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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-112295

CVE-2026-112295: FlyCms Mass Assignment Auth Bypass Flaw

CVE-2026-112295 is a mass assignment vulnerability in FlyCms that enables authenticated users to overwrite protected account fields including usernames, emails, and review status. This article covers technical details, exploitation risks, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-112295 Overview

CVE-2026-112295 is a mass assignment vulnerability in FlyCms through commit edfdf724. The flaw resides in the /ucenter/account_update endpoint, which binds unfiltered request parameters to the User bean. Authenticated attackers can submit extra fields that overwrite protected account columns the application never intended to expose. This maps to [CWE-915], Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes.

Exploitation allows an attacker to modify their own review status, rename their account, or hijack another user's username, email, or mobile identifier to break the victim's login flow.

Critical Impact

Authenticated users can tamper with protected account attributes and lock legitimate users out of their accounts by duplicating identifier fields.

Affected Products

  • FlyCms through commit edfdf724c3b944310f60c29aa755d03a00a75837
  • FlyCms backend UserController and UserService components
  • FlyCms /ucenter/account_update user-center endpoint

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-112295 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-112295

Vulnerability Analysis

FlyCms exposes an authenticated endpoint at /ucenter/account_update that accepts a User bean populated directly from HTTP request parameters. The backend performs no allow-list filtering on which bean fields the client may set. Any field present on the User object becomes a candidate for update when the request reaches the persistence layer.

An authenticated user can append fields such as status, username, email, or mobile to the request body. The service layer then forwards these fields to the MyBatis UserDao mapping, which issues an UPDATE statement that overwrites columns the user interface was never meant to expose. Technical references for the vulnerable code paths are published in the GitHub UserController Implementation, the GitHub UserService Implementation, and the GitHub UserDao XML Mapping.

Root Cause

The controller binds the entire User domain bean from client-controlled parameters without a Data Transfer Object (DTO) or field allow-list. The MyBatis mapper then updates every non-null column it receives. There is no server-side validation that restricts updates to profile-safe fields.

Attack Vector

An attacker authenticates with any low-privileged account, then submits a POST to /ucenter/account_update with additional parameters matching protected User fields. By setting a target victim's username, email, or mobile as their own identifier, the attacker creates a duplicate that breaks the victim's login logic. Additional discussion is available in the GitHub Issue #19 Discussion and the VulnCheck Advisory for FlyCms.

No verified proof-of-concept code is published. The exploitation pattern involves adding unexpected form fields to a standard profile update request.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-112295

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected changes to status, username, email, or mobile columns in the FlyCms user table without a corresponding administrative action.
  • Multiple user records sharing identical email or mobile values after an /ucenter/account_update request.
  • Legitimate users reporting that they can no longer log in after another account was recently modified.

Detection Strategies

  • Review web server access logs for POST requests to /ucenter/account_update containing parameters outside the standard profile form (for example status, is_admin, username).
  • Enable MyBatis SQL logging during audit windows and alert on UPDATE statements that modify columns not referenced by the profile UI.
  • Correlate authentication failures with recent profile update events from distinct accounts targeting the same identifier.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Instrument the application with request-body logging that captures all submitted field names for user-center endpoints.
  • Monitor the user table for schema-level changes to identifier columns and emit alerts on duplicate-identifier conflicts.
  • Track rate and diversity of parameters sent to /ucenter/account_update per session to flag probing behavior.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-112295

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict /ucenter/account_update at a reverse proxy or Web Application Firewall (WAF) to accept only the documented profile parameters until a patched build is deployed.
  • Audit the user table for duplicated username, email, and mobile values and restore legitimate records from backups where tampering is confirmed.
  • Add database-level UNIQUE constraints on identifier columns if they are not already enforced, to make duplication attempts fail safely.

Patch Information

No upstream patch is referenced in the NVD entry at the time of publication. Review the VulnCheck Advisory for FlyCms and the project's GitHub Issue #19 Discussion for upstream remediation status. Operators should rebuild from source only after replacing the User bean binding with a strict DTO.

Workarounds

  • Introduce a dedicated profile DTO that exposes only user-editable fields and map it to the User entity server-side.
  • Explicitly null or ignore sensitive fields such as status, username, email, and mobile in the UserService.updateAccount path.
  • Deploy a WAF rule that drops /ucenter/account_update requests containing parameter names outside an allow-list.
bash
# Example nginx rule to drop requests carrying prohibited mass-assignment fields
location = /ucenter/account_update {
    if ($request_body ~* "(^|&)(status|is_admin|username|email|mobile)=") {
        return 403;
    }
    proxy_pass http://flycms_backend;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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