Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-112178 Overview
MISP, the open-source threat intelligence sharing platform, contains a Missing Authorization flaw [CWE-862] in its proposal (shadow attribute) visibility logic. The authorization check accepted any attribute or object that carried one of the requesting user's sharing groups, without verifying the attribute's distribution level. The same logic denied the owning organisation access to proposals on its own organisation-only attributes. Versions prior to 2.5.48 are affected.
Critical Impact
Users belonging to a sharing group can view proposals on attributes with distribution levels 1-3 that should remain restricted, resulting in unauthorized disclosure of proposed intelligence changes.
Affected Products
- MISP versions prior to 2.5.48
- MISP ShadowAttribute model (app/Model/ShadowAttribute.php)
- Deployments relying on sharing-group distribution for proposal confidentiality
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-112178 published to NVD
- 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-112178
Vulnerability Analysis
MISP uses shadow attributes (proposals) to let analysts suggest edits to attributes contributed by other organisations. Visibility of these proposals must honor the parent attribute's distribution level: 0 (your organisation only), 1 (this community only), 2 (connected communities), 3 (all communities), 4 (sharing group), and 5 (inherit).
The pre-patch SQL conditions in ShadowAttribute.php added a clause that matched any attribute whose sharing_group_id appeared in the user's sharing-group list, without also constraining distribution = 4. As a result, a user who shared a sharing group with the owning organisation could see proposals attached to attributes marked for distribution levels 1-3. In parallel, the owning organisation was excluded from proposals on its own distribution = 0 attributes because the ownership branch did not account for them.
Root Cause
The root cause is a broken access control check [CWE-862] in the correlated lookup used for proposal queries. The sharing-group membership check was treated as sufficient authorization on its own, instead of being combined with a distribution-level predicate. The owning-organisation branch separately failed to grant access to org-only attributes.
Attack Vector
An authenticated MISP user with a valid API key or web session can query proposal endpoints and receive shadow attributes they are not authorized to see. Exploitation requires low privileges, no user interaction, and is performed over the network against the MISP instance. The impact is confined to confidentiality of proposed intelligence changes.
// Patched conditions in app/Model/ShadowAttribute.php
// fix: [proposals] Apply the attribute ACL rules to proposals
$this->correlatedLookup('objects', 'distribution', 'Attribute', 'object_id') . ' IN (1, 2, 3, 5)',
);
if (!empty($sgids) && (!isset($sgids[0]) || $sgids[0] != -1)) {
$objectDistribution[] = ['AND' => [
$this->correlatedLookup('objects', 'distribution', 'Attribute', 'object_id') . ' = 4',
$this->correlatedLookup('objects', 'sharing_group_id', 'Attribute', 'object_id')
. ' IN (' . implode(', ', array_map('intval', $sgids)) . ')',
]];
$attributeDistribution[] = ['AND' => [
'Attribute.distribution' => 4,
'Attribute.sharing_group_id' => $sgids,
]];
}
// Source: https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/9c5af321f
The patch wraps the sharing-group check in an AND clause that also requires distribution = 4, restoring the intended access control for both attributes and correlated objects.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-112178
Indicators of Compromise
- Proposal (/shadow_attributes/) API requests from accounts outside the owning organisation returning data for attributes with distribution set to 1, 2, or 3.
- Unexpected view or index calls against shadow attribute endpoints from users whose organisation does not match the parent attribute's org_id.
- Spikes in proposal enumeration activity from a single API key across many events.
Detection Strategies
- Audit MISP application logs for shadow attribute access and correlate the requesting user's organisation and sharing groups against the parent attribute's distribution level.
- Compare pre-patch and post-patch proposal query results for the same user to identify previously over-shared records.
- Query the MISP database for shadow attributes whose parent attribute distribution is in (1,2,3) and that were read by users outside the owning organisation.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Forward MISP audit logs and web server access logs to a central SIEM for retention and query.
- Alert on anomalous volumes of requests to /shadow_attributes/index or /shadow_attributes/view/* by non-owning organisations.
- Review API key usage reports in the MISP admin console to identify accounts that pulled large proposal datasets prior to patching.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-112178
Immediate Actions Required
- Upgrade MISP to version 2.5.48 or later, which contains the ACL fix in ShadowAttribute.php.
- Rotate API keys for any accounts suspected of enumerating proposals during the exposure window.
- Review which proposals exist on attributes with distribution levels 1-3 and assess whether their content should be considered disclosed to sharing-group members.
Patch Information
The fix is delivered in MISP commit 9c5af321f and is included in MISP 2.5.48. The patch applies the attribute ACL rules to proposals by requiring distribution = 4 alongside the sharing-group membership check, and corrects the owning-organisation branch so that organisations can view proposals on their own org-only attributes.
Workarounds
- Restrict access to the MISP instance to trusted analysts until the upgrade is applied, limiting the exploit population.
- Temporarily disable or tightly scope sharing groups that contain accounts outside the trust boundary of sensitive proposals.
- Monitor and manually review proposal access until 2.5.48 is deployed.
# Upgrade MISP via the standard update procedure, then verify the version
cd /var/www/MISP
sudo -u www-data git fetch origin
sudo -u www-data git checkout v2.5.48
sudo -u www-data git submodule update --init --recursive
sudo -u www-data app/Console/cake Admin runUpdates
cat VERSION.json
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

