Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-114634 Overview
CVE-2026-114634 is a blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in WWBN AVideo versions prior to 29.4.0. The flaw resides in the getHeaderContentTypeFromURL() function, where PHP's get_headers() call follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the destination through isSSRFSafeURL(). Authenticated uploaders can store a videoLink that points to an attacker-controlled redirector. When visitors view the video, the AVideo server issues internal GET requests to the redirect target. Attackers abuse the embed-versus-video render oracle to perform internal port scanning against hosts reachable from the server. The weakness is classified under CWE-918.
Critical Impact
Authenticated attackers can coerce the AVideo server into probing internal network resources, exposing hosts and services that are otherwise unreachable from the public internet.
Affected Products
- WWBN AVideo versions prior to 29.4.0
- Deployments exposing authenticated upload functionality
- Instances where getHeaderContentTypeFromURL() processes user-supplied videoLink values
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-22 - CVE-2026-114634 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-114634
Vulnerability Analysis
AVideo exposes a videoLink field that authenticated uploaders can populate with an external URL. The server-side function getHeaderContentTypeFromURL() validates the submitted URL using isValidURL() and isSSRFSafeURL() before calling get_headers(). These checks apply only to the initial URL. PHP's get_headers() transparently follows HTTP 3xx redirects, and the redirect target is never passed back through isSSRFSafeURL(). An attacker hosts a redirector that returns HTTP 302 to an internal address such as http://127.0.0.1:6379 or http://192.168.0.1:22. When a visitor loads the video page, AVideo evaluates the content type by issuing the request chain and chooses between an embed render path and a native video render path. That rendering difference leaks whether the internal port responded with a recognizable payload, producing a blind oracle for internal reconnaissance.
Root Cause
The root cause is incomplete SSRF validation across redirect boundaries. isSSRFSafeURL() is enforced only on the user-supplied URL and not on each hop returned by the HTTP server. Reliance on get_headers() default behavior with follow_location enabled permits the request chain to pivot to disallowed destinations.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires authenticated upload privileges. The attacker submits a video entry whose videoLink points to an external redirector under their control. Each visitor that triggers content-type resolution causes the AVideo backend to issue an internal GET request. The attacker iterates ports and IPs through the redirector and observes the rendering difference to map reachable services.
// Patch excerpt from objects/functions.php
// Source: https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/2db920d3326729743511a27de44034b0a6c78b05
// SECURITY: isValidURL() only checks format, not destination - require isSSRFSafeURL()
// since $url here can be an attacker-controlled videoLink (Video::getIncludeType()).
if (!isValidURL($url) || !isSSRFSafeURL($url)) {
return false;
}
// SECURITY: get_headers() follows redirects without re-checking them, so a safe URL could
// redirect to an internal host. Follow redirects manually and re-validate every hop,
// same as url_get_contents().
$options = stream_context_get_options(stream_context_get_default());
$maxRequests = max(1, (int) ($options['http']['max_redirects'] ?? 20));
$options['http']['follow_location'] = 0;
$context = stream_context_create($options);
$currentUrl = $url;
for ($redirectCount = 0; $redirectCount < $maxRequests; $redirectCount++) {
$headers = get_headers($currentUrl, false, $context);
if (empty($headers)) {
return false;
}
// ... parse status, Content-Type, and Location, then re-validate the next hop
}
The patch disables automatic redirect following, parses each response manually, and re-runs isSSRFSafeURL() against every Location header before issuing the next request.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114634
Indicators of Compromise
- Outbound HTTP requests from the AVideo PHP worker to external domains that return 3xx responses pointing to RFC1918, loopback, or link-local addresses.
- videoLink values in the AVideo database referencing short-lived or newly registered external hostnames.
- Repeated internal GET requests from the AVideo server to varying internal IPs or ports within short time windows.
Detection Strategies
- Inspect web server and PHP-FPM logs for high-frequency egress calls originating from getHeaderContentTypeFromURL() code paths.
- Correlate authenticated uploader actions with subsequent spikes in outbound requests from the application server.
- Review AVideo video metadata for videoLink entries that redirect to private address space during periodic crawls.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable egress firewall logging on the AVideo host and alert on connections targeting internal subnets, metadata endpoints, and non-standard ports.
- Monitor PHP error and access logs for anomalous get_headers() invocations and connection timeouts suggestive of port scanning.
- Track database writes to the video table for new entries whose videoLink field resolves to redirectors.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114634
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade WWBN AVideo to version 29.4.0 or later, which contains the fix in objects/functions.php.
- Audit existing video records and remove entries whose videoLink resolves to untrusted redirectors or internal destinations.
- Restrict upload privileges to trusted accounts and review recent uploader account creation activity.
Patch Information
The fix is implemented in commit 2db920d. The patched getHeaderContentTypeFromURL() disables automatic redirect following, manually iterates up to the configured max_redirects, and re-validates each hop through isSSRFSafeURL(). See the WWBN AVideo Security Advisory GHSA-m8q2-35pq-qrmc and the VulnCheck Advisory for additional context.
Workarounds
- Block outbound traffic from the AVideo application server to internal network ranges, cloud metadata services, and loopback interfaces at the host or egress firewall.
- Place the AVideo server in a network segment that cannot route to sensitive internal services until the patch is deployed.
- Temporarily disable the videoLink external URL feature or restrict it to an allowlist of trusted media hosts.
# Example iptables egress restriction to block AVideo from reaching internal ranges
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner www-data -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner www-data -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner www-data -d 172.16.0.0/12 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner www-data -d 192.168.0.0/16 -j REJECT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner www-data -d 169.254.0.0/16 -j REJECT
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

