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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-14935

CVE-2026-14935: GStreamer Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-14935 is an authentication bypass flaw in GStreamer's webrtcbin component that weakens DTLS fingerprint verification in WebRTC connections. This article covers the technical details, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

CVE-2026-14935 Overview

CVE-2026-14935 is a logic vulnerability in the webrtcbin component of GStreamer, the widely used open-source multimedia framework. The _check_sdp_crypto() function contains an inverted boolean condition that reverses the intended validation of the a=fingerprint attribute in Session Description Protocol (SDP) messages. As a result, GStreamer accepts remote SDP offers and answers that lack the required DTLS certificate fingerprint, while rejecting well-formed SDPs that include it. The defect weakens the SDP-to-DTLS binding that WebRTC relies on to authenticate media peers, exposing sessions to man-in-the-middle attacks on the signaling path.

Critical Impact

An attacker able to intercept WebRTC signaling can bypass DTLS fingerprint validation and interpose on media streams handled by webrtcbin.

Affected Products

  • GStreamer webrtcbin element (gst-plugins-bad, WebRTC plugin)
  • GStreamer distributions shipped by Red Hat (see the Red Hat CVE-2026-14935 Advisory)
  • Downstream applications embedding GStreamer WebRTC for real-time media

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-07-07 - CVE-2026-14935 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-07-08 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-14935

Vulnerability Analysis

The flaw is categorized as a business logic error [CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation] in the SDP validation path of webrtcbin. WebRTC binds the identity of a remote peer to a DTLS certificate by transmitting the certificate's fingerprint inside an a=fingerprint line of the SDP. During the DTLS handshake, the receiving peer compares the negotiated certificate against the signaled fingerprint. If they match, the media path inherits the authentication properties of the signaling channel.

Because _check_sdp_crypto() inverts its check, the function returns success when the fingerprint attribute is missing and failure when it is present. Sessions negotiated through the affected code path therefore proceed without enforcing the fingerprint binding. An attacker who can modify signaling messages between peers can strip or substitute the a=fingerprint line, present an attacker-controlled DTLS certificate, and relay media in cleartext to the attacker's tooling.

The issue affects confidentiality and integrity of the media path but does not itself grant code execution. Exploitation requires an active network position, which is reflected in the attack complexity rating.

Root Cause

The root cause is an inverted boolean expression inside _check_sdp_crypto() in the webrtcbin element. The condition intended to verify the presence of an a=fingerprint attribute evaluates to true when the attribute is absent, so the function short-circuits validation instead of enforcing it. Details of the corrected logic are available in the GStreamer Security Merge Request and the associated GStreamer Work Item #5171.

Attack Vector

Exploitation is network-based and requires an on-path attacker between the two WebRTC peers or control over an intermediary signaling server. The attacker intercepts an SDP offer or answer, removes the a=fingerprint attribute (or replaces it), and forwards the modified SDP to the GStreamer-based peer. The affected peer accepts the SDP without a bound fingerprint, then completes a DTLS handshake against the attacker's certificate. The attacker terminates DTLS, decrypts SRTP media, and optionally re-encrypts it toward the far end, achieving a man-in-the-middle position on the media stream.

No verified public exploit code is available. The vulnerability is described in prose based on the vendor advisory and upstream merge request.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-14935

Indicators of Compromise

  • WebRTC sessions negotiated by webrtcbin peers where the remote SDP lacks an a=fingerprint attribute yet the session still progresses to media exchange.
  • DTLS handshakes on media ports terminating against certificates whose SHA-256 fingerprint does not match any value advertised in signaling logs.
  • Signaling proxies or SFUs recording SDP payloads that were rewritten in transit to strip a=fingerprint lines.

Detection Strategies

  • Instrument WebRTC applications to log the presence and value of a=fingerprint for every negotiated session, then alert when the attribute is absent.
  • Compare fingerprints observed in signaling with the DTLS certificate fingerprint negotiated on the media path; mismatches or missing values indicate tampering or an affected build.
  • Inventory hosts running vulnerable GStreamer packages by querying package managers for gst-plugins-bad versions predating the upstream fix.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Capture and retain SDP exchanges from signaling servers for forensic replay against the observed DTLS certificate chain.
  • Monitor outbound DTLS/SRTP flows from media servers for connections to unexpected destinations that could indicate a relayed session.
  • Track GStreamer version telemetry across build pipelines and container images to confirm patched libraries are deployed.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-14935

Immediate Actions Required

  • Apply the upstream GStreamer patch that corrects the inverted condition in _check_sdp_crypto(), as referenced in the GStreamer Security Merge Request.
  • Rebuild and redeploy applications and containers that statically link or bundle affected gst-plugins-bad versions.
  • Enforce mutual authentication at the signaling layer (for example, authenticated WebSocket transport with TLS pinning) to limit an attacker's ability to modify SDP in transit.

Patch Information

Refer to the Red Hat CVE-2026-14935 Advisory and Red Hat Bug Report #2497679 for distribution package versions. Upstream fixes are tracked in GStreamer Work Item #5171. Package updates should be pulled from vendor repositories once available for the affected channel.

Workarounds

  • Terminate WebRTC signaling on a trusted, authenticated broker that validates that every SDP contains an a=fingerprint attribute before relaying it to webrtcbin peers.
  • Require peers to exchange DTLS certificate fingerprints out of band and reject sessions whose runtime fingerprint does not match the expected value.
  • Restrict WebRTC endpoints to trusted networks or VPN overlays until patched builds of GStreamer are deployed to production.

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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