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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-44187

CVE-2026-44187: Ansible Lightspeed Information Disclosure

CVE-2026-44187 is an information disclosure flaw in Ansible Lightspeed for Visual Studio Code that exposes Google Gemini API keys in plain text. This article covers the technical details, impact, and mitigation steps.

Updated:

CVE-2026-44187 Overview

CVE-2026-44187 is an information disclosure vulnerability in the Ansible Lightspeed extension for Visual Studio Code. The extension stores the Google Gemini API key in plain text within the user's configuration file and writes it to output log files. An attacker with local access to the workstation, or malware running with the user's privileges, can read the API key and impersonate the developer against Google Gemini services. This weakness is categorized under [CWE-256] (Plaintext Storage of a Password).

Critical Impact

Local attackers or user-level malware can exfiltrate the Google Gemini API key, consume the victim's API quota, and access AI services under the victim's identity.

Affected Products

  • Ansible Lightspeed extension for Visual Studio Code
  • Red Hat Ansible Lightspeed with IBM watsonx Code Assistant integrations that leverage the affected extension
  • Developer workstations with the extension installed and a configured Google Gemini API key

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-07-22 - CVE-2026-44187 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-07-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-44187

Vulnerability Analysis

The Ansible Lightspeed extension integrates generative AI assistance into Visual Studio Code and requires an API key to authenticate against Google Gemini. The extension persists that credential using insecure storage patterns rather than the VS Code Secret Storage API or an operating system keychain. As a result, the Gemini API key is written in cleartext to the user's extension configuration file. The same credential is also emitted to output log files produced by the extension during normal operation.

Any process running with the user's privileges can read those files without triggering a privilege boundary. This includes low-privilege malware, malicious VS Code extensions, backup agents, telemetry tools, and shared-workstation users with access to the profile directory. Once obtained, the API key allows an attacker to issue arbitrary requests to Google Gemini under the developer's identity and quota.

Root Cause

The root cause is plaintext storage of a credential in a location protected only by filesystem permissions [CWE-256]. Secrets written to configuration files and log files are treated as ordinary application data, not as sensitive material requiring an encrypted secret store or in-memory-only handling.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires local access with existing low privileges and no user interaction. An attacker reads the extension configuration file or scans the extension's output logs for the stored API key. The disclosed key affects confidentiality only; the vulnerability does not directly grant code execution, integrity impact, or availability impact on the local host.

No synthetic code is provided. See the Red Hat CVE-2026-44187 advisory and Red Hat Bug Report #2466765 for authoritative technical details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-44187

Indicators of Compromise

  • Presence of plaintext GEMINI_API_KEY or equivalent strings in the Ansible Lightspeed extension configuration file under the user's VS Code profile directory.
  • Ansible Lightspeed output log files containing API key values or Authorization header fragments.
  • Unexpected Google Gemini API usage or quota consumption tied to a developer account.

Detection Strategies

  • Scan developer endpoints for the extension's configuration and log paths, and flag files containing high-entropy strings matching Google API key formats.
  • Correlate Google Cloud audit logs for Gemini API calls with expected developer source IP ranges and working hours to surface anomalous use.
  • Monitor file read access to the VS Code extension storage directory by non-VS Code processes.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable file integrity monitoring on VS Code user profile directories on developer workstations.
  • Forward endpoint process and file telemetry to a centralized data lake for retrospective hunting once the extension is patched.
  • Alert on any process other than code or code-insiders reading Ansible Lightspeed configuration or log files.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-44187

Immediate Actions Required

  • Revoke and rotate any Google Gemini API key that has been configured in the Ansible Lightspeed extension on affected workstations.
  • Restrict the rotated key with Google Cloud API key restrictions, including IP allowlists and per-service scoping to Gemini only.
  • Remove or truncate existing Ansible Lightspeed output log files that may contain the credential.
  • Audit Google Gemini API usage for unexpected activity following the disclosure window.

Patch Information

Refer to the Red Hat CVE-2026-44187 advisory and Red Hat Bug Report #2466765 for the fixed extension version and remediation status. Update the Ansible Lightspeed extension to the patched release once available and confirm that the API key is migrated to VS Code Secret Storage.

Workarounds

  • Uninstall or disable the Ansible Lightspeed extension until a fixed version is installed.
  • Where the extension must remain in use, store the Gemini API key only in short-lived form and revoke it at the end of each session.
  • Enforce filesystem ACLs so that only the owning user account can read the VS Code user profile directory, and disable shared or roaming profiles for developer workstations.
  • Disable verbose or debug logging in the extension to reduce the chance of secrets being written to log files.
bash
# Configuration example: restrict access to VS Code user profile on Linux/macOS
chmod 700 "$HOME/.config/Code"
chmod 700 "$HOME/.vscode"
# Remove any existing Ansible Lightspeed logs that may contain the API key
find "$HOME/.config/Code/logs" -type f -iname '*lightspeed*' -print -delete

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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