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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-44192

CVE-2026-44192: Ansible Lightspeed MCP Path Traversal Flaw

CVE-2026-44192 is a path traversal vulnerability in Ansible Lightspeed Model Context Protocol server that enables attackers to write files to unauthorized locations via AI agent manipulation, risking full system compromise.

Published:

CVE-2026-44192 Overview

CVE-2026-44192 is a path traversal vulnerability [CWE-22] in the Ansible Lightspeed Model Context Protocol (MCP) server. Attackers exploit the flaw through indirect prompt injection against the AI agent connected to the MCP server. The manipulated agent writes files to unauthorized locations on the host filesystem. This behavior exposes sensitive host information and allows attackers to place executable content in paths that lead to command execution.

Critical Impact

Successful exploitation lets an attacker write arbitrary files outside the intended directory, disclose host data, and stage payloads that can result in full system compromise.

Affected Products

  • Ansible Lightspeed Model Context Protocol (MCP) server
  • Red Hat Ansible Lightspeed integrations exposing the MCP interface
  • Environments where an AI agent processes untrusted input and interacts with the Lightspeed MCP server

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-07-22 - CVE CVE-2026-44192 published to NVD
  • 2026-07-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-44192

Vulnerability Analysis

The Ansible Lightspeed MCP server exposes tools that allow an AI agent to write files as part of its workflow. The server fails to normalize and constrain file path inputs supplied through those tool invocations. An attacker who controls content the agent consumes, such as a task description, repository file, or web resource, can inject instructions that direct the agent to call the write tool with traversal sequences such as ../ in the target path.

The MCP server accepts the traversal payload and writes the file outside the intended workspace directory. Because MCP tool calls execute with the privileges of the local user running the agent, the write lands anywhere that user can reach on disk. Local access is required, and user interaction with the AI agent triggers the untrusted flow.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing canonicalization and boundary enforcement on file path parameters passed to MCP write operations. The server does not resolve the target path against an allow-listed base directory before opening the file for write.

Attack Vector

The attacker plants prompt injection content in data the AI agent will process. When the agent invokes the vulnerable MCP tool, the injected instructions coerce it into supplying a traversal path. The server writes attacker-controlled content into locations such as shell startup files, cron directories, SSH configuration, or Ansible plugin paths, which then execute during normal user activity.

No verified public exploit code is available. See the Red Hat CVE-2026-44192 Advisory and Red Hat Bugzilla Entry #2466760 for vendor technical details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-44192

Indicators of Compromise

  • MCP server logs showing file write operations with paths containing ../ sequences or absolute paths outside the configured workspace
  • Unexpected new or modified files in shell startup locations such as ~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, or ~/.ssh/authorized_keys created around the time of agent activity
  • Ansible plugin or role directories receiving writes that do not correspond to a legitimate playbook execution

Detection Strategies

  • Enable verbose logging on the Lightspeed MCP server and alert on file write tool invocations where the resolved path escapes the configured project root
  • Monitor AI agent prompt and tool-call transcripts for path arguments containing traversal patterns, encoded traversal sequences, or absolute paths
  • Correlate MCP write events with subsequent process execution to identify staged payloads

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Deploy file integrity monitoring on user home directories, SSH configuration, and system automation paths on hosts running the MCP server
  • Ingest MCP server and AI agent logs into a centralized SIEM to enable retrospective hunting for prompt injection patterns
  • Track outbound requests from the agent that could source injected instructions, such as fetches of remote README files or issue content

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-44192

Immediate Actions Required

  • Apply the fixed version of the Ansible Lightspeed MCP server as published in the Red Hat CVE-2026-44192 Advisory
  • Restrict the AI agent to processing only trusted inputs until the patch is deployed
  • Run the MCP server under a dedicated low-privilege user with no write access to sensitive host paths

Patch Information

Refer to the Red Hat CVE-2026-44192 Advisory for the authoritative list of fixed packages and versions. The Red Hat Bugzilla Entry #2466760 tracks the underlying issue and remediation status.

Workarounds

  • Confine the MCP server process using mandatory access controls such as SELinux or AppArmor policies that deny writes outside the project workspace
  • Execute the agent and MCP server inside a container or sandbox with a read-only root filesystem and a bind-mounted writable workspace
  • Disable or gate MCP file write tools behind explicit user confirmation until the fix is applied
  • Sanitize and canonicalize path inputs at a proxy layer, rejecting any request containing .., symbolic link targets, or absolute paths
bash
# Configuration example: restrict MCP workspace with a bind mount and read-only root
# Refer to vendor documentation for supported configuration syntax

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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