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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-14814

CVE-2026-14814: GitLab CE/EE Cache Poisoning RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2026-14814 is a cache poisoning remote code execution vulnerability in GitLab CE/EE that allows attackers to inject malicious content into CI/CD pipelines and expose environment variables. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact assessment, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

CVE-2026-14814 Overview

GitLab has patched a cache poisoning vulnerability in GitLab Community Edition (CE) and Enterprise Edition (EE) that affects raw repository file responses. The flaw stems from improper validation of repository references, allowing an authenticated attacker to poison cached responses served to other users. Victims whose Continuous Integration/Continuous Deployment (CI/CD) pipelines fetch the poisoned raw files can execute attacker-controlled content and expose protected environment variables. The issue is tracked under [CWE-625: Permissive Regular Expression].

Critical Impact

Poisoned cached responses can hijack targeted CI/CD pipelines and leak protected environment variables, including deployment credentials and signing secrets.

Affected Products

  • GitLab CE/EE all versions before 19.2.8
  • GitLab CE/EE 19.3 before 19.3.5
  • GitLab CE/EE 19.4 before 19.4.2

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-13 - CVE-2026-14814 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-10-14 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-14814

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in how GitLab validates repository references when serving raw repository files. Improper validation lets an attacker craft requests that cause the cache layer to store a response under a key that other users will later retrieve. When a victim's CI/CD pipeline requests the same raw file path, the cache serves the attacker-controlled payload instead of the legitimate repository content.

Because CI/CD runners execute the fetched content in a trusted context, the poisoned response can trigger arbitrary pipeline actions. Protected environment variables scoped to the targeted environment become reachable to the attacker-controlled logic running inside the pipeline. The impact scope is marked as changed because the vulnerable component (cache + raw file endpoint) extends compromise into the CI/CD subsystem.

Root Cause

The root cause is insufficient validation of repository reference parameters supplied in requests for raw files. The reference handling allows semantically distinct inputs to normalize to the same cache key. This mismatch between the cache key and the content actually resolved creates the opportunity for cache poisoning.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the GitLab instance and low-privileged authenticated access. The attacker submits specially crafted raw file requests referencing a repository they can influence. Once the manipulated response is cached, any user, service account, or pipeline requesting the matching path receives the poisoned content. The attack complexity is high because successful exploitation depends on timing, cache state, and knowledge of a target pipeline's fetch patterns.

See the HackerOne Report #3832707 and GitLab Work Item #604950 for technical details.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-14814

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected modifications or anomalous output in CI/CD job logs that fetch raw repository files via /-/raw/ or /raw/ endpoints.
  • Repeated raw-file requests from a single authenticated user referencing varied or unusual branch, tag, or commit identifiers.
  • Pipeline executions that reference protected environment variables outside their normal job scope or export them to external destinations.

Detection Strategies

  • Review GitLab production and Workhorse logs for requests to raw file endpoints with abnormal reference parameters or encoded characters.
  • Correlate cache hit patterns with user identity to identify responses served to users who did not originate the cached request.
  • Audit CI/CD pipeline history for jobs whose fetched artifacts diverge from the committed repository content.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward GitLab application, Workhorse, and runner logs to a centralized analytics platform for correlation across the raw-file request path and pipeline execution events.
  • Alert on egress from CI/CD runners to untrusted destinations following raw-file fetches.
  • Track outbound use of protected variables such as deployment tokens and signing keys for anomalous usage patterns.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-14814

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade GitLab CE/EE to 19.2.8, 19.3.5, 19.4.2, or later as published in the GitLab Patch Release 19.4.2 advisory.
  • Rotate any protected CI/CD variables, deployment tokens, and signing keys that may have been exposed to pipelines on vulnerable versions.
  • Review recent pipeline runs that consumed raw repository files and validate their outputs against the expected repository state.

Patch Information

GitLab resolved the issue by correcting repository reference validation on the raw file endpoint. Apply the fix by upgrading to a patched release listed in the vendor advisory. Self-managed administrators should follow the standard GitLab upgrade path and verify the running version after deployment.

Workarounds

  • Restrict project membership and reduce the number of users permitted to push to repositories referenced by sensitive pipelines until the patch is applied.
  • Pin CI/CD jobs to fetch artifacts by immutable commit SHA rather than branch or tag names when retrieving raw files.
  • Where feasible, place a reverse proxy in front of GitLab that bypasses or shortens caching on raw file responses until upgrading is complete.
bash
# Verify installed GitLab version after upgrading
sudo gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info | grep "GitLab information" -A 5

# Example: enforce commit SHA pinning in .gitlab-ci.yml include blocks
include:
  - project: 'group/shared-ci'
    ref: '7f3c9a1b4e2d8f6c0a9b1d3e5f7a9c1b3d5e7f9a'
    file: '/templates/build.yml'

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

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