Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-113496 Overview
A flaw in cockpit-machines exposes Virtual Network Computing (VNC) console passwords through the process list. When a user saves VNC console settings in the Cockpit web interface, the configured password is passed directly as a command-line argument to an underlying system utility. On hosts that permit cross-user process inspection, a local unprivileged attacker can read the password from /proc while another user modifies settings. The disclosure enables unauthorized access to the guest virtual machine's graphical console. The weakness is tracked under CWE-214: Invocation of Process Using Visible Sensitive Information.
Critical Impact
Local unprivileged users can harvest VNC console passwords during the brief window a privileged user updates settings, granting unauthorized access to guest VM graphical consoles.
Affected Products
- cockpit-machines (Red Hat ecosystem)
- Hosts running Cockpit with the virtual machine management plugin enabled
- Multi-user systems that permit cross-user process inspection in /proc
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-20 - CVE-2026-113496 published to NVD
- 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-113496
Vulnerability Analysis
The flaw resides in how cockpit-machines applies VNC console configuration changes for libvirt-managed guests. When a user saves a new VNC password through the web UI, the backend invokes a system utility and supplies the password as a command-line argument. Command-line arguments are visible to any local user through /proc/<pid>/cmdline on systems with default hidepid settings.
An attacker only needs shell access on the host and the ability to poll the process table. Tools such as ps, top, or a loop reading /proc/*/cmdline can capture the credential during the short window the helper process runs. The leaked password then permits direct VNC authentication to the targeted guest.
The issue affects confidentiality of guest console credentials but does not grant immediate code execution on the host. Impact scales with how many users administer VMs through Cockpit and whether the host restricts /proc visibility.
Root Cause
The root cause is credential handling that passes secrets through argv instead of through environment variables, a file descriptor, or standard input. Argument vectors are world-readable by default on Linux. Secure invocation patterns require secret material to travel through channels not exposed to other local users.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires local access with low privileges and depends on another user triggering a VNC settings save. The attacker runs a lightweight monitor against /proc and captures the password the moment the helper process executes. User interaction from the victim administrator is required to initiate the vulnerable code path.
No exploitation code is publicly available at this time. Describing the mechanism in prose is sufficient: enumerate running processes, filter for the VNC configuration helper, and read the command-line arguments before the process exits.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-113496
Indicators of Compromise
- Unexpected processes repeatedly reading /proc/<pid>/cmdline entries belonging to other users
- Unknown VNC client sessions connecting to libvirt guest consoles from unauthorized sources
- Shell history showing tight ps, pgrep, or cat /proc/*/cmdline polling loops from non-admin accounts
Detection Strategies
- Audit process creation events (execve) on Cockpit hosts for helper utilities invoked with password-like arguments
- Correlate Cockpit UI activity logs with libvirt VNC configuration changes to establish a baseline for legitimate updates
- Flag long-running user processes that enumerate /proc entries outside their own UID
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable Linux audit rules on execve syscalls and alert on suspicious command-line patterns on virtualization hosts
- Monitor libvirt event streams for unexpected guest console authentication attempts
- Track VNC listener connections and source IP addresses for each managed guest
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-113496
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict shell access on Cockpit hosts to trusted administrators only until a patched cockpit-machines package is deployed
- Mount /proc with the hidepid=2 option to prevent unprivileged users from reading other users' process arguments
- Rotate any VNC passwords configured through the Cockpit UI since the last known-good state
Patch Information
Monitor the Red Hat CVE-2026-113496 advisory and Red Hat Bug Report #2556058 for fixed package versions. Apply the vendor update to cockpit-machines as soon as it is available through your distribution's package manager.
Workarounds
- Configure /proc with hidepid=2,gid=<trusted-group> in /etc/fstab to block cross-user process inspection
- Avoid setting or updating VNC passwords through the Cockpit web interface; configure them directly in libvirt XML definitions with restrictive file permissions
- Limit the set of users granted the cockpit and libvirt administrative roles
# Harden /proc to block cross-user cmdline inspection
# Add to /etc/fstab, then remount
proc /proc proc defaults,hidepid=2,gid=proc 0 0
sudo groupadd proc
sudo usermod -aG proc <admin-user>
sudo mount -o remount,hidepid=2,gid=proc /proc
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

