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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-114665

CVE-2026-114665: Goploy Information Disclosure Vulnerability

CVE-2026-114665 is an information disclosure flaw in Goploy that allows authenticated users to read arbitrary files through symlink exploitation. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-114665 Overview

CVE-2026-114665 is a symlink following vulnerability [CWE-59] in Goploy, an open-source deployment management system. The flaw affects version 1.18.0 and is fixed in 1.18.1. The /deploy/fileDiff and /deploy/fileCompare endpoints resolve user-supplied file paths without validating whether the final target resides inside the project directory. Authenticated members with repository write access can commit a symbolic link that points outside the project root. When the vulnerable endpoints follow that symlink, Goploy returns the contents of arbitrary files on the server, including database configuration files and SSH private keys used for deployment.

Critical Impact

Authenticated users can exfiltrate deployment SSH private keys and database credentials, enabling lateral movement into production infrastructure managed by Goploy.

Affected Products

  • Goploy 1.18.0
  • Goploy versions prior to 1.18.1
  • /deploy/fileDiff and /deploy/fileCompare API endpoints

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-22 - CVE-2026-114665 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-114665

Vulnerability Analysis

Goploy exposes two deployment endpoints that read project files for diff and comparison views. In version 1.18.0, the handler constructed the source path by joining the project directory with a user-controlled FilePath field, then opened the resulting path with os.Open. The code called pkg.ValidateRelativePath to reject traversal sequences such as ../, but it never resolved symbolic links. An attacker with write access to a linked repository can commit a symlink inside the project tree that resolves to a target outside the project root. When Goploy opens the path, the Go runtime transparently follows the symlink, returning the content of the external file to the authenticated caller.

Root Cause

The vulnerability stems from path validation performed on the raw request string rather than on the resolved filesystem target. ValidateRelativePath inspects textual components for traversal patterns but does not call filepath.EvalSymlinks or compare the resolved target against the project root. The subsequent filepath.Join operation preserves the symlink, and os.Open dereferences it without further checks.

Attack Vector

An authenticated member with repository write permission commits a symlink such as payload -> /etc/goploy/config.toml or payload -> /home/goploy/.ssh/id_rsa. The attacker then invokes /deploy/fileDiff or /deploy/fileCompare with FilePath set to the symlink name. Goploy opens the resolved target and returns the file contents in the API response. The attack requires only low privileges and no user interaction.

go
// Patch: cmd/server/api/deploy/handler.go (commit 97a4983)
// Replaces unchecked filepath.Join with ResolvePath, which rejects
// symlink escapes outside the project directory.

-	if err := pkg.ValidateRelativePath(reqData.FilePath); err != nil {
+	project, err := model.Project{ID: reqData.ProjectID, NamespaceID: gp.Namespace.ID}.GetNamespaceData()
+	if err != nil {
 		return response.JSON{Code: response.Error, Message: err.Error()}
 	}
 
-	project, err := model.Project{ID: reqData.ProjectID, NamespaceID: gp.Namespace.ID}.GetNamespaceData()
+	srcPath, _, err := pkg.ResolvePath(config.GetProjectPath(project.ID), reqData.FilePath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return response.JSON{Code: response.Error, Message: err.Error()}
 	}
-
-	srcPath := filepath.Join(config.GetProjectPath(project.ID), filepath.FromSlash(strings.ReplaceAll(reqData.FilePath, `\`, "/")))
 	file, err := os.Open(srcPath)

Source: GitHub goploy Commit 97a4983

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114665

Indicators of Compromise

  • HTTP requests to /deploy/fileDiff or /deploy/fileCompare where the FilePath parameter references files not expected in the project tree.
  • Repository commits that introduce symbolic links pointing to absolute paths such as /etc/, /root/, /home/*/.ssh/, or Goploy configuration directories.
  • Goploy process access to files outside GetProjectPath(project.ID), visible in filesystem audit logs.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect Git repositories managed by Goploy for symlink entries using git ls-tree -r HEAD | grep ^120000 and alert on links resolving outside the repository root.
  • Enable Linux audit rules (auditd) on sensitive files such as /etc/goploy/*, SSH private keys, and database credential files, correlating reads to the Goploy service account.
  • Review Goploy application logs for high-frequency fileDiff or fileCompare calls originating from a single member account.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Baseline normal FilePath values per project and alert on anomalous paths or extensions such as .pem, .key, .env, or config.*.
  • Forward Goploy API logs and host filesystem telemetry to a centralized analytics platform to correlate repository changes with suspicious read activity.
  • Track outbound SSH connections from infrastructure that reuses Goploy deployment keys to detect downstream credential abuse.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114665

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Goploy to version 1.18.1 or later, which introduces pkg.ResolvePath to reject symlink escapes.
  • Rotate all deployment SSH private keys and database credentials that were accessible to the Goploy service account during the exposure window.
  • Audit project repositories for unauthorized symbolic links and remove any that reference paths outside the project tree.

Patch Information

The fix is included in Goploy Release v1.18.1. Commit 97a4983 replaces the unchecked filepath.Join logic with pkg.ResolvePath, which validates that the resolved target remains inside the project directory. Full details are published in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw and the Vulncheck Advisory for goploy.

Workarounds

  • Restrict Goploy member accounts so that only trusted users retain repository write access until the patch is applied.
  • Run the Goploy service under a dedicated low-privilege user that cannot read deployment SSH keys or system configuration files directly.
  • Apply mandatory access controls (AppArmor or SELinux) that confine the Goploy process to its project directories.
bash
# Verify the installed Goploy version and locate stray symlinks in managed repos
goploy --version
find /var/lib/goploy/projects -type l -exec ls -l {} \; \
  | awk '$NF ~ /^\// {print}'

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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