Skip to main content
CVE Vulnerability Database
Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-42773

CVE-2026-42773: eMagicOne Store Manager SQLi Vulnerability

CVE-2026-42773 is a blind SQL injection vulnerability in eMagicOne Store Manager that allows attackers to extract sensitive database information. This article covers technical details, affected versions up to 1.3.2, and steps to secure your system.

Published:

CVE-2026-42773 Overview

CVE-2026-42773 is a blind SQL injection vulnerability in the eMagicOne Store Manager plugin for WordPress. The flaw affects all versions up to and including 1.3.2. Attackers can inject malicious SQL statements through unsanitized input passed to backend database queries. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-89, which covers improper neutralization of special elements used in an SQL command.

The issue requires no authentication and can be exploited remotely over the network. Successful exploitation allows attackers to extract sensitive database content, including user credentials, customer records, and store configuration data.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated remote attackers can execute arbitrary SQL queries against the WordPress database, leading to confidentiality loss across the connected store data.

Affected Products

  • eMagicOne Store Manager plugin for WordPress
  • All versions from initial release through 1.3.2
  • WordPress installations using the store-manager-connector plugin

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-05-25 - CVE-2026-42773 published to NVD
  • 2026-05-26 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-42773

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the eMagicOne Store Manager Connector plugin, which provides a bridge between WordPress-based e-commerce stores and the eMagicOne desktop management application. User-supplied parameters reach SQL queries without proper sanitization or parameterized binding. The result is a blind SQL injection condition where attackers infer database contents through boolean or time-based response differences.

Blind SQL injection does not return query output directly in HTTP responses. Instead, attackers craft conditional payloads that alter application behavior or response timing. Through iterative requests, an attacker reconstructs database contents character by character.

The attack vector is network-based and requires no privileges or user interaction. The scope is changed, meaning the impact extends beyond the vulnerable component to other resources accessible through the WordPress database.

Root Cause

The root cause is direct concatenation of untrusted input into SQL statements within the plugin's request handlers. The plugin fails to use prepared statements or the WordPress $wpdb->prepare() API, which would safely parameterize query inputs.

Attack Vector

An unauthenticated attacker sends crafted HTTP requests to plugin endpoints exposed by the Store Manager Connector. The malicious parameters carry SQL syntax that alters the structure of backend queries. By observing differences in application responses, the attacker enumerates database tables, columns, and rows.

The vulnerability manifests through standard WordPress AJAX or REST endpoints registered by the plugin. Refer to the Patchstack SQL Injection Vulnerability advisory for additional technical context.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-42773

Indicators of Compromise

  • HTTP requests to Store Manager Connector endpoints containing SQL keywords such as UNION, SELECT, SLEEP, or BENCHMARK in query parameters
  • Repeated requests with incrementally changing payloads characteristic of automated blind SQLi enumeration
  • Unusual database query latency or sustained spikes in MySQL CPU utilization from wp_* queries
  • Web server access logs showing requests with URL-encoded SQL metacharacters (%27, %22, %23) targeting plugin paths

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect web access logs for requests targeting store-manager-connector plugin endpoints with anomalous parameter content
  • Enable WordPress query logging and review database statements originating from the plugin for non-parameterized patterns
  • Deploy a web application firewall ruleset that flags SQL injection signatures on plugin URIs
  • Correlate authentication anomalies and outbound data transfers with prior suspicious plugin requests

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Monitor for sudden increases in 500-level HTTP responses from plugin endpoints, which often accompany malformed SQL payloads
  • Alert on time-based query patterns where request duration exceeds normal baselines by several seconds
  • Track database read volume on tables containing user credentials and customer data
  • Forward WordPress and web server logs to a centralized SIEM for correlation and retention

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-42773

Immediate Actions Required

  • Disable the eMagicOne Store Manager Connector plugin until a vendor patch is confirmed installed
  • Restrict access to the WordPress admin and plugin endpoints by source IP where operationally feasible
  • Audit the WordPress database for unauthorized accounts, modified user roles, and unexpected data exports
  • Rotate WordPress administrator credentials and database passwords after remediation

Patch Information

No fixed version is identified in the published advisory at the time of writing. Versions through 1.3.2 are affected. Monitor the Patchstack advisory and the official plugin repository for an updated release addressing CVE-2026-42773.

Workarounds

  • Deactivate and remove the plugin if Store Manager integration is not operationally required
  • Deploy a web application firewall rule blocking SQL injection patterns targeting plugin URIs
  • Apply virtual patching via WAF or reverse proxy to drop requests containing SQL syntax in plugin parameters
  • Limit database user privileges so the WordPress account cannot read sensitive tables outside its required scope
bash
# Example WAF rule snippet (ModSecurity) blocking SQLi on plugin endpoints
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@contains /wp-content/plugins/store-manager-connector/" \
  "chain,deny,status:403,id:1042773,msg:'Block SQLi attempt on eMagicOne Store Manager'"
  SecRule ARGS "@rx (?i)(union(\s)+select|sleep\(|benchmark\(|--|\bor\b\s+1=1)" "t:none,t:urlDecode"

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Default Legacy - Prefooter | Experience the World’s Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

Experience the Most Advanced Cybersecurity Platform

See how the world’s most intelligent, autonomous cybersecurity platform can protect your organization today and into the future.