Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-115329 Overview
CVE-2026-115329 is a cross-tenant Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in Lotus, an open-source pricing and billing platform, through version 0.10.2. The flaw resides in SubscriptionViewSet.get_object() within backend/api/views.py, which queries subscription records using an unscoped queryset. Authenticated users or API keys from any organization can supply another organization's subscription_id to read, cancel, update, switch plans, or modify addons belonging to a different tenant. The weakness is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.
Critical Impact
Any authenticated tenant can enumerate and manipulate another organization's billing state, including canceling subscriptions and altering plan addons, resulting in cross-tenant data exposure and revenue integrity loss.
Affected Products
- Lotus billing platform (uselotus/lotus) through version 0.10.2
- The vulnerable code path is in backend/api/views.py at the SubscriptionViewSet.get_object() method
- Deployments exposing the Lotus REST API to multi-tenant users or shared API keys
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-22 - CVE-2026-115329 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-115329
Vulnerability Analysis
Lotus implements multi-tenant isolation by scoping querysets to an authenticated organization. The SubscriptionViewSet violated this pattern by resolving a request's subscription_id against the class-level self.queryset attribute instead of the request-scoped self.get_queryset() helper. The class-level queryset returns all subscription records across every organization in the database. Any authenticated principal, whether a user session or an API key, can therefore pass an arbitrary subscription_id and operate on the resulting record. Because SubscriptionViewSet exposes read, update, cancel, plan-switch, and addon-management actions, a single IDOR primitive maps to multiple destructive billing operations.
Root Cause
The root cause is a direct reference to self.queryset in get_object(), bypassing the organization filter applied in get_queryset(). The correct Django REST Framework pattern delegates object lookup through get_queryset() so that tenant scoping and permission checks apply uniformly. See Lotus Issue #799 and Pull Request #802 for the maintainer discussion.
Attack Vector
An attacker with any valid authentication credential in a Lotus instance enumerates or guesses a target subscription_id (UUID). They then issue a request to the subscription endpoint, substituting the victim organization's identifier. The server returns or mutates the record without validating tenant ownership. No elevated privileges or user interaction are required beyond holding a low-privilege API key.
"Unexpected state. Could not find subscription_id in request."
)
try:
- obj = self.queryset.get(subscription_record_id=subscription_uuid)
+ obj = self.get_queryset().get(subscription_record_id=subscription_uuid)
except SubscriptionRecord.DoesNotExist:
raise NotFoundException(
f"Subscription with subscription_id {subscription_id} not found"
Source: uselotus/lotus commit 1375d514 — the patch replaces the unscoped self.queryset lookup with self.get_queryset(), re-enabling organization filtering for object retrieval.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-115329
Indicators of Compromise
- API requests to subscription endpoints where the authenticated organization identifier does not match the organization that owns the referenced subscription_record_id.
- Unexpected cancel, update, switch_plan, or addon-modification actions in Lotus audit logs originating from tenants that have never previously interacted with the target subscription.
- Spikes in HTTP 200 responses from /api/subscriptions/<uuid>/ endpoints with high-cardinality UUID enumeration patterns from a single API key.
Detection Strategies
- Instrument the Lotus application to log the requesting organization ID alongside the owning organization ID for every subscription operation, and alert on mismatches.
- Deploy an authorization gateway rule that cross-references the API key's tenant with the target resource's tenant before forwarding requests to Lotus.
- Review historical application logs for sequential or scripted access to subscription_record_id values that span multiple organizations within a short window.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Centralize Lotus application and web server logs in a SIEM and build correlation rules for cross-tenant resource access.
- Monitor billing-state transitions (cancellations, plan switches, addon changes) and require secondary approval for high-value accounts.
- Track API key usage patterns and alert on sudden increases in subscription endpoint request volume per key.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-115329
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Lotus beyond version 0.10.2 to a build that includes commit 1375d514.
- Rotate all Lotus API keys issued to tenants, assuming any key may have been used to enumerate cross-tenant subscription IDs.
- Audit subscription modification history for unauthorized cancellations, plan switches, and addon changes across all organizations.
Patch Information
The fix is published in the upstream Lotus repository via Pull Request #802 and merged as commit 1375d5140795d72251c89f47200879b9bd1d6d96. The patch replaces the unscoped self.queryset.get(...) call in SubscriptionViewSet.get_object() with self.get_queryset().get(...), restoring per-request organization filtering. Reference the VulnCheck advisory for the full technical write-up.
Workarounds
- Place Lotus behind a reverse proxy that validates the authenticated tenant against the requested subscription_id before forwarding the request.
- Restrict Lotus API access to trusted internal consumers only, and disable multi-tenant API key issuance until patched.
- Apply the one-line upstream diff as a local hotfix for operators who cannot immediately deploy a new release.
# Apply the upstream fix locally to backend/api/views.py (line 754)
cd /opt/lotus
git fetch origin
git cherry-pick 1375d5140795d72251c89f47200879b9bd1d6d96
# Rebuild and restart the Lotus backend
docker compose build backend && docker compose up -d backend
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

