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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-113652

CVE-2026-113652: ApostropheCMS Azure SAS Token Disclosure

CVE-2026-113652 is an information disclosure vulnerability in ApostropheCMS that leaks Azure account-level SAS tokens in public attachment URLs. This article covers technical details, affected versions, security impact, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-113652 Overview

CVE-2026-113652 is an information disclosure vulnerability in ApostropheCMS, an open-source Node.js content management system. The flaw exists in the uploadfs Azure backend between versions 1.25.0 and 1.28.0. When administrators configure the Azure backend with sas: true, the createContainer() function builds the BlobServiceClient from a URL that embeds the full Shared Access Signature (SAS) query string. Azure SDK v12 derived clients inherit that query string and append it to every public attachment URL. The result is leakage of an account-level SAS token to any visitor who views an attachment. This issue is tracked under [CWE-200] and fixed in uploadfs@1.28.0.

Critical Impact

Public attachment URLs expose account-level Azure SAS tokens, allowing unauthenticated remote parties to perform operations permitted by the leaked token across the storage account.

Affected Products

  • ApostropheCMS uploadfs package versions 1.25.0 through 1.27.x
  • Deployments configured with the Azure Blob Storage backend and sas: true
  • Azure SDK v12 derived BlobServiceClient instances created via createContainer()

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-113652 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-21 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-113652

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability resides in the uploadfs Azure backend. When operators enable Shared Access Signature mode with sas: true, the backend constructs a BlobServiceClient by concatenating the storage account URL with the full SAS query string. Azure SDK v12 propagates the originating URL and its query parameters to every derived client, including container and blob clients. Those derived clients then generate public blob URLs that retain the SAS query string. Any attachment URL served by the CMS therefore contains the account-level SAS token in plain text.

Any party able to view the HTML response, read browser history, inspect referrer headers, or scrape pages can harvest the token. Because the SAS is scoped at the account level, an attacker can reuse it to perform all operations the token permits across the Azure storage account.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper separation of credential material from resource URLs. The createContainer() implementation passed a credential-bearing URL into the SDK constructor instead of supplying the SAS as a credential object. Azure SDK clients inherit the query string from the parent URL, so every downstream URL exposed the secret.

Attack Vector

Exploitation is remote and unauthenticated. An attacker browses any public page that renders an attachment, extracts the ?sv=...&sig=... SAS parameters from the resulting blob URL, and reuses them against the Azure storage endpoint. No user interaction with the attacker is required, and the token can be replayed outside the CMS context.

See the ApostropheCMS Security Advisory GHSA-hhph-8536-gfq5 and the fix in commit 9500b8b for implementation details.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-113652

Indicators of Compromise

  • Public attachment URLs containing SAS query parameters such as sv=, ss=, srt=, sp=, se=, st=, spr=, and sig=
  • Azure Storage Analytics logs showing blob operations authenticated with the same SAS signature from unexpected client IP addresses
  • Access to blobs outside the public attachments container using the leaked signature

Detection Strategies

  • Crawl the CMS and inspect rendered HTML for blob.core.windows.net URLs that carry SAS query strings
  • Review Azure Monitor and Storage Analytics for SASAuthenticated requests originating from unknown user agents or geographies
  • Correlate web server access logs with Azure blob read operations to identify token replay from third-party clients

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable Azure Storage logging and alert on SAS-authenticated requests outside expected CDN or CMS egress IP ranges
  • Monitor Microsoft Defender for Storage alerts related to anomalous access patterns and token abuse
  • Track dependency inventories to flag any service still running uploadfs versions 1.25.0 through 1.27.x

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-113652

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade uploadfs to version 1.28.0 or later and redeploy the ApostropheCMS application
  • Rotate the Azure storage account keys and revoke any outstanding account-level SAS tokens that may have been exposed
  • Audit public pages and purge cached HTML, CDN responses, and search engine snapshots that contain leaked SAS URLs

Patch Information

The fix is published in the uploadfs 1.28.0 release. Supporting changes are available in commit 9500b8b and commit f84fd41. The patch stops embedding the SAS query string in the base client URL so derived clients no longer propagate the credential.

Workarounds

  • Disable sas: true in the Azure backend configuration and rely on account-key or managed-identity authentication server side
  • Serve attachments through a signed-URL proxy that generates short-lived, blob-scoped SAS values per request
  • Restrict the storage account firewall to the CMS egress IPs so leaked tokens cannot be replayed from arbitrary networks
bash
# Upgrade uploadfs to the patched release
npm install uploadfs@1.28.0 --save

# Verify the installed version
npm ls uploadfs

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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