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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-15496

CVE-2026-15496: SonicCloudOrg sonic-agent RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2026-15496 is a remote code execution vulnerability in SonicCloudOrg sonic-agent up to version 2.7.2, caused by OS command injection in the Groovy Script Handler. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

CVE-2026-15496 Overview

CVE-2026-15496 is an OS command injection vulnerability in SonicCloudOrg sonic-agent versions up to 2.7.2. The flaw resides in the evalIsFailed function of sonic-agent/src/main/java/org/cloud/sonic/agent/tests/script/GroovyScriptImpl.java, part of the Groovy Script Handler component. Authenticated remote attackers can inject operating system commands through unsandboxed Groovy script evaluation. The vulnerability affects an end-of-life product line that no longer receives maintainer support. A public proof-of-concept has been published, and the vendor did not respond to disclosure attempts.

Critical Impact

Remote authenticated attackers can execute arbitrary OS commands on the host by abusing unsandboxed Groovy script evaluation in the sonic-agent testing framework.

Affected Products

  • SonicCloudOrg sonic-agent versions up to and including 2.7.2
  • Groovy Script Handler component (GroovyScriptImpl.java)
  • Deployments of the Sonic Cloud mobile testing platform running unsupported releases

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-07-12 - CVE-2026-15496 published to NVD
  • 2026-07-13 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-15496

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability is classified as OS command injection under CWE-77. The sonic-agent component executes Groovy scripts to evaluate test failure conditions through the evalIsFailed function. Because the Groovy interpreter runs without sandboxing, attacker-controlled script content can invoke arbitrary Java runtime methods, including Runtime.exec() and ProcessBuilder. An authenticated attacker with the ability to submit Groovy scripts to the agent can therefore execute arbitrary operating system commands with the privileges of the sonic-agent process.

Because the maintainer no longer supports this product line, no upstream patch will be released. The public proof-of-concept demonstrates unsandboxed remote code execution against the Sonic Cloud Platform.

Root Cause

The root cause is the use of an unrestricted GroovyShell (or equivalent evaluator) inside evalIsFailed. Groovy natively exposes the full Java class library, and without a SecureASTCustomizer or class filter, expressions such as "cmd".execute() bypass any intended logic-only evaluation. The design assumes trusted script content but exposes evaluation over the network.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the sonic-agent management interface and low-privileged authentication. An attacker submits a crafted Groovy expression as part of a test failure condition. When evalIsFailed parses and executes the script, the injected shell commands run in the context of the agent process. The exploitation mechanism is documented in the public proof-of-concept repository. No synthetic code is reproduced here; refer to the linked advisory for exact syntax.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-15496

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected child processes spawned by the Java process hosting sonic-agent (for example, sh, bash, cmd.exe, powershell.exe).
  • Outbound network connections initiated from the sonic-agent host to unfamiliar IP addresses shortly after test job submission.
  • Groovy script payloads containing tokens such as Runtime.getRuntime(), .execute(), or ProcessBuilder in sonic-agent request logs.
  • New or modified files under the sonic-agent working directory that do not correspond to legitimate test artifacts.

Detection Strategies

  • Enable process ancestry logging on hosts running sonic-agent and alert on shell interpreters spawning from the Java runtime.
  • Inspect HTTP request bodies to sonic-agent endpoints for Groovy metaprogramming keywords and OS-command primitives.
  • Correlate authentication events with subsequent process creation to identify malicious script submissions.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward sonic-agent application logs and host EDR telemetry to a centralized analytics platform for correlation.
  • Baseline normal Groovy script content submitted by legitimate CI/CD pipelines and alert on deviation.
  • Monitor for privilege escalation attempts and lateral movement originating from the sonic-agent service account.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-15496

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict network access to sonic-agent management interfaces using firewall rules or a bastion host, permitting only trusted CI/CD systems.
  • Rotate credentials used to authenticate to sonic-agent and enforce least-privilege service accounts on the host.
  • Migrate off the unsupported sonic-agent 2.7.x line, as the vendor has not responded to disclosure and no patch is planned.
  • Audit historical sonic-agent logs for Groovy payloads containing command-execution primitives.

Patch Information

No vendor patch is available. According to the advisory, the affected sonic-agent releases up to 2.7.2 belong to a product line no longer supported by the maintainer. Organizations should plan decommissioning or replacement with an actively maintained testing agent.

Workarounds

  • Run sonic-agent inside an isolated container with a read-only filesystem, dropped Linux capabilities, and a restrictive seccomp profile to contain command execution.
  • Place a reverse proxy in front of sonic-agent that blocks request bodies containing Groovy execution primitives such as .execute(, Runtime.getRuntime, and ProcessBuilder.
  • Execute the agent under a dedicated non-root user with no shell and no write access to sensitive directories.
  • Disable inbound network exposure entirely if the Groovy scripting feature is not required for current test workloads.
bash
# Example: restrict sonic-agent to loopback and run under a hardened systemd unit
# /etc/systemd/system/sonic-agent.service.d/hardening.conf
[Service]
User=sonic
NoNewPrivileges=true
ProtectSystem=strict
ProtectHome=true
PrivateTmp=true
CapabilityBoundingSet=
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_UNIX
# Bind only to localhost; expose via authenticated reverse proxy
Environment=SONIC_AGENT_BIND=127.0.0.1

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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