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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-112147

CVE-2026-112147: Octoally Information Disclosure Vulnerability

CVE-2026-112147 is an information disclosure vulnerability in ai-genius-automations Octoally affecting versions up to 1.0.87. Attackers can exploit a path manipulation flaw to access sensitive data. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact assessment, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-112147 Overview

CVE-2026-112147 is an information disclosure vulnerability in the ai-genius-automations octoally project, affecting versions up to and including 1.0.87. The flaw resides in an unknown function within server/src/index.ts and is triggered through manipulation of the path argument. Because the server previously bound to all interfaces and exposed an unauthenticated API, remote attackers can retrieve sensitive information without credentials or user interaction. A public exploit exists, and the issue is tracked under CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor. The vendor resolved the issue in version 1.0.88 via commit 3898085c4e701be21377ebd9e91e10b941e47168.

Critical Impact

Remote, unauthenticated attackers can disclose sensitive information from any octoally instance reachable over the network prior to version 1.0.88.

Affected Products

  • ai-genius-automations octoally versions 1.0.0 through 1.0.87
  • The server/src/index.ts HTTP server component
  • Deployments exposing the default port 42010 beyond the loopback interface

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-19 - CVE CVE-2026-112147 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database
  • Patch commit - 3898085c4e701be21377ebd9e91e10b941e47168 released in version 1.0.88

Technical Details for CVE-2026-112147

Vulnerability Analysis

The vulnerability stems from two compounding design decisions in the octoally server. First, the HTTP API was unauthenticated by default. Second, the server bound to the dual-stack wildcard address ::, exposing the API on every reachable interface. An attacker able to send HTTP requests to the host could invoke endpoints that accept a path parameter and receive information that should remain local to the operator. The CWE-200 classification confirms the outcome as unauthorized exposure of sensitive data rather than modification or denial of service.

Root Cause

The root cause is an insecure default configuration combined with missing origin validation. The pre-patch config.ts set host: process.env.HOST || '::', binding the service to all IPv4 and IPv6 interfaces. No host, origin, or token check restricted which callers could reach the path-handling endpoint. Any request that arrived at port 42010 was processed as if it originated from a trusted local user.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires only network access to the service port and a crafted HTTP request supplying a controlled path value. No authentication, privileges, or user interaction are required. Because a public exploit is available, opportunistic scanning for exposed octoally instances is a realistic risk.

typescript
// Patch excerpt — server/src/config.ts (v1.0.88)
// Before: host: process.env.HOST || '::'   // listens on all interfaces
// After:  host: process.env.HOST || 'localhost' // loopback only
export const config = {
  port: parseInt(process.env.PORT || '42010', 10),
  host: process.env.HOST || 'localhost',
  isDev: process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production',
  logLevel: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info',
  // authToken field removed; API is treated as local-only
};
// Source: https://github.com/ai-genius-automations/octoally/commit/3898085c4e701be21377ebd9e91e10b941e47168
typescript
// Patch excerpt — server/src/index.ts (v1.0.88)
// New loopback and Host/Origin validation helpers
function isLoopbackHost(hostname: string): boolean {
  const h = hostname.toLowerCase();
  return h === 'localhost' || h === '127.0.0.1' || h === '::1' || h === '[::1]';
}

/** Strip the port from a Host header value ("[::1]:42010" → "[::1]") */
function hostnameOf(host: string): string {
  return host.startsWith('[') ? host.slice(0, host.indexOf(']') + 1) : host.split(':')[0];
}
// Source: https://github.com/ai-genius-automations/octoally/commit/3898085c4e701be21377ebd9e91e10b941e47168

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-112147

Indicators of Compromise

  • Inbound HTTP connections to TCP port 42010 from non-loopback source addresses.
  • Requests containing a path query parameter or body field targeting the octoally API.
  • Host or Origin headers in request logs that do not resolve to localhost, 127.0.0.1, or ::1.
  • Presence of octoally server versions 1.0.87 or earlier on networked systems.

Detection Strategies

  • Inventory development and automation hosts for the octoally package and compare installed versions against 1.0.88.
  • Review proxy and firewall logs for external access attempts to the default octoally port.
  • Alert on process-level network listeners binding :: or 0.0.0.0 on port 42010.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable HTTP access logging on octoally and forward logs to a centralized analytics platform for review.
  • Monitor outbound data volumes from systems running octoally to spot abnormal exfiltration patterns.
  • Track changes to the HOST environment variable in deployment manifests and configuration management.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-112147

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade octoally to version 1.0.88 or later on every affected host.
  • Restrict network access to port 42010 using host firewalls until the upgrade is deployed.
  • Audit existing deployments for prior exposure by reviewing historical access logs.

Patch Information

The vendor fix is delivered in version 1.0.88 and corresponds to commit 3898085c4e701be21377ebd9e91e10b941e47168. The patch binds the server to loopback only by default and rejects requests whose Host or Origin headers do not resolve to a loopback address. See the GitHub Release v1.0.88 and GitHub Commit Details for the complete change set. Additional context is published on VulDB CVE-2026-112147.

Workarounds

  • Set the HOST environment variable to localhost or 127.0.0.1 before starting the service.
  • Block inbound traffic to port 42010 at perimeter and host firewalls.
  • Place the service behind an authenticating reverse proxy if remote access is required.
bash
# Configuration example — enforce loopback-only binding
export HOST=localhost
export PORT=42010
npm start

# Host firewall example (Linux, iptables) — drop non-loopback traffic to port 42010
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 42010 ! -i lo -j DROP

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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