CVE-2026-14321 Overview
The divi-dash WordPress plugin before version 1.0.7 fails to validate the source of the client IP address it uses for rate limiting and banning. Unauthenticated attackers can spoof arbitrary IP addresses through HTTP headers such as X-Forwarded-For. This allows attackers to bypass rate limiting, ban chosen addresses from the plugin feature, and grow a stored option without bound. The unbounded growth of the stored option results in a denial of service condition affecting the WordPress site. The vulnerability is tracked under [CWE-400] (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption).
Critical Impact
Unauthenticated remote attackers can exhaust site resources and lock out legitimate IP addresses without any authentication or user interaction.
Affected Products
- divi-dash WordPress plugin versions prior to 1.0.7
- WordPress sites with the divi-dash plugin installed and active
- Deployments where the plugin's rate limiting or IP banning features are relied upon
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-09-23 - CVE-2026-14321 published to the National Vulnerability Database
- 2026-09-23 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-14321
Vulnerability Analysis
The divi-dash plugin implements rate limiting and IP banning to throttle abusive clients. The plugin derives the client IP from HTTP request headers without validating whether those headers came from a trusted upstream proxy. Attackers can inject arbitrary values into headers such as X-Forwarded-For or Client-IP and have the plugin treat those values as authoritative source addresses.
Because each spoofed address is stored persistently in a WordPress option row, an attacker sending large volumes of unique IPs causes the option to grow indefinitely. WordPress loads options into memory on each request, so an oversized option row degrades performance and can exhaust available memory. The impact combines an integrity issue (banning arbitrary victims, bypassing throttling) with a high-impact availability outcome.
Root Cause
The plugin trusts client-controlled HTTP headers when identifying the request source. It does not restrict header parsing to configured reverse proxies and does not enforce an upper bound on the size of the stored option that tracks IP state.
Attack Vector
The attack is executed over the network without authentication or user interaction. An attacker sends HTTP requests to the target WordPress site with forged IP-identifying headers. By rotating spoofed values, the attacker can populate the plugin's stored option with unbounded entries and selectively ban legitimate user IPs from the plugin's functionality.
No verified proof-of-concept code is currently available. Refer to the WPScan Vulnerability Report for further technical details.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-14321
Indicators of Compromise
- Abnormal growth of WordPress wp_options row size associated with the divi-dash plugin
- High volumes of requests containing varied or malformed X-Forwarded-For header values from a single upstream source
- Legitimate user IP addresses appearing in plugin ban state without prior abuse activity
- Elevated PHP memory usage or HTTP 500 errors correlated with divi-dash-handled endpoints
Detection Strategies
- Inspect web server access logs for repeated requests from the same TCP source presenting rotating client IP headers
- Monitor the size of divi-dash-related options in the WordPress database and alert on unexpected growth
- Correlate spikes in unique claimed client IPs against a smaller set of true TCP peers at the load balancer or WAF
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable web application firewall logging for header manipulation patterns targeting rate-limit bypass
- Track WordPress database option row sizes as a health metric and alert on sudden increases
- Watch for sudden loss of access from known-good administrator IP ranges to the plugin surface
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-14321
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade the divi-dash plugin to version 1.0.7 or later on all WordPress installations
- Audit the plugin's stored options and truncate any oversized IP state entries introduced by spoofing
- Configure the reverse proxy or WAF to strip or overwrite client-supplied IP headers from untrusted sources
Patch Information
The vendor addressed the issue in divi-dash version 1.0.7. The fix validates the source of the client IP address before applying rate limiting or banning decisions. See the WPScan Vulnerability Report for advisory details.
Workarounds
- Deploy a WAF rule that removes or normalizes X-Forwarded-For, Client-IP, and related headers on requests originating outside trusted proxies
- Temporarily disable the divi-dash plugin if patching cannot be performed immediately
- Restrict access to plugin endpoints using network-layer allowlists where feasible
# Example nginx configuration to strip client-supplied IP headers
# from requests not originating from a trusted upstream proxy
location / {
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For "";
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header Client-IP "";
proxy_pass http://wordpress_backend;
}
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.