monitor for repeated AT command submissions from a single application UID within short time windows
- Alert on file read operations targeting baseband storage paths from non-privileged contexts
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-50207
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict installation of untrusted applications on affected devices until a vendor patch is applied
- Remove or disable applications that request access to telephony or AT command interfaces without a clear business need
- Apply OEM and carrier security updates as soon as they are published for the affected platform
Patch Information
No specific patch identifier is listed in the published advisory. Consult the Acer Community Knowledge Base Article and your device OEM for firmware updates that enforce validation on AT command pass-through at the Binder boundary.
Workarounds
- Enforce application allow-listing through mobile device management (MDM) to block untrusted installs
- Disable the AT command pass-through Binder service on managed devices where vendor configuration permits
- Limit physical and logical access to the device, since the attack vector is local
# Configuration example: MDM policy snippet to block untrusted sources
adb shell settings put global install_non_market_apps 0
adb shell pm disable-user --user 0 <package.providing.at.passthrough>
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

