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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-114068

CVE-2026-114068: Trigger.dev Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-114068 is an authorization bypass flaw in Trigger.dev that lets attackers block runs from other organizations and inject malicious data. This post explains its technical details, affected versions, impact, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-114068 Overview

CVE-2026-114068 is a missing authorization vulnerability in Trigger.dev versions prior to 4.6.0. The flaw resides in the waitpoint token wait endpoint and permits authenticated attackers to interfere with runs owned by other organizations. An attacker holding any valid secret API key can supply a victim run ID together with their own waitpoint, forcing the targeted run to block indefinitely on a waitpoint only the attacker controls. The same code path also allows the attacker to inject resume data into the victim's run. The weakness is tracked under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.

Critical Impact

Any tenant with a secret API key can indefinitely stall background jobs belonging to other organizations and inject arbitrary resume payloads into them, undermining tenant isolation in multi-tenant deployments.

Affected Products

  • Trigger.dev versions before 4.6.0
  • Self-hosted Trigger.dev deployments exposing the waitpoint token wait endpoint
  • Multi-tenant Trigger.dev instances issuing secret API keys to multiple organizations

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-114068 published to the National Vulnerability Database
  • 2026-10-21 - Last updated in the NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-114068

Vulnerability Analysis

Trigger.dev is a background job and workflow platform that supports long-running tasks using waitpoints. A waitpoint allows a run to pause until an external signal, timeout, or token completion is received. The vulnerable endpoint accepts a run identifier and a waitpoint identifier from an authenticated caller but fails to verify that both objects belong to the same organization as the API key presented.

Because the server trusts the caller-supplied run ID without a cross-organization ownership check, an attacker with any valid secret API key can target runs they do not own. The attacker attaches a waitpoint from their own organization to a victim run. The victim's organization has no visibility into or control over that waitpoint, so the run cannot progress. The same endpoint also writes resume data back onto the targeted run, enabling payload injection into another tenant's workflow context.

Root Cause

The root cause is a missing authorization check mapped to [CWE-639]. The waitpoint token wait handler authenticates the request but does not authorize the relationship between the authenticated principal, the referenced run, and the referenced waitpoint. User-controlled identifiers are used directly to look up and mutate server-side state across tenant boundaries.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires only network access to the Trigger.dev API and a valid secret API key, which any registered organization possesses. The attacker issues a request to the waitpoint token wait endpoint referencing a victim organization's run ID and an attacker-controlled waitpoint. The server attaches the waitpoint to the victim run and later accepts attacker-supplied resume data for that run. No user interaction on the victim side is required. Technical details are documented in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-xrp6-5fpv-4fxf and the VulnCheck Advisory for Trigger.dev.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114068

Indicators of Compromise

  • Runs that remain in a blocked or waiting state far beyond expected durations without a legitimate waitpoint owner in the same organization.
  • Waitpoint associations where the waitpoint's owning organization differs from the run's owning organization.
  • Resume data written to runs by API keys that do not belong to the run's organization.

Detection Strategies

  • Audit the Trigger.dev database for waitpoint-to-run links that cross organization boundaries and flag any mismatches.
  • Review API access logs for calls to the waitpoint token wait endpoint and correlate the authenticated API key's organization with the referenced run's organization.
  • Alert on repeated waitpoint wait requests from a single API key against runs in multiple distinct organizations.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward Trigger.dev application and API logs to a centralized logging platform and retain them long enough to investigate stalled runs.
  • Instrument metrics on run duration and waitpoint completion rates to surface anomalies indicative of malicious blocking.
  • Monitor for sudden drops in job throughput per organization, which may indicate runs stalled on attacker-controlled waitpoints.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114068

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all Trigger.dev installations to version 4.6.0 or later without delay.
  • Rotate secret API keys if there is any suspicion that keys were used to target other tenants.
  • Review currently blocked runs and cancel any that were paused on waitpoints owned by foreign organizations.

Patch Information

The maintainers fixed the authorization gap in Trigger.dev 4.6.0 by enforcing that the authenticated organization owns both the referenced run and the referenced waitpoint before the wait and resume operations proceed. Refer to GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-xrp6-5fpv-4fxf for upgrade guidance and release notes.

Workarounds

  • Restrict issuance of secret API keys to trusted organizations until the upgrade is applied.
  • Place the Trigger.dev API behind a gateway that enforces per-tenant request validation on run and waitpoint identifiers where feasible.
  • In single-tenant deployments, limit network reachability of the waitpoint token wait endpoint to internal callers only.
bash
# Upgrade example for self-hosted Trigger.dev using npm
npm install trigger.dev@^4.6.0

# Verify the installed version
npm list trigger.dev

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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