Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-112303 Overview
CVE-2026-112303 is a credential leak vulnerability in the GDevelop desktop application through version 5.6.284. The flaw resides in the downloadLocalFile() function inside LocalFileDownloader.js, which attaches the gd_resource session cookie to every outbound HTTP request regardless of destination host. Attackers can craft a GDevelop project file containing resource URLs pointing to attacker-controlled servers. When a victim opens the project, the desktop app downloads those resources and transmits the GDevelop cloud session cookie to the attacker. This exposes private cloud project resources tied to the victim's account. The weakness is categorized under [CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials].
Critical Impact
Successful exploitation leaks the victim's gd_resource cloud session cookie to an arbitrary attacker-controlled host, enabling access to private cloud project resources.
Affected Products
- GDevelop desktop application through version 5.6.284
- newIDE/electron-app/app/LocalFileDownloader.js component
- newIDE/app/src/ProjectsStorage/LocalFileStorageProvider/LocalFileResourceMover.js component
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-112303 published to NVD
- 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-112303
Vulnerability Analysis
The vulnerability exists in the Electron-based desktop IDE for GDevelop, an open-source game development platform. GDevelop projects reference external resource files such as images, audio, and fonts through URLs stored inside the project file. When a user opens a project, the LocalFileResourceMover component calls downloadLocalFile(url, outputPath) from LocalFileDownloader.js to fetch each resource to local storage.
Before the patch, downloadLocalFile() unconditionally retrieved the GDevelop cloud session cookie via findGDevelopCloudCookieValue() and attached it to every download request. The function performed no validation on the target hostname. An attacker who distributes a malicious .gdevelop project file can embed resource URLs pointing to a host they control, triggering the IDE to send the authenticated session cookie to that external server.
Root Cause
The root cause is missing destination validation before attaching sensitive authentication material. Resource URLs sourced from untrusted project files were treated as trusted targets for session-authenticated requests. The code failed to enforce an allowlist restricting cookie transmission to legitimate gdevelop.io hosts.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires user interaction. An attacker publishes or shares a crafted GDevelop project containing a resource entry whose file field is an attacker-controlled HTTPS URL. When the victim opens the project in a vulnerable version of the desktop IDE, the resource mover invokes downloadLocalFile(), which issues an HTTP request to the attacker's server with the gd_resource cookie attached. The attacker captures the cookie from the request headers and reuses it to authenticate against GDevelop cloud services.
return gdevelopCloudCookieValue;
};
+// `url` ultimately comes from a resource's "file" path, which is stored in
+// (and can be set by) the project file itself - so it must be treated as
+// untrusted. Only ever attach the GDevelop cloud session cookie when the
+// request is actually going to a gdevelop.io host; otherwise a project
+// resource pointing at an attacker-controlled URL would exfiltrate the
+// visitor's cloud session cookie to that host.
+const isGDevelopCloudHost = url => {
+ try {
+ const { hostname, protocol } = new URL(url);
+ return (
+ (protocol === 'https:' || protocol === 'http:') &&
+ (hostname === 'gdevelop.io' || hostname.endsWith('.gdevelop.io'))
+ );
+ } catch (error) {
+ return false;
+ }
+};
+
module.exports = {
/**
* @param {string} url
* @param {string} outputPath
*/
downloadLocalFile: async (url, outputPath) => {
- const gdevelopCloudCookieValue = await findGDevelopCloudCookieValue();
+ const gdevelopCloudCookieValue = isGDevelopCloudHost(url)
+ ? await findGDevelopCloudCookieValue()
Source: GitHub Commit Details. The patch introduces an isGDevelopCloudHost() check that only attaches the cookie when the request target is gdevelop.io or a subdomain.
Detection Methods for CVE-2026-112303
Indicators of Compromise
- Outbound HTTP or HTTPS requests from the GDevelop desktop process to non-gdevelop.io hosts containing a Cookie header with the gd_resource value.
- GDevelop project files (.json, .gdevelop) with resource file fields referencing arbitrary external domains instead of gdevelop.io subdomains.
- Unexpected downloads initiated by the GDevelop Electron app targeting newly registered or low-reputation domains.
Detection Strategies
- Inspect network telemetry from workstations running GDevelop for HTTP requests originating from the Electron renderer process to hosts outside the gdevelop.io domain allowlist.
- Perform static analysis of untrusted GDevelop project files before opening, parsing the resource manifest to validate every file URL hostname.
- Monitor the installed GDevelop version on endpoints and flag any instance at or below 5.6.284.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Alert on process-to-network pairings where the GDevelop desktop binary initiates connections to domains not matching *.gdevelop.io.
- Log and retain full HTTP request headers for GDevelop IDE traffic in your data lake to support retroactive hunting for cookie exfiltration patterns.
- Track endpoint software inventory for vulnerable GDevelop builds and prioritize upgrades on developer workstations with cloud project access.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-112303
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade the GDevelop desktop application to a release that includes commit fbb01f40a640c35c6064f827065eda00e5608690 or later.
- Avoid opening GDevelop project files received from untrusted sources until patched.
- Rotate the active GDevelop cloud session by signing out and signing back in to invalidate any session cookies that may have been exfiltrated.
Patch Information
The fix is published in the GDevelop repository as commit fbb01f40a640c35c6064f827065eda00e5608690. The patch introduces an isGDevelopCloudHost() guard in LocalFileDownloader.js that attaches the gd_resource cookie only when the download URL hostname is gdevelop.io or a subdomain and uses http/https. Reference details are tracked in the GitHub Issue Tracker #9257 and the VulnCheck Advisory on GDevelop.
Workarounds
- Review third-party GDevelop project files and remove any resource entries referencing non-gdevelop.io URLs before opening them in a vulnerable client.
- Use network egress controls to block GDevelop desktop traffic to any destination outside the official gdevelop.io domain until patching is complete.
- Restrict developer workstations to opening GDevelop projects only from trusted internal repositories.
# Verify installed GDevelop desktop version on Linux/macOS
gdevelop --version
# Example egress firewall rule (iptables) limiting GDevelop traffic
# Replace <uid> with the user ID running GDevelop
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner <uid> -p tcp \
-m string --algo bm --string "gdevelop.io" -j ACCEPT
iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner <uid> -p tcp --dport 443 -j REJECT
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

