CVE-2026-44761: SAP Commerce Cloud Auth Bypass Flaw

CVE-2026-44761 Overview

CVE-2026-44761 affects SAP Commerce Cloud deployments that retain a sample OAuth2 client shipped with publicly documented credentials from SAP Help Portal documentation. An unauthenticated remote attacker who reaches the OAuth2 token endpoint can present these well-known credentials to obtain a valid access token. That token grants access to certain APIs, allowing an attacker to read and modify business data.

The issue is classified under [CWE-1392: Use of Default Credentials]. It is exploitable over the network without user interaction or prior privileges.

Critical Impact
An unauthenticated attacker on the network can authenticate as the sample OAuth2 client using publicly documented credentials, then invoke SAP Commerce Cloud APIs to read and modify data.

Affected Products

SAP Commerce Cloud deployments retaining the sample OAuth2 client from SAP Help Portal documentation
Instances where the sample client credentials were never rotated or removed after installation
Environments exposing the OAuth2 token endpoint to untrusted networks

Discovery Timeline

2026-07-14 - CVE-2026-44761 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
2026-07-14 - SAP publishes SAP Note #3753495 as part of SAP Security Patch Day
2026-07-15 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-44761

Vulnerability Analysis

SAP Commerce Cloud documentation on the SAP Help Portal provides sample OAuth2 client configuration to help administrators bootstrap integrations. If an administrator applies the sample configuration verbatim and does not replace or delete the sample client, the platform retains an OAuth2 client whose client_id and client_secret are documented publicly.

An attacker only needs to read the vendor documentation to learn the credentials. The attacker then performs a standard OAuth2 client credentials grant against the deployment's token endpoint. The resulting access token carries whatever scopes the sample client was granted, which is sufficient to invoke APIs that read and modify data.

Successful exploitation compromises the confidentiality and integrity of data accessible to the sample client. Availability is not directly affected. Because the credentials are documented and static, exploitation requires no reverse engineering, no brute forcing, and no prior foothold.

Root Cause

The root cause is the retention of a sample OAuth2 client with publicly documented credentials in production or internet-facing deployments. This falls under [CWE-1392: Use of Default Credentials], where a shipped or documented credential is left active in an environment where it should be removed, disabled, or rotated.

Attack Vector

The attack vector is network-based and unauthenticated. An attacker sends a client credentials request to the SAP Commerce Cloud OAuth2 token endpoint using the sample client_id and client_secret published in the SAP Help Portal. The server returns a bearer access token, which the attacker then supplies to protected API endpoints to read or modify business objects.

No exploitation code is required beyond a standard HTTP client capable of performing an OAuth2 client credentials flow. No public proof-of-concept has been referenced in the advisory data.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-44761

Indicators of Compromise

OAuth2 token issuance events referencing the sample client_id documented on the SAP Help Portal
API access tokens presented by clients whose identifier matches the sample OAuth2 client
Unexpected read or write operations on SAP Commerce Cloud APIs performed under the sample client identity
Token requests to the OAuth2 endpoint originating from IP addresses outside approved integration ranges

Detection Strategies

Enumerate all OAuth2 clients configured in SAP Commerce Cloud and flag any whose identifier or secret matches values documented on the SAP Help Portal
Alert on any successful client_credentials grant issued to the sample client identifier
Correlate access token issuance with subsequent API activity to identify data reads or modifications performed under the sample client

Monitoring Recommendations

Enable verbose logging on the SAP Commerce Cloud OAuth2 authorization server, including client identifier, source IP, and granted scopes
Forward authentication and API access logs to a centralized SIEM for continuous review
Baseline legitimate OAuth2 client activity and alert on new or unexpected clients issuing tokens

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-44761

Immediate Actions Required

Apply the fix described in SAP Note #3753495 on all SAP Commerce Cloud instances
Immediately delete or disable any OAuth2 client that uses the sample client_id and client_secret from SAP Help Portal documentation
Rotate credentials for all OAuth2 clients whose secrets may have been derived from public sample values
Review recent API access logs for activity performed under the sample client identity and investigate any unauthorized data reads or modifications

Patch Information

SAP addresses CVE-2026-44761 through the guidance published in SAP Note #3753495, released as part of SAP Security Patch Day. Administrators must authenticate to SAP for Me to retrieve the note and follow the vendor's remediation steps, which include removing or reconfiguring the sample OAuth2 client.

Workarounds

Remove the sample OAuth2 client from the SAP Commerce Cloud configuration if it is not required for production integrations
If the sample client must remain temporarily, replace the documented client_secret with a strong, unique secret and restrict its granted scopes to the minimum required
Restrict network access to the OAuth2 token endpoint using firewall rules, reverse proxies, or WAF policies so it is reachable only from trusted integration sources

bash

# Configuration example: audit OAuth2 clients and remove sample entries
# 1. List configured OAuth2 clients in SAP Commerce Cloud (Backoffice or hac):
#    Backoffice > System > OAuth > OAuth Clients
#
# 2. Identify any client whose clientId matches the sample value published
#    in SAP Help Portal documentation.
#
# 3. Remove or rotate the sample client, for example via impex:
#
# REMOVE OAuthClientDetails; clientId[unique=true]
# ; "<sample-client-id-from-sap-help-portal>"
#
# 4. For clients that must remain, rotate the secret:
#
# UPDATE OAuthClientDetails; clientId[unique=true]; clientSecret
# ; "my-integration-client"       ; "<new-strong-random-secret>"