CVE-2026-25069: SunFounder Pironman Path Traversal Flaw

CVE-2026-25069 Overview

CVE-2026-25069 is a critical path traversal vulnerability affecting SunFounder Pironman Dashboard (pm_dashboard) version 1.3.13 and prior. The vulnerability exists in the log file API endpoints, where an unauthenticated remote attacker can supply traversal sequences via the filename parameter to read and delete arbitrary files on the underlying system. This weakness is classified as CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory).

Critical Impact
Successful exploitation allows unauthenticated attackers to read sensitive system files (such as /etc/passwd or application credentials) and delete critical files, potentially causing data loss, system compromise, or denial of service conditions.

Affected Products

SunFounder Pironman Dashboard (pm_dashboard) version 1.3.13
SunFounder Pironman Dashboard (pm_dashboard) versions prior to 1.3.13

Discovery Timeline

2026-02-01 - CVE-2026-25069 published to NVD
2026-02-03 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-25069

Vulnerability Analysis

This path traversal vulnerability enables attackers to break out of the intended directory structure and access files anywhere on the filesystem. The vulnerable endpoints in pm_dashboard.py fail to properly sanitize user-supplied input in the filename parameter, allowing directory traversal sequences such as ../ to be processed. Since no authentication is required to access these API endpoints, any network-connected attacker can exploit this vulnerability remotely.

The impact is twofold: first, attackers can read arbitrary files, potentially exposing sensitive configuration data, credentials, private keys, or other confidential information. Second, the delete functionality allows attackers to remove critical system files, which could render the system inoperable or create conditions for further compromise.

Root Cause

The root cause lies in insufficient input validation within the log file API endpoints. The application accepts a filename parameter without properly sanitizing or validating that the requested path remains within the intended log directory. The vulnerable code segments are located in pm_dashboard.py at lines 62 and 440, where user input is directly used to construct file paths without removing or rejecting traversal sequences like ../ or verifying the resolved path stays within allowed boundaries.

Attack Vector

The attack is network-accessible, requiring no authentication or user interaction. An attacker can craft malicious HTTP requests to the vulnerable API endpoints, including path traversal sequences in the filename parameter. For example, supplying a value like ../../../etc/passwd would traverse up from the expected log directory and access the system password file. Similarly, using the delete endpoint with traversal sequences allows removal of arbitrary files accessible by the web application's user context.

The vulnerability is exploited through standard HTTP requests to the dashboard's API endpoints. Detailed technical information regarding the vulnerable code paths can be found in the Vulncheck Security Advisory and the vulnerable source code.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-25069

Indicators of Compromise

HTTP requests to log file API endpoints containing ../ sequences or URL-encoded variants (%2e%2e%2f)
Access logs showing requests for sensitive system files like /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, or application configuration files
Unexpected file deletions or missing log files on systems running Pironman Dashboard
Web server logs with abnormally long filename parameters or null byte injection attempts

Detection Strategies

Configure web application firewall (WAF) rules to detect and block path traversal patterns in request parameters
Implement file integrity monitoring (FIM) on critical system files to detect unauthorized read or delete operations
Monitor network traffic for HTTP requests to Pironman Dashboard endpoints containing suspicious path patterns
Review application logs for access attempts to files outside the designated log directory

Monitoring Recommendations

Enable verbose logging on the Pironman Dashboard application to capture all API requests with full parameter values
Set up alerting for any 200 OK responses to requests containing traversal sequences
Monitor system file access patterns for the user account running the dashboard service
Implement anomaly detection for unusual file access patterns or unexpected file deletions

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-25069

Immediate Actions Required

Restrict network access to the Pironman Dashboard to trusted IP addresses or internal networks only
Implement reverse proxy authentication in front of the dashboard to prevent unauthenticated access
Consider disabling the affected log file API endpoints if they are not essential to operations
Run the dashboard service with minimal filesystem permissions to limit the scope of potential exploitation

Patch Information

At the time of publication, no official patch has been confirmed from SunFounder. Users should monitor the official pm_dashboard GitHub repository for security updates. Additional technical details and proof-of-concept information are available in the security researcher's Gist.

Workarounds

Deploy a reverse proxy with authentication (such as nginx with HTTP Basic Auth) to prevent unauthenticated access to the dashboard
Implement network segmentation to isolate systems running Pironman Dashboard from untrusted networks
Use firewall rules to restrict access to the dashboard port (typically TCP/34001) from authorized management IPs only
Consider running the dashboard in a containerized environment with read-only filesystem mounts for sensitive system directories

bash

# Example nginx configuration to add basic authentication
# Save this in /etc/nginx/sites-available/pironman-proxy
server {
    listen 8080;
    server_name localhost;
    
    location / {
        auth_basic "Restricted Access";
        auth_basic_user_file /etc/nginx/.htpasswd;
        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:34001;
        proxy_set_header Host $host;
        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
    }
}