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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-24330

CVE-2026-24330: WildFly Core RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2026-24330 is a remote code execution flaw in WildFly Core where authenticated deployers can upload malicious archives via HTTP POST requests. This post explains its technical details, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

CVE-2026-24330 Overview

CVE-2026-24330 is a flaw in wildfly-core that allows an authenticated user holding the deployer role to upload and deploy a malicious archive from an untrusted source. An attacker crafts a Java project that uses WildFly libraries to send an HTTP POST request that uploads and deploys the archive to the server. Successful exploitation can lead to further compromise, including arbitrary file read on the host running WildFly. The weakness is classified as unrestricted upload of a file with dangerous type [CWE-434]. The vulnerability requires valid credentials with the deployer role, which limits the attacker population but does not eliminate risk in multi-tenant or shared-management environments.

Critical Impact

An authenticated deployer account can deploy a crafted archive that enables arbitrary file read and further exploitation on the WildFly host.

Affected Products

  • Red Hat WildFly Core (see Red Hat advisory for affected versions)
  • Downstream products embedding wildfly-core
  • Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform builds referencing this component

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-08-11 - CVE-2026-24330 published to NVD
  • 2026-08-11 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-24330

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw resides in how wildfly-core handles archive deployment requests from users assigned the deployer role. The management layer accepts archives uploaded through HTTP POST without sufficient validation of the archive's contents or origin. An attacker with deployer privileges can craft a Java project using WildFly management libraries to submit an archive that WildFly then deploys into the running application server.

Once deployed, the malicious archive executes within the server's runtime context. The Red Hat advisory notes that this can be leveraged to read arbitrary files accessible to the WildFly process. Because deployment is a legitimate function of the deployer role, exploitation blends with normal administrative activity and is difficult to detect through role auditing alone.

The attack is network-reachable and does not require user interaction. It does require high privileges in the form of an authenticated deployer account, which shifts the threat model toward insider abuse, credential compromise, and lateral movement scenarios where an attacker has already obtained management credentials.

Root Cause

The root cause is unrestricted upload of a file with a dangerous type [CWE-434]. WildFly Core treats archives submitted by the deployer role as trusted deployable artifacts and does not sufficiently constrain what the archive may do once activated. The design assumes that role assignment implies trust in the archive contents, which fails when a deployer account is compromised or intentionally hostile.

Attack Vector

The attacker authenticates to the WildFly management interface using valid deployer credentials. They then issue an HTTP POST request, built with WildFly client libraries, that uploads a malicious archive and triggers deployment. WildFly loads the archive, and the embedded code runs with the privileges of the WildFly process. Post-exploitation activity observed in the advisory includes arbitrary file read from the underlying filesystem.

See the Red Hat CVE-2026-24330 advisory and the Red Hat Bug Report #2431939 for reference material. No public proof-of-concept code is available at time of writing.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-24330

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected archive deployments (.war, .ear, .jar, .rar) submitted via the WildFly management HTTP interface by deployer accounts.
  • HTTP POST requests to the /management endpoint carrying add-content or full-replace-deployment operations from unusual source addresses.
  • New deployment entries in standalone.xml or domain.xml that do not match change-management records.
  • File read activity by the WildFly process touching paths outside application directories, such as /etc/, credential stores, or user home directories.

Detection Strategies

  • Enable and forward WildFly audit logging for all management operations, focusing on deploy, add-content, and full-replace-deployment operations.
  • Baseline which principals normally deploy applications and alert on deployments performed by rarely-used deployer accounts.
  • Correlate deployment events with subsequent process behavior, such as file reads outside the deployment directory or outbound connections from the JVM.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Ship WildFly audit logs and JVM process telemetry to a centralized analytics platform for correlation with authentication events.
  • Monitor authentication to the management interface for brute force, credential stuffing, and logins from new geographies against deployer accounts.
  • Track file integrity on WildFly configuration and deployment directories to catch out-of-band deployments.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-24330

Immediate Actions Required

  • Apply the WildFly Core update referenced in the Red Hat advisory for CVE-2026-24330 once available for your distribution.
  • Inventory all accounts assigned the deployer role and remove any that are unused or over-provisioned.
  • Rotate credentials for all remaining deployer accounts and enforce strong authentication for the management interface.
  • Review recent deployment history for archives that do not correspond to approved change requests.

Patch Information

Red Hat tracks the fix under CVE-2026-24330 and Bug Report #2431939. Consult the advisory for the specific wildfly-core versions and Red Hat JBoss EAP releases that contain the fix, and follow the vendor's upgrade path for your deployment.

Workarounds

  • Restrict network access to the WildFly management interface (default 9990/tcp) to trusted administrative networks only.
  • Reduce deployer role assignments to the minimum set of operators and require multi-person approval for production deployments.
  • Require deployments to flow through a controlled CI/CD pipeline rather than direct uploads to the management interface.
  • Run WildFly as a low-privilege service account and apply filesystem permissions that limit which files the JVM process can read.
bash
# Restrict WildFly management interface to a management subnet
# Example iptables rule (adjust interface and CIDR to your environment)
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 9990 -s 10.0.10.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 9990 -j DROP

# Review deployer role assignments in mgmt-users and RBAC configuration
grep -R "deployer" $JBOSS_HOME/standalone/configuration/ $JBOSS_HOME/domain/configuration/

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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