CVE-2026-32982: Openclaw Information Disclosure Flaw

CVE-2026-32982 Overview

CVE-2026-32982 is an information disclosure vulnerability affecting OpenClaw, a Node.js application, in versions prior to 2026.3.13. The vulnerability exists in the fetchRemoteMedia function, which exposes sensitive Telegram bot tokens in error messages. When media downloads fail, the original Telegram file URLs—containing embedded bot tokens—are included in MediaFetchError strings and subsequently leaked to application logs and error surfaces.

This vulnerability falls under CWE-532 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File), representing a significant security concern for organizations using OpenClaw with Telegram bot integrations. Attackers who gain access to logs or error outputs can extract valid bot tokens, potentially leading to unauthorized bot control and further exploitation of connected systems.

Critical Impact
Exposed Telegram bot tokens can allow attackers to impersonate bots, access private channels, exfiltrate data, and potentially pivot to other connected services. This information disclosure can serve as a stepping stone for more severe attacks against the affected infrastructure.

Affected Products

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.3.13
OpenClaw Node.js deployments with Telegram bot integration
Systems using OpenClaw's fetchRemoteMedia function for Telegram media handling

Discovery Timeline

2026-03-31 - CVE-2026-32982 published to NVD
2026-04-02 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-32982

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is rooted in improper error handling within OpenClaw's media fetching subsystem. When the application attempts to download remote media from Telegram servers and encounters a failure, the error handling logic constructs a MediaFetchError that includes the full Telegram file URL. These URLs inherently contain the bot token as part of the Telegram Bot API URL structure (e.g., https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/getFile).

The problematic code path occurs in src/telegram/bot/delivery.resolve-media.ts, where failed media fetch operations propagate the raw URL through the error chain. This results in bot tokens being written to:

Application logs
Error response bodies
Monitoring and alerting systems
Debugging outputs

Root Cause

The root cause is insufficient sanitization of sensitive data before inclusion in error messages. The fetchRemoteMedia function and associated transport layer did not strip or redact bot tokens from URLs before embedding them in exception messages. The error handling design prioritized debugging convenience over security, treating the full URL as useful diagnostic information without considering the credential exposure implications.

Attack Vector

This vulnerability is exploitable over the network without requiring authentication or user interaction. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability through several scenarios:

Log File Access: Gaining read access to application logs through separate vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, or insider access
Error Response Harvesting: Triggering media download failures and observing error responses if they are exposed to clients
Monitoring System Compromise: Accessing centralized logging platforms (e.g., ELK stack, Splunk) where error messages are aggregated

Once a bot token is extracted, an attacker can:

Send messages as the bot
Read messages in channels where the bot has access
Download files shared with the bot
Modify bot settings and webhooks

The patch addresses this by introducing fallback handling mechanisms that avoid exposing raw Telegram URLs in error surfaces:

typescript

   return true;
 }
 
+export function shouldRetryTelegramIpv4Fallback(err: unknown): boolean {
+  return shouldRetryWithIpv4Fallback(err);
+}
+
 // Prefer wrapped fetch when available to normalize AbortSignal across runtimes.
 export type TelegramTransport = {
   fetch: typeof fetch;
   sourceFetch: typeof fetch;
   pinnedDispatcherPolicy?: PinnedDispatcherPolicy;
+  fallbackPinnedDispatcherPolicy?: PinnedDispatcherPolicy;
 };
 
 export function resolveTelegramTransport(

Source: GitHub Commit Update

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-32982

Indicators of Compromise

Presence of Telegram bot API URLs containing tokens in application logs (pattern: api.telegram.org/bot[A-Za-z0-9:_-]+/)
Unusual or unauthorized API calls using your organization's Telegram bot tokens
Evidence of log file access or exfiltration from affected OpenClaw deployments
Unexpected bot behavior or messages originating from compromised bot tokens

Detection Strategies

Implement log scanning rules to detect Telegram bot token patterns in error logs and alert on matches
Monitor Telegram bot API usage for anomalous activity such as unexpected IP addresses or unusual request volumes
Enable file integrity monitoring on OpenClaw log directories to detect unauthorized access
Review application error handling paths for credential exposure in stack traces and error messages

Monitoring Recommendations

Configure SIEM rules to alert on regex patterns matching Telegram bot tokens in log streams
Implement rate limiting and anomaly detection on Telegram bot API endpoints
Establish baseline bot activity metrics and alert on deviations
Regularly audit log retention and access controls to minimize exposure windows

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-32982

Immediate Actions Required

Upgrade OpenClaw to version 2026.3.13 or later immediately
Rotate all Telegram bot tokens that may have been exposed in logs prior to patching
Audit existing logs for exposed tokens and securely purge affected log entries
Review access controls on log storage systems to limit potential exposure

Patch Information

The vulnerability has been addressed in OpenClaw version 2026.3.13. The security fix is available through the GitHub Commit Update with commit hash 7a53eb7ea8295b08be137e231c9a98c1a79b5cd5. Additional details are available in the GitHub Security Advisory.

The patch modifies the transport layer in src/telegram/fetch.ts and src/telegram/bot/delivery.resolve-media.ts to implement IPv4 fallback retry logic and improved error handling that prevents token leakage.

Workarounds

Implement log sanitization filters to redact Telegram bot token patterns before log persistence
Configure error handling middleware to strip sensitive URL parameters from error messages
Restrict log file access to essential personnel only using file system permissions
Consider proxying Telegram API requests through an intermediary service that handles tokens server-side

bash

# Example log sanitization filter for rsyslog
# Add to /etc/rsyslog.d/openclaw-sanitize.conf
:msg, regex, "api\\.telegram\\.org/bot[A-Za-z0-9:_-]+/" ~
# This drops log messages containing Telegram bot URLs
# Alternatively, use sed-based replacement in log processing pipelines