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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-114053

CVE-2026-114053: vLLM RCE Vulnerability

CVE-2026-114053 is a remote code execution flaw in vLLM that allows attackers to execute arbitrary Python code through the unauthenticated /tokenize endpoint. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-114053 Overview

CVE-2026-114053 is a remote code execution vulnerability in vLLM versions 0.7.3 through 0.31.0. The server forwards the request-supplied mm_processor_kwargs.code_revision parameter to the Transformers AutoProcessor.from_pretrained function. When trust_remote_code is enabled, clients can select which revision of a model's dynamic processor code is imported. An attacker who controls a revision in the served model repository can send a multimodal request to the unauthenticated /tokenize endpoint to execute arbitrary Python code in the vLLM API process. This flaw is tracked as CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated attackers can execute arbitrary Python code in the vLLM API process when trust_remote_code is enabled, leading to full host compromise.

Affected Products

  • vLLM 0.7.3 through versions before 0.31.0
  • Deployments with trust_remote_code enabled
  • Multimodal model serving configurations exposing /tokenize

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-114053 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-114053

Vulnerability Analysis

vLLM is a widely deployed inference and serving engine for large language models. The vulnerability resides in how vLLM handles multimodal processor keyword arguments supplied through HTTP requests. The mm_processor_kwargs dictionary is parsed from client input and passed directly to the Hugging Face Transformers AutoProcessor.from_pretrained loader. One of its accepted keys, code_revision, selects which Git revision of a repository's dynamic Python code is imported into the running process.

When the server is launched with trust_remote_code=True, Transformers imports the Python modules referenced by the selected revision without sandboxing. The /tokenize endpoint accepts these parameters without authentication, so any network-reachable client can trigger the import. If an attacker can author or submit a revision in the served model repository, they can supply Python that runs in the vLLM API worker.

Root Cause

The root cause is unvalidated propagation of a client-controlled field into a code-loading API. vLLM does not strip, pin, or allowlist the code_revision value within mm_processor_kwargs before forwarding it to Transformers. Combined with trust_remote_code semantics, this converts a model configuration parameter into an arbitrary code execution primitive.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires network access to the vLLM HTTP API and a repository revision the attacker controls. The attacker sends a crafted multimodal request to /tokenize containing mm_processor_kwargs with a malicious code_revision. vLLM loads the specified revision's processor module, executing the attacker-supplied Python with the privileges of the vLLM API process.

python
# Patch reference from vllm/v1/attention/backends/mla/flashinfer_mla_sparse.py
    MultipleOf,
)
from vllm.v1.attention.backends.mla.sparse_utils import (
    flat_kv_row_view,
    triton_convert_req_index_to_global_index,
    triton_filter_and_convert_dcp_index,
)
# Source: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/570735520942b6428ae98f1eb442c6d88adae55e

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-114053

Indicators of Compromise

  • HTTP POST requests to /tokenize containing mm_processor_kwargs with a code_revision field originating from untrusted clients.
  • Unexpected outbound network connections, shell processes, or file writes spawned from the vLLM API process.
  • Hugging Face cache directories showing newly fetched revisions that do not match the pinned production revision.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect reverse proxy and application logs for mm_processor_kwargs.code_revision values submitted at request time.
  • Monitor child-process creation under the Python interpreter hosting vLLM for anomalous commands such as sh, curl, or python -c.
  • Alert on access to the /tokenize endpoint from source IPs outside the expected inference client set.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose request logging on the vLLM OpenAI-compatible server and forward logs to a central analytics platform.
  • Track filesystem changes in the Transformers and Hugging Face Hub cache directories used by the service account.
  • Baseline normal outbound destinations from inference hosts and alert on deviations consistent with reverse shells or data staging.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-114053

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade vLLM to version 0.31.0 or later, which removes code_revision from the accepted mm_processor_kwargs fields.
  • Disable trust_remote_code for any model that does not strictly require dynamic processor code.
  • Place the vLLM API behind an authenticating gateway and restrict network exposure of /tokenize to trusted clients.

Patch Information

The vLLM maintainers released a fix referenced in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-h3rc-6mm3-gc2m and the upstream commit. Additional analysis is available in the VulnCheck RCE Advisory. Upgrade to vLLM 0.31.0 or later to receive the fix.

Workarounds

  • Launch vLLM without --trust-remote-code and only serve models whose code is vendored and reviewed.
  • Pin and validate the model revision at startup, and reject any request-supplied code_revision at the proxy layer.
  • Run the vLLM process as an unprivileged user inside a container with egress filtering to limit post-exploitation impact.
bash
# Example reverse-proxy filter to strip client-controlled code_revision
# NGINX location block for /tokenize
location /tokenize {
    if ($request_body ~* "code_revision") {
        return 400;
    }
    proxy_pass http://vllm_backend;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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