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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-114477

CVE-2026-114477: hMailServer Information Disclosure Flaw

CVE-2026-114477 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Progressive Robot hMailServer versions 6.2.25 through 6.3.6 that allows domain-confined users to access server-wide traffic data. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact assessment, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-114477 Overview

CVE-2026-114477 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in Progressive Robot hMailServer versions 6.2.25 through 6.3.6. The flaw resides in the REST metrics route GET /api/v1/metrics/history, which returns server-wide traffic counters covering the last 30 days. The server's authorization gate does not list the metrics route among those it refuses to confined credentials, and the handler is not passed the caller context. As a result, a domain administrator, an auditor role holding view_configuration on named domains, or an API key scoped to named domains can read traffic totals for the entire server rather than only for domains in their scope.

Critical Impact

An authenticated user confined to specific domains can read aggregate server-wide traffic counters, exposing operational metrics beyond their authorized scope.

Affected Products

  • Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.2.25 through 6.3.6
  • hMailServer REST API (/api/v1/metrics/history endpoint)
  • Deployments granting domain-scoped roles, auditor roles, or domain-scoped API keys

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-114477 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-114477

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability stems from inconsistent authorization enforcement across hMailServer's REST API surface. The server implements an authorization gate that refuses server-wide report routes to credentials confined to named domains. This control recognizes that traffic counters carry no domain attribution and therefore cannot be filtered to a caller's authorized domains.

The metrics route was omitted from this gate. The GET /api/v1/metrics/history handler was also written without a parameter for the authenticated caller, so it has no basis on which to apply domain-scoped filtering even if the gate did route to it. The result is that any authenticated principal with API access can retrieve the complete 30-day server-wide traffic history.

Affected principals include domain administrators, accounts assigned any role carrying view_configuration on named domains (such as the auditor role tied to a domain list), and API keys issued for specific domains. The disclosure is limited to aggregate operational counters and does not include message content or account data.

Root Cause

The root cause is a missing authorization check [CWE-862] on an endpoint that returns data outside the authenticated principal's scope. The REST metrics handler was neither enumerated in the server's domain-confinement gate nor supplied with the caller identity needed to make a scope decision.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network reachability to the hMailServer REST API and valid credentials or an API key scoped to one or more named domains. The attacker issues a GET request to /api/v1/metrics/history using the confined credential. The server returns 30 days of server-wide traffic counters regardless of the caller's domain scope. No elevated privilege, user interaction, or unusual conditions are required.

See the GitLab hMailServer Work Item #96 and the GitLab hMailServer Release 6.3.7 for technical details of the fix.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114477

Indicators of Compromise

  • Requests to GET /api/v1/metrics/history from accounts or API keys that are confined to named domains rather than holding server-wide roles.
  • API access logs showing successful 200 responses to /api/v1/metrics/* originating from auditor-role credentials or domain-scoped API keys.
  • Unexpected volume of metrics endpoint queries from client IPs associated with single-domain tenants.

Detection Strategies

  • Review hMailServer REST API access logs for calls to /api/v1/metrics/history and correlate the authenticated principal's role and domain scope against the request.
  • Alert on any /api/v1/metrics/* request where the authenticated principal is not a server-wide administrator.
  • Baseline normal metrics endpoint consumers and flag deviations introduced by domain-scoped roles.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward hMailServer REST API logs to a central logging platform and tag requests with the caller's role and domain scope for correlation.
  • Monitor for enumeration patterns against /api/v1/metrics/ paths following credential issuance for new domain administrators or API keys.
  • Track response sizes for /api/v1/metrics/history to identify unusual bulk retrieval against the 30-day window.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114477

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade hMailServer to version 6.3.7 or later, which addresses the missing authorization check.
  • Audit existing API keys and role assignments to identify principals confined to named domains that previously had REST access.
  • Rotate API keys that may have been used to query /api/v1/metrics/history while the server was unpatched.

Patch Information

The fix is included in hMailServer 6.3.7. See the GitLab hMailServer Release 6.3.7 notes and the tracking issue in GitLab hMailServer Work Item #96 for the authoritative patch references.

Workarounds

  • Restrict network access to the hMailServer REST API so that only trusted administrative hosts can reach /api/v1/metrics/*.
  • Avoid issuing domain-scoped API keys or auditor-role credentials with REST access until the server is upgraded to 6.3.7.
  • Place a reverse proxy or web application firewall in front of the REST API to block requests to /api/v1/metrics/history from non-administrative principals.
bash
# Example reverse proxy rule to block the vulnerable route until patching
location = /api/v1/metrics/history {
    deny all;
    return 403;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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