Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-114663 Overview
CVE-2026-114663 is a miscompilation flaw in the Vyper smart contract compiler affecting versions 0.4.0b1 through 0.5.0b1. The compiler's parse_Name function resolves identifiers for unfoldable constants and omitted default arguments from imported modules in the calling function's scope rather than at the declaration site. When a contract parameter, local variable, or loop variable shares a name with an imported constant or default argument, attacker-influenced input can replace the intended value. This substitution can introduce out-of-range values for narrow numeric types such as uint8, corrupting validation logic and accounting routines in deployed contracts. The flaw is tracked under CWE-706: Use of Incorrectly-Resolved Name or Reference.
Critical Impact
Attacker-controlled input can override imported constants or default arguments at compile time, bypassing validation checks and corrupting state in Vyper-compiled smart contracts.
Affected Products
- Vyper compiler version 0.4.0b1
- Vyper compiler versions between 0.4.0b1 and 0.5.0b1
- Smart contracts compiled with the affected Vyper versions that import constants or default arguments
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-22 - CVE-2026-114663 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-114663
Vulnerability Analysis
The defect lives in the Vyper front-end name-resolution pass. During compilation, parse_Name is responsible for binding identifiers that appear in the body of a function to their declarations. For unfoldable constants and omitted default arguments pulled in from imported modules, the resolver walks the scope of the function that uses the symbol instead of the scope where it was declared. This inversion of scoping rules allows local names to shadow imported names silently, with no diagnostic emitted by the compiler.
The effect is a miscompilation: the generated bytecode substitutes a local or parameter value in place of the imported constant. Developers reading the source see a trusted module constant, while the compiled contract uses whatever value the caller supplies. For narrow numeric types like uint8, the substituted value may fall outside the declared range and bypass bounds-checking that the original constant was meant to enforce. This behavior maps to CWE-706.
Root Cause
The root cause is incorrect lexical scoping in parse_Name. Imported symbols must resolve against the declaration module's scope. Instead, the resolver uses the current function's scope, which permits parameters, local variables, and loop induction variables to override imported identifiers.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires a contract whose source imports a constant or relies on an omitted default argument that shares a name with a function parameter, local variable, or loop variable. An attacker who controls the shadowing input value can supply data that the contract author never anticipated. The compiled bytecode then uses the attacker-controlled value in place of the trusted constant, enabling validation bypass, accounting corruption, or logic flow deviation. Detailed exploitation mechanics are documented in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-2489-32vh-8rrc and the VulnCheck Advisory on Vyper Name Shadowing.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114663
Indicators of Compromise
- Deployed Vyper contracts compiled with versions between 0.4.0b1 and 0.5.0b1 that import constants or use default arguments from external modules.
- Transactions that pass values outside the declared range for narrow types such as uint8 without triggering expected reverts.
- Divergence between source-level audit expectations and on-chain contract behavior for accounting or validation functions.
Detection Strategies
- Recompile affected contracts with a patched Vyper release and compare the resulting bytecode against production deployments to identify miscompiled artifacts.
- Perform static review of Vyper sources to flag any function where a parameter, local, or loop variable name collides with an imported constant or default argument.
- Audit contract call traces for state changes that violate invariants that imported constants were intended to enforce.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Monitor on-chain transactions to affected contracts for unexpected input values in parameters that share names with imported module symbols.
- Track Vyper compiler version metadata in CI/CD pipelines and alert on builds that use versions in the vulnerable range.
- Instrument smart contract test suites with property-based fuzzing targeting functions that reference imported constants or default arguments.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114663
Immediate Actions Required
- Inventory all Vyper projects and identify any contracts compiled with versions 0.4.0b1 through 0.5.0b1.
- Rename function parameters, local variables, and loop variables that collide with imported constant or default argument identifiers.
- Recompile and redeploy affected contracts after upgrading to a fixed Vyper release.
- Review audit reports for assumptions tied to imported constants and re-verify them against the compiled bytecode.
Patch Information
The Vyper maintainers have published remediation guidance in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-2489-32vh-8rrc. Upgrade to the fixed Vyper release referenced in the advisory and rebuild all downstream contracts. Deployed contracts cannot be patched in place; affected contracts must be redeployed or migrated.
Workarounds
- Avoid naming any function parameter, local variable, or loop variable identically to an imported constant or default argument until the compiler is upgraded.
- Replace reliance on omitted default arguments with explicit argument passing to force the correct value at the call site.
- Inline critical constants into the consuming module as a stop-gap so name resolution happens in the declaration scope.
# Verify installed Vyper compiler version in CI
vyper --version
# Upgrade to a fixed release per the GHSA-2489-32vh-8rrc advisory
pip install --upgrade vyper
# Recompile contracts and diff bytecode against production artifacts
vyper contracts/MyContract.vy > build/MyContract.bin
diff build/MyContract.bin production/MyContract.bin
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

