Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-114717 Overview
CVE-2026-114717 is a mail header injection vulnerability in Roundcube Webmail affecting versions before 1.6.20 and 1.7.x before 1.7.5. The flaw occurs when a user forwards a message as an attachment. Roundcube uses the forwarded message's subject verbatim to build the attachment name in the outgoing MIME message. A subject containing carriage return and line feed (CRLF) sequences allows an attacker to inject arbitrary MIME part headers into messages generated by the victim.
The vulnerability is tracked under CWE-99: Improper Control of Resource Identifiers and was fixed in the upstream commit titled "Fix mail header injection via subject of a message forwarded as attachment."
Critical Impact
An attacker who sends a crafted email can cause the recipient's forwarded message to carry attacker-controlled MIME headers, enabling manipulation of outgoing mail structure.
Affected Products
- Roundcube Webmail versions prior to 1.6.20
- Roundcube Webmail 1.7.x versions prior to 1.7.5
- Downstream Linux distributions packaging vulnerable Roundcube builds
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-19 - Roundcube publishes security updates 1.6.20 and 1.7.5
- 2026-10-22 - CVE-2026-114717 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-114717
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in program/actions/mail/compose.php, which generates the attachment filename when a user forwards an email as a MIME attachment. Roundcube truncated the original message subject to 64 characters and used the result directly as the attachment name field inside the generated MIME part. Because MIME headers are separated by CRLF sequences, embedding \r\n into the subject breaks out of the name= parameter and injects additional headers into the message body.
This is a classic CRLF injection pattern applied to outbound mail composition. The attacker does not control the victim's mail client directly. Instead, the attacker sends an email with a crafted subject and waits for the recipient to forward it as an attachment, at which point the injected headers reach downstream recipients and mail infrastructure.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing sanitization of untrusted input before it is placed inside a MIME header value. The pre-patch code performed only a length truncation using mb_substr($message->subject, 0, 64). No stripping or normalization of whitespace, control characters, or CRLF sequences was applied, so the subject value flowed directly into the header context.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires an attacker to send an email with a subject that contains CRLF sequences and injected MIME headers. The attack succeeds only if a Roundcube user with a vulnerable version chooses to forward that message as an attachment. The exploitation path is network-based and requires no authentication on the Roundcube server, but it does depend on specific user behavior, which raises attack complexity.
// Pre-patch (vulnerable) vs. post-patch (fixed) in program/actions/mail/compose.php
// generate (unique) attachment name
- $name = strlen($message->subject) ? mb_substr($message->subject, 0, 64) : 'message_rfc822';
+ $name = 'message_rfc822';
+ if (strlen($message->subject)) {
+ // Note: Replace any whitespace characters (most importantly \r and \n)
+ $name = mb_substr(trim(preg_replace('/\s+/', ' ', $message->subject)), 0, 64);
+ }
if (!empty($names[$name])) {
$names[$name]++;
$name .= '_' . $names[$name];
Source: Roundcube Commit 4c3291c. The patch collapses all whitespace in the subject to single spaces using preg_replace('/\s+/', ' ', ...) and trims the result before truncation, eliminating the CRLF primitive used for injection.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114717
Indicators of Compromise
- Outbound MIME messages generated by Roundcube that contain unexpected or duplicated headers inside attachment parts.
- Inbound emails whose Subject: header contains encoded or raw CRLF sequences, particularly in long or oddly structured subjects.
- Mail queue entries where a forwarded attachment's name= parameter is followed by additional header-like tokens.
Detection Strategies
- Inspect MTA logs for messages composed via Roundcube that contain abnormal MIME structures or extra headers in attachment parts.
- Run SMTP header hygiene checks on inbound mail to flag subjects containing control characters or encoded CRLF sequences such as =0D=0A in quoted-printable form.
- Correlate Roundcube compose actions with outbound messages that exceed expected header counts for forwarded attachments.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor Roundcube version strings reported in HTTP responses or application logs and alert on any instance below 1.6.20 or 1.7.5.
- Track user-forward-as-attachment actions in webmail audit logs and sample the resulting outbound messages for header anomalies.
- Enable mail security gateway rules that reject or quarantine messages whose MIME headers include unescaped control characters.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114717
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Roundcube Webmail to version 1.6.20 or 1.7.5 as published in the Roundcube Security Updates Announcement.
- Apply distribution-level patches tracked in Debian Bug #1151279 for packaged Roundcube builds.
- Audit webmail logs for recent use of the "forward as attachment" feature and review the resulting outbound messages.
Patch Information
The upstream fix is available in two commits: commit 4c3291c for the 1.6.x branch and commit c325953 for the 1.7.x branch. Both are included in the tagged releases Roundcube 1.6.20 and Roundcube 1.7.5.
Workarounds
- If patching is delayed, instruct users to avoid using the "forward as attachment" option and use inline forwarding instead.
- Deploy a mail gateway rule that strips or rejects inbound Subject: headers containing CRLF, NUL, or other control characters before they reach Roundcube users.
- Restrict Roundcube SMTP submission paths through an authenticated outbound relay that normalizes MIME headers on egress.
# Example: verify installed Roundcube version meets the fixed release
grep -R "RCMAIL_VERSION" /var/www/roundcube/program/include/ | head -n 1
# Debian/Ubuntu: upgrade packaged Roundcube
sudo apt update && sudo apt install --only-upgrade roundcube roundcube-core
# Source install: switch to the fixed tag and reinstall dependencies
cd /opt/roundcubemail
git fetch --tags
git checkout 1.6.20 # or 1.7.5 for the 1.7.x branch
composer install --no-dev
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

