CVE-2026-32598 Overview
OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. A sensitive information disclosure vulnerability exists in versions prior to 10.0.24 where the password reset flow logs the complete password reset URL—containing the plaintext reset token—at INFO log level, which is enabled by default in production environments. This vulnerability (CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File) allows anyone with access to application logs to intercept reset tokens and perform account takeover on any user.
Critical Impact
Attackers with access to application logs (log aggregation systems, Docker logs, Kubernetes pod logs) can intercept password reset tokens and take over any user account, leading to complete compromise of user accounts and potential unauthorized access to monitored services.
Affected Products
- Hackerbay OneUptime versions prior to 10.0.24
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-03-13 - CVE CVE-2026-32598 published to NVD
- 2026-03-17 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-32598
Vulnerability Analysis
This vulnerability represents a classic case of sensitive information exposure through application logging (CWE-532). When a user initiates a password reset, OneUptime generates a unique token and constructs a reset URL. The application then logs this complete URL at the INFO log level, which is the default logging level in production deployments. This design flaw means that the security-critical reset token is persisted in plaintext within application logs.
The attack requires local access to retrieve the logged information, which limits the attack surface to individuals who can access log files through various means—system administrators, developers with production access, or attackers who have compromised log aggregation services.
Root Cause
The root cause is improper logging practices in the password reset functionality. The application logs the full password reset URL including the sensitive token without any redaction or masking. Since INFO-level logging is enabled by default in production, this sensitive data is captured and stored in accessible log files. The token should never be logged, or at minimum, should be masked/truncated when logging is necessary for debugging purposes.
Attack Vector
The attack vector is local, requiring the attacker to have access to application logs through one of several avenues:
- Log Aggregation Services: If logs are shipped to centralized logging platforms (ELK Stack, Splunk, Datadog), anyone with read access to those systems can search for and extract reset tokens
- Container Logs: In Docker or Kubernetes deployments, users with access to container logs via docker logs or kubectl logs commands can retrieve tokens
- File System Access: Direct access to log files on the server file system exposes the tokens
- Compromised Log Infrastructure: If an attacker compromises a log aggregation service, they gain access to historical reset tokens
Once a token is obtained, the attacker can navigate to the password reset URL before the legitimate user and set a new password, effectively taking over the account.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-32598
Indicators of Compromise
- Unusual access patterns to log aggregation systems or log files
- Password reset tokens being accessed or searched for in log queries
- Multiple password resets for the same user account in a short time period
- Account access from unexpected IP addresses following password reset events
- Log queries specifically filtering for password reset URLs or token patterns
Detection Strategies
- Monitor log aggregation system access logs for queries containing password reset-related keywords
- Implement alerts for unusual log file access patterns on production servers
- Track password reset completion rates—high rates of unused reset tokens may indicate interception
- Monitor for account logins from new devices/locations immediately following password resets
- Review container log access in Kubernetes audit logs for suspicious activity
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable audit logging on all log aggregation platforms and monitor for sensitive data searches
- Implement role-based access control for log viewing with the principle of least privilege
- Set up alerts for bulk log downloads or exports that might include password reset data
- Monitor user authentication events for anomalies following password reset requests
- Consider implementing log scrubbing to remove sensitive tokens before storage
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-32598
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade OneUptime to version 10.0.24 or later immediately
- Rotate all existing password reset tokens by invalidating active reset links
- Review log access permissions and restrict to essential personnel only
- Audit log aggregation systems for any evidence of token harvesting
- Force password resets for any accounts where token exposure is suspected
Patch Information
The vulnerability is fixed in OneUptime version 10.0.24. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the issue. The fix addresses the improper logging of password reset URLs by ensuring sensitive tokens are no longer written to application logs. For detailed information about the vulnerability and the fix, refer to the GitHub Security Advisory.
Workarounds
- Restrict log access to only essential personnel using strict role-based access controls
- Implement log filtering/scrubbing to remove or mask password reset URLs before storage
- Reduce log retention periods to minimize the window of exposure for reset tokens
- Consider temporarily disabling password reset functionality until the patch is applied
- Monitor and audit all log access during the interim period before patching
# Configuration example - Restrict log file access permissions
chmod 600 /var/log/oneuptime/*.log
chown oneuptime:oneuptime /var/log/oneuptime/*.log
# If using Docker, limit who can access container logs
# Implement RBAC in Kubernetes to restrict kubectl logs access
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.


