Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-114093 Overview
CVE-2026-114093 is a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Trigger.dev versions prior to 4.5.6. The flaw resides in the /logout endpoint, which accepts session-terminating actions via unauthenticated HTTP GET requests. Remote attackers can craft an obfuscated, URL-encoded link that, when clicked by an authenticated victim, forcibly terminates the user's session. The resulting forced logout causes loss of unsaved work and can be chained with social engineering to disrupt active workflows. The issue is tracked under CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery.
Critical Impact
Authenticated Trigger.dev users can be forcibly logged out by clicking an attacker-supplied link, interrupting active jobs and causing loss of unsaved work.
Affected Products
- Trigger.dev versions prior to 4.5.6
- Self-hosted Trigger.dev deployments exposing the web UI to end users
- Trigger.dev Cloud tenants running pre-4.5.6 builds
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-114093 published to NVD
- 2026-10-21 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-114093
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability stems from Trigger.dev exposing session termination through an HTTP GET verb at the /logout endpoint. GET requests are automatically issued by browsers whenever a user navigates to a URL, loads an image, or follows a hyperlink. Because the endpoint lacks an anti-CSRF token and does not require a POST request with same-origin verification, any cross-origin page can trigger logout on behalf of an authenticated session.
An attacker only needs to deliver a link, embed an <img> tag, or place a redirect pointing at /logout. The victim's browser attaches the Trigger.dev session cookie automatically, and the server completes the logout. The attack requires user interaction, which keeps the severity in the medium band, but it does not require any privileges on the target application.
Impact is limited to availability of the user session. The flaw does not expose confidentiality or integrity of Trigger.dev workloads directly. However, forcing logout mid-job can interrupt orchestrated workflows and complicate incident response if used alongside phishing.
Root Cause
The root cause is a combination of two design decisions: using GET for a state-changing action and omitting CSRF protection on the logout handler. Browsers treat GET as a safe, idempotent verb, so no origin or token check is enforced by default. Session termination is state-changing and must be guarded with either a CSRF token, a POST request with origin validation, or a SameSite=Strict session cookie posture.
Attack Vector
Exploitation is network-based and requires user interaction. An attacker hosts a page containing a URL-encoded or shortened link to https://<trigger-host>/logout. The victim, authenticated to Trigger.dev in another tab, clicks the link from email, chat, or a malicious site. The browser issues the GET request with the authenticated session cookie, and the server logs the user out. No credentials, authentication, or elevated privileges are required on the attacker side.
Technical details are documented in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-2cqj-rq4j-8835 and the VulnCheck Advisory for Trigger.dev CSRF.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114093
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected GET /logout requests in Trigger.dev web server access logs with a Referer header pointing to an external origin.
- Clusters of authenticated users reporting involuntary logouts within a short time window, indicating a mass-phishing campaign.
- URL-encoded or shortened links referencing the /logout path appearing in email gateways, chat platforms, or web proxy logs.
Detection Strategies
- Alert on cross-origin Referer or Origin headers accompanying any state-changing GET request to Trigger.dev endpoints, including /logout.
- Correlate authentication telemetry to flag session terminations that occur without a corresponding user-initiated navigation from the Trigger.dev UI.
- Inspect proxy and secure web gateway logs for obfuscated URLs targeting the Trigger.dev hostname and the /logout path.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose authentication logging on the Trigger.dev platform to capture logout source IP, user agent, and referrer.
- Forward Trigger.dev access and authentication logs to a centralized SIEM or data lake for correlation with email and web proxy telemetry.
- Baseline normal logout volume per user and alert on anomalous spikes that could indicate a CSRF campaign in progress.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114093
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade Trigger.dev to version 4.5.6 or later across all self-hosted and managed deployments.
- Audit recent access logs for GET requests to /logout originating from external referrers and notify affected users.
- Advise users to avoid clicking unsolicited links that reference the Trigger.dev domain until the upgrade is complete.
Patch Information
The maintainers resolved the vulnerability in Trigger.dev 4.5.6. The fix is referenced in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-2cqj-rq4j-8835. Administrators of self-hosted instances should pull the updated container images or source release and redeploy. Trigger.dev Cloud customers should confirm their tenant version with the vendor.
Workarounds
- Enforce SameSite=Strict on the Trigger.dev session cookie at the reverse proxy or ingress layer to block cross-site cookie attachment on GET navigations.
- Place the Trigger.dev UI behind an authenticating reverse proxy or VPN to limit exposure of the /logout endpoint to untrusted origins.
- Use a web application firewall rule to reject GET requests to /logout that carry an external Referer or Origin header until the patch is applied.
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

