Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-114463 Overview
CVE-2026-114463 is an authorization bypass in the Nous Research Hermes Agent webhook platform gateway. The gateway constructs the session chat_id using the pattern webhook:{route_name}:{delivery_id} and later re-derives the authorizing route by splitting that string on the colon delimiter. A route name that contains a colon causes the parser to resolve toolset authorization against a different, higher-privileged prefix route than the one actually authenticated. A remote attacker with a valid HMAC for the lower-privileged route can invoke toolsets reserved for the higher-privileged route.
Critical Impact
Attackers with a legitimate webhook HMAC can escalate privileges and access toolsets belonging to a different, higher-privileged route.
Affected Products
- Nous Research Hermes Agent (webhook platform gateway)
- Versions prior to v0.22.2
- Deployments exposing multiple webhook routes with shared HMAC infrastructure
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-114463 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-114463
Vulnerability Analysis
The Hermes Agent webhook gateway identifies sessions with a composite string of the form webhook:{route_name}:{delivery_id}. When the gateway later needs to determine which route authorized a request, it splits that composite string on : and treats the second field as the route name. The format assumes route names never contain the delimiter.
When an operator registers a route whose name itself contains a colon, the split operation returns a prefix that matches a different, pre-existing route. The authorization layer then grants that prefix route's toolsets to the request, even though the HMAC verification was performed against the longer, lower-privileged route. The authenticated identity and the authorized identity diverge, producing a privilege escalation primitive. This is a classic business logic flaw rooted in parser-authorizer disagreement, closely related to [CWE-863] Incorrect Authorization and [CWE-290] Authentication Bypass by Spoofing.
Root Cause
The gateway serializes structured session data into an ambiguous delimited string and then parses that string to make security decisions. Because the delimiter is also a valid character in route_name, the serialized form is not injective, and the derived authorization context cannot be trusted to match the authenticated context.
Attack Vector
An attacker with a valid HMAC for any lower-privileged route can target a deployment where a route name containing : has been registered. By submitting a webhook delivery against the longer colon-containing route, the gateway authenticates the HMAC successfully but resolves authorization against the colon-prefix, inheriting the toolsets of that higher-privileged prefix route. Exploitation details are described in the GitHub Security Advisory: Webhook Auth Bypass.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114463
Indicators of Compromise
- Webhook route configurations whose route_name field contains one or more : characters.
- Session chat_id values with more than three colon-delimited segments appearing in gateway logs.
- Successful toolset invocations where the authenticated route differs from the toolset owner recorded in audit logs.
Detection Strategies
- Audit the route registry for any names containing a : and cross-reference with HMAC signer identities.
- Correlate webhook delivery authentication events with downstream toolset authorization events; flag mismatches between the authenticated route and the authorizing route.
- Replay historical gateway logs through a parser that validates chat_id segment counts and raises on ambiguous forms.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose logging of both the authenticating route and the resolved authorizing route for every webhook invocation.
- Alert on new or modified webhook routes immediately after deployment, with a specific rule for colon characters in route names.
- Monitor toolset usage patterns for sudden access to tools outside a route's historical baseline.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114463
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Nous Research Hermes Agent to v0.22.2 or later using the fix shipped in the GitHub Release v0.22.2.
- Enumerate all registered webhook routes and rename any route whose name contains : before or immediately after upgrade.
- Rotate HMAC secrets for any route suspected of having been used to pivot into another route's toolsets.
Patch Information
The upstream fix is tracked in GitHub Pull Request #115285 and released in v0.22.2. The patch stops deriving the authorizing route from the serialized chat_id string and instead carries the authenticated route identity through the session context directly, eliminating the parser-authorizer disagreement.
Workarounds
- Enforce a route-name validation policy that rejects any identifier containing : at registration time.
- Place a reverse proxy or API gateway in front of the webhook endpoint that normalizes and validates route names before forwarding requests.
- Restrict high-privilege toolsets to dedicated deployments until the upgrade to v0.22.2 can be completed.
# Configuration example: reject colon-containing route names at registration
# Run against the Hermes Agent route registry prior to upgrade
grep -E '"route_name"\s*:\s*"[^"]*:[^"]*"' /etc/hermes-agent/routes.json \
&& echo "[FAIL] Colon-containing route name detected - remediate before enabling webhook gateway" \
|| echo "[OK] No ambiguous route names detected"
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

