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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-112292

CVE-2026-112292: CheckCle Authorization Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-112292 is an authorization bypass vulnerability in CheckCle through version 1.6.0 that enables unauthenticated attackers to access sensitive data and manipulate records. This article covers technical details, affected versions, security impact, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-112292 Overview

CheckCle through version 1.6.0 contains a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in its shipped PocketBase collections. The collections ship with empty API rules, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read, modify, and delete records through the /api/collections/<name>/records endpoints. Attackers can harvest server_token values and alert_configurations secrets, disable alerting, alter status pages, or delete monitoring data. The vulnerability is remotely exploitable over the network with no authentication or user interaction required.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated attackers can exfiltrate server tokens and alert configuration secrets, tamper with monitoring data, and silently disable alerting on affected CheckCle deployments.

Affected Products

  • CheckCle through version 1.6.0
  • Shipped PocketBase collections including alert_configurations and data_settings
  • CheckCle status pages and monitoring data stores

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-19 - CVE CVE-2026-112292 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-112292

Vulnerability Analysis

CheckCle uses PocketBase as its backend data layer. PocketBase enforces per-collection access control through five rule strings: listRule, viewRule, createRule, updateRule, and deleteRule. When a rule is left as an empty string, PocketBase treats the operation as fully public and bypasses authentication checks on the matching REST endpoints.

In CheckCle through 1.6.0, the shipped pb_schema_latest.json defined these rules as empty strings for sensitive collections. Any client reaching /api/collections/<name>/records could enumerate, read, mutate, or delete records without presenting credentials. This exposes server_token values used for agent communication and secrets stored in alert_configurations.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper access control at the collection definition layer. The PocketBase schema shipped with CheckCle omitted the @request.auth.id != "" guard on sensitive collections, resulting in missing authorization on every CRUD operation exposed through the auto-generated REST API.

Attack Vector

An unauthenticated attacker needs only network reachability to the CheckCle PocketBase API. By issuing HTTP requests to /api/collections/alert_configurations/records or /api/collections/data_settings/records, the attacker can list records, extract secrets, modify status page content, or issue DELETE requests to erase monitoring history and suppress alerting.

javascript
// Security patch: server/pb_migrations/1772125544_updated_alert_configurations.js
/// <reference path="../pb_data/types.d.ts" />
migrate((app) => {
  const collection = app.findCollectionByNameOrId("pbc_1938176441")

  // update collection data
  unmarshal({
    "createRule": "@request.auth.id != \"\"",
    "deleteRule": "@request.auth.id != \"\"",
    "listRule":   "@request.auth.id != \"\"",
    "updateRule": "@request.auth.id != \"\"",
    "viewRule":   "@request.auth.id != \"\""
  }, collection)

  return app.save(collection)
}, (app) => {
  const collection = app.findCollectionByNameOrId("pbc_1938176441")

  // previous (vulnerable) state: empty rules = publicly accessible
  unmarshal({
    "createRule": "",
    "deleteRule": "",
    "listRule":   "",
    "updateRule": "",
    "viewRule":   ""
  }, collection)

  return app.save(collection)
})

Source: CheckCle Commit f2c338c. The patch replaces empty rule strings with @request.auth.id != "", which requires an authenticated PocketBase session on all CRUD operations against the collection.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-112292

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unauthenticated HTTP requests to /api/collections/alert_configurations/records or /api/collections/data_settings/records returning HTTP 200 with record data.
  • Unexpected DELETE requests against PocketBase collection record endpoints originating from external IP addresses.
  • Modifications to status pages or alert configurations without a corresponding administrator login event.
  • Missing or truncated monitoring history that cannot be correlated with scheduled retention jobs.

Detection Strategies

  • Review PocketBase access logs for requests to /api/collections/<name>/records that lack an Authorization header or valid session token.
  • Inspect the deployed pb_schema_latest.json and confirm every collection defines non-empty listRule, viewRule, createRule, updateRule, and deleteRule values.
  • Alert on any read of records containing server_token fields from a source outside the application's own backend.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward CheckCle and PocketBase application logs to a central log store and retain request method, path, source IP, and auth state.
  • Baseline the volume of record-list and record-delete operations and alert on sudden spikes.
  • Monitor outbound use of any server_token to detect reuse of credentials that may have been exfiltrated.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-112292

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade CheckCle to a release that includes commit f2c338c or later, which enforces @request.auth.id != "" on affected collections.
  • Rotate every server_token and any secrets stored in alert_configurations on exposed instances, assuming compromise.
  • Restrict network exposure of the PocketBase API to trusted administrative networks until patching completes.
  • Audit records in alert_configurations, data_settings, and status page collections for unauthorized modifications.

Patch Information

The fix is published in CheckCle commit f2c338c as PocketBase migrations that update each sensitive collection's rule set from empty strings to @request.auth.id != "". See the CheckCle Commit f2c338c, the tracking CheckCle Issue #214, and the VulnCheck Advisory for CheckCle.

Workarounds

  • Place the CheckCle PocketBase API behind a reverse proxy that requires authentication before forwarding /api/collections/* requests.
  • Manually edit each collection in the PocketBase admin UI and set listRule, viewRule, createRule, updateRule, and deleteRule to @request.auth.id != "".
  • Block external access to the PocketBase port at the firewall and allowlist only administrative hosts.
bash
# Example PocketBase migration applying the authenticated-user rule
# Save as server/pb_migrations/<timestamp>_lockdown_collections.js
cat <<'EOF' > server/pb_migrations/9999999999_lockdown_collections.js
migrate((app) => {
  const names = ["alert_configurations", "data_settings"]
  for (const name of names) {
    const c = app.findCollectionByNameOrId(name)
    c.listRule   = "@request.auth.id != \"\""
    c.viewRule   = "@request.auth.id != \"\""
    c.createRule = "@request.auth.id != \"\""
    c.updateRule = "@request.auth.id != \"\""
    c.deleteRule = "@request.auth.id != \"\""
    app.save(c)
  }
})
EOF

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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