Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-44034 Overview
CVE-2026-44034 is a heap-based out-of-bounds read [CWE-125] in the DcmRLECodecDecoder::decodeFrame() function of OFFIS DCMTK 3.7.0. The flaw lives in dcmdata/libsrc/dcrleccd.cc and affects applications that decode Run-Length Encoded (RLE) Lossless DICOM images frame by frame. An attacker who supplies a crafted DICOM file with a pixel data fragment shorter than the 64-byte RLE header can read up to 63 bytes of adjacent heap memory or trigger a process crash. The dcmdrle command-line tool calls decode() and is not affected. The issue is fixed in commit 45469f3c30037e9c7159290e4bb74cd7b3b9ef1d.
Critical Impact
Attackers can leak up to 63 bytes of heap memory or crash DICOM processing applications by delivering a single malformed RLE Lossless image.
Affected Products
- OFFIS DCMTK 3.7.0
- Applications using DcmPixelData::getUncompressedFrame() for RLE frame decoding
- Third-party medical imaging software linking DCMTK 3.7.0 libraries
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-08 - CVE CVE-2026-44034 published to NVD
- 2026-10-08 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-44034
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability is a heap-based out-of-bounds read in the RLE decoder shipped with DCMTK, the open-source DICOM toolkit maintained by OFFIS. DICOM files encoded with the RLE Lossless transfer syntax store pixel data in fragments. Each fragment is expected to begin with a 64-byte RLE header that describes segment offsets.
DcmRLECodecDecoder::decodeFrame() copies the first 64 bytes of a fragment into a header buffer without first checking that the fragment is at least 64 bytes long. If a crafted fragment is shorter than 64 bytes, the copy reads past the end of the heap allocation. The sibling function decode() performs the required length check, which is why the command-line tool dcmdrle — which routes through decode() — is unaffected.
Exploitation produces one of two outcomes: disclosure of up to 63 bytes of adjacent heap memory, or a process crash when the read lands on unmapped memory. The attack requires user interaction, such as opening or ingesting a malicious DICOM file.
Root Cause
The root cause is a missing bounds check before a fixed-size memory copy. decodeFrame() assumes every pixel data fragment contains a complete 64-byte RLE header. Fragments shorter than this threshold cause the copy to overrun the source buffer on the heap.
Attack Vector
An attacker crafts a DICOM file whose RLE Lossless pixel data fragment is shorter than 64 bytes. When a vulnerable application invokes frame-by-frame decoding (for example, through DcmPixelData::getUncompressedFrame()), the undersized fragment triggers the out-of-bounds read. The vector is local and requires the victim to process the file.
/*
*
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2025, OFFIS e.V.
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2026, OFFIS e.V.
* All rights reserved. See COPYRIGHT file for details.
*
* This software and supporting documentation were developed by
*/
// Source: https://github.com/DCMTK/dcmtk/commit/45469f3c30037e9c7159290e4bb74cd7b3b9ef1d
// The patch adds a fragment-length check in dcmdata/libsrc/dcrleccd.cc before the 64-byte header copy.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-44034
Indicators of Compromise
- DICOM files containing RLE Lossless transfer syntax (1.2.840.10008.1.2.5) with pixel data fragments shorter than 64 bytes.
- Crash reports or segmentation faults in processes linked against libdcmdata when parsing RLE images.
- Unexpected memory contents written to logs, exports, or rendered image buffers originating from RLE frame decoding.
Detection Strategies
- Statically scan incoming DICOM files for RLE fragment lengths below 64 bytes before passing them to decoding libraries.
- Hunt for process crashes in PACS, viewers, and conversion utilities that occur during pixel data extraction.
- Review file ingestion telemetry for DICOM uploads from untrusted peers or external modalities.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor host workloads running medical imaging software for abnormal termination signals tied to DCMTK call stacks.
- Capture file access patterns on DICOM directories and alert on bulk ingestion of malformed studies.
- Correlate crash events with recently received DICOM transfers to identify suspect sources.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-44034
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory applications and services that bundle or link DCMTK 3.7.0, including PACS, viewers, and conversion pipelines.
- Apply the upstream patch from commit 45469f3c30037e9c7159290e4bb74cd7b3b9ef1d or upgrade to a DCMTK release that includes the fix.
- Restrict DICOM ingestion to trusted modalities and authenticated peers until the patch is deployed.
Patch Information
OFFIS fixed the issue in commit 45469f3c30037e9c7159290e4bb74cd7b3b9ef1d of the DCMTK repository. The patch adds a fragment-length check in DcmRLECodecDecoder::decodeFrame() before the 64-byte header copy. See the DCMTK security commit and DCMTK Support Issue #1213 for details.
Workarounds
- Route RLE decoding through decode() rather than decodeFrame() where application logic allows, since decode() already performs the required length check.
- Use the dcmdrle command-line tool for RLE decompression tasks, as it is not affected.
- Pre-validate DICOM files with a sanitizer that rejects RLE fragments shorter than 64 bytes before handoff to vulnerable code paths.
# Build and install the patched DCMTK from source
git clone https://github.com/DCMTK/dcmtk.git
cd dcmtk
git checkout 45469f3c30037e9c7159290e4bb74cd7b3b9ef1d
mkdir build && cd build
cmake ..
make -j$(nproc)
sudo make install
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

