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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-14999

CVE-2026-14999: IBM DataPower Gateway Auth Bypass Flaw

CVE-2026-14999 is an authentication bypass flaw in IBM DataPower Gateway that allows attackers to forge JSON Web Signatures. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-14999 Overview

IBM DataPower Gateway contains an authentication bypass vulnerability tied to improper verification of cryptographic signatures on JSON Web Signatures (JWS). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can forge a valid JWS and bypass authentication controls on affected gateways. The flaw is tracked under CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature and affects multiple release trains of DataPower Gateway, including 10.5, 10.6, and 11.0 branches. Successful exploitation allows attackers to impersonate authenticated identities and tamper with protected integration traffic that transits the gateway.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated attackers can forge JWS tokens to bypass authentication on IBM DataPower Gateway and compromise the integrity of API traffic traversing the appliance.

Affected Products

  • IBM DataPower Gateway 10.5.0.0 through 10.5.0.22
  • IBM DataPower Gateway 10.6.0.0 through 10.6.0.10 and 10.6.1 through 10.6.6
  • IBM DataPower Gateway 11.0.0.0 through 11.0.0.2

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-08 - CVE-2026-14999 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-14 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-14999

Vulnerability Analysis

IBM DataPower Gateway acts as a security and integration gateway for APIs, often validating JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) and JSON Web Signatures (JWS) presented by clients. The vulnerability lies in how the gateway verifies the cryptographic signature attached to a JWS. Because verification is improper, the gateway accepts tokens whose signatures should be rejected.

An attacker who forges a JWS can present it to any protected endpoint that relies on DataPower for signature-based authentication. The gateway treats the forged token as valid and forwards the request downstream with the attacker-chosen identity and claims. This undermines the trust boundary DataPower is deployed to enforce.

The network attack vector requires no privileges and no user interaction. Integrity impact is high because an attacker can issue arbitrary signed assertions, while confidentiality and availability are not directly affected per the published vector.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper verification of cryptographic signatures on JWS objects, mapped to CWE-347. Common failure modes in this class include accepting the none algorithm, failing to enforce the expected algorithm against the key type, confusing asymmetric public keys with HMAC secrets, or short-circuiting signature checks under specific header or key identifier conditions. IBM has not publicly described which specific defect applies.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network reach to an API or management interface protected by DataPower JWS validation. The attacker crafts a JWS with chosen header, payload, and signature values, then submits it to the gateway as an authentication credential. If the forged token is accepted, downstream services receive requests bound to spoofed identities, enabling authorization bypass against protected APIs.

No public proof-of-concept, exploit code, or in-the-wild exploitation has been reported. The EPSS score at publication is 0.186%. Refer to the IBM Support Document for vendor technical details.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-14999

Indicators of Compromise

  • Authentication events in DataPower logs where the presented JWS uses an unexpected algorithm value such as none, HS256 against an RSA public key, or an unknown kid.
  • Successful API calls from client identities, source IPs, or user agents that have no prior history of accessing the gateway.
  • Downstream services receiving requests with claim sets that do not match any legitimate issuer behavior.

Detection Strategies

  • Parse DataPower audit and access logs for JWS header values and alert on algorithm or key identifier combinations outside an approved allowlist.
  • Correlate token issuance records from the real identity provider against tokens accepted by DataPower to surface tokens never issued upstream.
  • Hunt for identity reuse patterns where the same subject claim appears from geographically or behaviorally inconsistent sources.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward DataPower logs to a centralized analytics platform and retain full JWS header metadata for retrospective hunting.
  • Monitor administrative and API traffic for spikes in authentication success following token structure anomalies.
  • Track vendor advisories at the IBM Support Document for updated indicators or fixed-version guidance.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-14999

Immediate Actions Required

  • Inventory all DataPower Gateway appliances and identify instances running versions in the affected ranges for 10.5, 10.6, and 11.0.
  • Apply the fixed releases identified in the IBM Support Document as the primary remediation.
  • Restrict network exposure of DataPower management and API endpoints to trusted networks until patching is complete.

Patch Information

IBM has published remediation guidance in the IBM Support Document. Administrators should upgrade affected 10.5.x, 10.6.x, and 11.0.x deployments to the fixed versions listed by IBM. The NVD entry for CVE-2026-14999 was last modified on 2026-10-14 and should be rechecked for additional references.

Workarounds

  • Enforce a strict algorithm allowlist on JWS consumers and reject any token presenting the none algorithm or a mismatched algorithm or key type pair.
  • Place an additional authentication layer, such as mutual TLS or an upstream API gateway, in front of DataPower for high-value APIs until patches are applied.
  • Rotate signing keys and shorten token lifetimes to reduce the window of usefulness for any forged tokens.
bash
# Example: restrict DataPower management interface to a trusted jump host
# Apply at the network edge or on the appliance ACL
access-list permit tcp host 10.10.5.20 any eq 9090
access-list deny   tcp any any eq 9090

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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