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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-48787

CVE-2026-48787: gin-vue-admin RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2026-48787 is a remote code execution flaw in gin-vue-admin that allows authenticated attackers to inject malicious code through the code-generation feature. This article covers technical details, affected systems, and workarounds.

Published:

CVE-2026-48787 Overview

CVE-2026-48787 is a command injection vulnerability [CWE-78] affecting gin-vue-admin version 2.9.1, an AI-assisted basic development platform. An authenticated attacker with access to the code-generation feature and the Model Context Protocol (MCP) management interface can inject attacker-controlled Go source code through POST /autoCode/addFunc. The attacker then invokes POST /autoCode/mcpStart to trigger a rebuild and restart of the standalone MCP service, executing arbitrary operating system commands with the privileges of the application process.

Critical Impact

Successful exploitation leads to remote code execution, source code modification, persistent backdoor deployment, and unauthorized access to application data running under the same service account.

Affected Products

  • gin-vue-admin version 2.9.1
  • Deployments retaining the source tree with write access to source files
  • Installations supporting local build or startup of standalone MCP components

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-06-19 - CVE-2026-48787 published to NVD
  • 2026-06-23 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-48787

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the automatic code-generation workflow of gin-vue-admin. The platform exposes endpoints that accept developer-supplied identifiers and route names, then writes them directly into Go source files used to build standalone MCP services. Because input fields such as humpPackageName, packageName, FuncName, and Router are not validated against a strict allowlist, an authenticated attacker can inject Go syntax that escapes the intended template context.

When the attacker subsequently calls POST /autoCode/mcpStart, the application rebuilds and restarts the MCP binary using the poisoned source tree. The injected code executes within the rebuilt service, inheriting the privileges of the application process. This grants the attacker arbitrary command execution on the host.

Root Cause

The root cause is insufficient input validation on path- and identifier-related fields submitted through the code-generation API. User-controlled values flow into source-file generation without sanitization, allowing attacker-supplied Go code to be persisted and later compiled into the MCP binary.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access and authenticated privileges on the gin-vue-admin instance with permission to use the code-generation feature and MCP management interface. The attacker submits crafted payloads through POST /autoCode/addFunc containing malicious identifiers or code fragments. A follow-up call to POST /autoCode/mcpStart triggers compilation and restart, completing the chain. The exploitability is reduced in binary-only releases, on read-only filesystems, or where local build capabilities are removed. See the GitHub Security Advisory for additional technical context.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-48787

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected POST /autoCode/addFunc requests containing non-identifier characters in humpPackageName, packageName, FuncName, or Router fields.
  • POST /autoCode/mcpStart invocations following modifications to MCP-related source files.
  • Unauthorized changes to Go source files under the gin-vue-admin source tree or new binaries in MCP build output directories.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect web access logs for sequential calls to /autoCode/addFunc followed by /autoCode/mcpStart from the same authenticated session.
  • Monitor file integrity on the application source tree, particularly auto-generated Go files and MCP service modules.
  • Alert on child processes spawned by the gin-vue-admin process that deviate from expected Go build toolchain activity.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward authentication and API audit logs to a centralized SIEM for correlation across code-generation and MCP lifecycle events.
  • Track outbound network connections from the MCP service binary for indicators of reverse shells or command-and-control traffic.
  • Establish behavioral baselines for the gin-vue-admin service account and alert on deviations such as shell invocations or unusual file writes.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-48787

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict access to the code-generation and MCP management interfaces to trusted administrative users only.
  • Disable the online code-generation capability and MCP-hosted startup workflow in production deployments where they are not required.
  • Audit existing source trees and MCP binaries for unauthorized modifications and rebuild from a known-good baseline if tampering is suspected.

Patch Information

As of publication, it is unknown whether a patched version is available. Monitor the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-22cv-9jv2-6m62 for updates from the gin-vue-admin maintainers.

Workarounds

  • Enforce strict allowlist validation on path- and identifier-related fields such as humpPackageName, packageName, FuncName, and Router, permitting only safe identifier formats.
  • Deploy binary-only releases on read-only filesystems and remove the local Go build toolchain from production hosts.
  • Run the gin-vue-admin process under a dedicated, least-privileged service account isolated from sensitive resources.
  • Place the application behind a reverse proxy that blocks or rate-limits requests to /autoCode/addFunc and /autoCode/mcpStart from non-administrative networks.
bash
# Example reverse proxy rule restricting MCP endpoints to an admin network
location ~ ^/autoCode/(addFunc|mcpStart) {
    allow 10.0.0.0/24;   # admin subnet
    deny  all;
    proxy_pass http://gin_vue_admin_upstream;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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