Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-113725 Overview
CVE-2026-113725 affects virtualenv, the widely used tool for creating isolated Python virtual environments. Versions prior to 21.14.7 contain a command injection flaw [CWE-78] in the bash activate script. The script escapes the environment name for only one of the two passes bash performs over PS1. An environment name containing $(...) or backticks executes as shell commands each time bash redraws the prompt. The maintainer, pypa, released version 21.14.7 with the fix.
Critical Impact
An attacker who controls a virtual environment name can achieve arbitrary command execution in the user's shell every time the prompt is rendered after activation.
Affected Products
- pypa/virtualenv versions prior to 21.14.7
- Bash shells sourcing the vulnerable activate script
- Any workflow consuming untrusted environment names or --prompt values
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-113725 published to NVD
- 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-113725
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability resides in src/virtualenv/activation/bash/activate.sh. Bash expands PS1 in two passes on every prompt redraw. The first pass decodes backslash prompt escapes, converting \\ into \ and \$ into $. The second pass then performs parameter, command, and arithmetic expansion on the result. The original activator applied a single layer of escaping that was sufficient for zsh but insufficient for bash. A single backslash in the environment name survived the first pass and unmasked special characters for the second. An environment name containing $(malicious_command) therefore executed during prompt rendering.
Root Cause
The shared code path treated bash and zsh identically despite different prompt-expansion semantics. The guard if [ -n "${BASH_VERSION-}${ZSH_VERSION-}" ] applied zsh-appropriate escaping to both shells. Bash required double escaping of \, $, and ` to survive both expansion passes, which the script did not perform.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires local user interaction. A victim must create or activate a virtual environment whose name or --prompt argument contains the injected payload. Attack scenarios include malicious project templates, shared CI configurations that derive environment names from untrusted input, and documentation examples that encourage copy-paste of attacker-controlled names. Once the environment is activated, every subsequent prompt redraw runs the embedded commands in the user context.
# bash, and zsh under PROMPT_SUBST, re-expand backslashes, dollar signs and backticks in PS1 on every redraw;
# zsh gets the escaping even without the option, since a user can set it after activation. The guards keep
# the substitution away from POSIX shells such as dash, which reject it with "Bad substitution"
- if [ -n "${BASH_VERSION-}${ZSH_VERSION-}" ]; then
+ if [ -n "${BASH_VERSION-}" ]; then
+ # bash first decodes its backslash prompt escapes, turning \\ into \ and \$ into $ (or # for root), and only
+ # then expands the result, so each character needs escaping for both passes
+ _VIRTUAL_PROMPT="${_VIRTUAL_PROMPT//\\/\\\\\\\\}"
+ _VIRTUAL_PROMPT="${_VIRTUAL_PROMPT//\$/\\\\\$}"
+ _VIRTUAL_PROMPT="${_VIRTUAL_PROMPT//\`/\\\\\`}"
+ elif [ -n "${ZSH_VERSION-}" ]; then
_VIRTUAL_PROMPT="${_VIRTUAL_PROMPT//\\/\\\\}"
_VIRTUAL_PROMPT="${_VIRTUAL_PROMPT//\$/\\\$}"
_VIRTUAL_PROMPT="${_VIRTUAL_PROMPT//\`/\\\`}"
Source: GitHub Commit c3104e0
Stop Remote Code Execution Before It Runs
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Stop Exploit AttemptsDetection Methods for CVE-2026-113725
Indicators of Compromise
- Virtual environment directory names containing $(, backticks, or embedded backslashes before shell metacharacters.
- activate scripts under */bin/activate where _VIRTUAL_PROMPT contains unescaped command substitution syntax.
- Unexpected child processes spawned by interactive bash sessions immediately after source activate.
Detection Strategies
- Audit virtualenv --version across developer workstations and build agents, flagging anything below 21.14.7.
- Scan source repositories and CI pipelines for virtualenv or python -m venv invocations that pass untrusted strings as the environment name or --prompt value.
- Review shell history for source or . commands targeting activate scripts in directories with suspicious names.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on process executions whose parent is bash and whose command line matches content derived from PS1.
- Track creation of virtual environment directories by non-standard automation accounts.
- Correlate interactive shell activity with unexpected outbound network connections after environment activation.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-113725
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade virtualenv to version 21.14.7 or later on all developer machines, build servers, and container images.
- Inventory existing virtual environments and recreate any whose names contain shell metacharacters.
- Remove or sanitize --prompt values sourced from untrusted input in automation scripts.
Patch Information
The fix is delivered in pypa/virtualenv release 21.14.7. The patch adds double escaping for \, $, and ` in the bash branch of the activator so that both bash prompt-expansion passes treat the environment name as literal text. Review the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-vxj4-q4g9-crj7 and the GitHub Release 21.14.7 for full details.
Workarounds
- Restrict virtual environment names to an allowlist of alphanumeric characters, underscores, and hyphens.
- Avoid passing user-controlled strings to the --prompt option until the upgrade is deployed.
- Prefer the standard library venv module where feasible, or manually patch activate.sh with the escaping logic from commit c3104e0.
# Upgrade virtualenv and verify the installed version
python -m pip install --upgrade 'virtualenv>=21.14.7'
virtualenv --version
# Recreate an environment using a sanitized name
SAFE_NAME="$(printf '%s' "$RAW_NAME" | tr -cd 'A-Za-z0-9_-')"
virtualenv "./.venvs/${SAFE_NAME}"
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

