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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-112015

CVE-2026-112015: Omnigent Path Traversal Vulnerability

CVE-2026-112015 is a path traversal vulnerability in Omnigent versions 0.3.0 to 0.14.0 that enables authenticated attackers to escape workspace restrictions and access host files. This article covers technical details, affected versions, impact analysis, and mitigation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-112015 Overview

CVE-2026-112015 is a path traversal vulnerability [CWE-22] affecting Omnigent versions 0.3.0 through 0.13.x. The flaw allows authenticated users to escape the workspace sandbox by setting os_env.cwd on nested sub-agents within an uploaded bundle. Root-level validation in bundles.py fails to recursively inspect sub-agent definitions, letting attackers supply absolute or parent-traversing working directories. The runner then reads and writes host files with the privileges of the Omnigent runner user.

Critical Impact

Authenticated attackers can read and write arbitrary files on the Omnigent host by uploading a crafted bundle whose sub-agent uses a malicious cwd, bypassing workspace isolation.

Affected Products

  • Omnigent 0.3.0 through 0.13.x (vulnerable)
  • Omnigent 0.14.0 (patched)
  • Omnigent server component omnigent/server/bundles.py

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-18 - CVE-2026-112015 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-112015

Vulnerability Analysis

Omnigent executes agent bundles inside a scoped workspace directory. The server validates that an agent's os_env.cwd resolves inside the workspace root before launching the runner. This check is applied only to the top-level agent definition. Nested sub-agents are parsed from the same YAML bundle but are not re-validated through the same path containment logic.

An authenticated user who can upload a bundle supplies a sub-agent whose os_env.cwd is an absolute path such as /etc or a traversal string such as ../../../../root. When the orchestrator spawns the sub-agent, it honors the attacker-controlled working directory. Any tool, file-write, or shell step the sub-agent executes then operates against host paths outside the workspace.

Because the runner process typically holds broader file-system privileges than the end user, the result is arbitrary host file read and write under the runner identity. This can be chained to overwrite configuration, SSH keys, or deployment artifacts.

Root Cause

The validation in omnigent/server/bundles.py lines 138-155 enforces the workspace-containment rule against the root agent's os_env only. The bundle loader does not iterate the recursive sub_agents tree to apply the same check. Trust boundaries assumed at the root agent therefore collapse at every nested level.

Attack Vector

The attacker needs an authenticated session with bundle-upload privileges. The attack is network-reachable, requires low privileges, and no user interaction. The exploit payload is a YAML bundle whose nested sub-agent declaration specifies a cwd outside the workspace, then invokes any file-touching tool.

python
# Patch excerpt from omnigent/policies/registry.py
# Source: https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/4a406d5b3b3f3a7c3401eab659ab04e728923b94
def function_policy_handler_allowed(
    path: object,
    arguments: dict[str, object] | None,
) -> bool:
    """Whether a function policy uses a registered handler.

    Legacy wrappers are checked against their target handler. Non-string paths
    are left to the spec parser to reject with a validation error.
    """
    if not isinstance(path, str):
        return True
    if is_registered_handler(path):
        return True
    from omnigent.spec._omnigent_legacy_shim import BUILD_PATH as _SHIM_BUILD_PATH

    if path == _SHIM_BUILD_PATH:
        target = arguments.get("target") if isinstance(arguments, dict) else None
        return isinstance(target, str) and is_registered_handler(target)
    return False

The companion change in omnigent/inner/loader.py aligns bundle validation so that handler and os_env checks are enforced consistently across nested agent definitions during the untrusted bundle-upload path.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-112015

Indicators of Compromise

  • Uploaded bundle YAML containing os_env.cwd entries inside nested sub_agents blocks that reference absolute paths or .. traversal sequences.
  • Runner process file access or writes to paths outside the configured Omnigent workspace root.
  • New or modified files owned by the Omnigent runner user in sensitive directories such as /etc, /root, or ~/.ssh.

Detection Strategies

  • Parse incoming bundle YAML at an upload proxy and flag any os_env.cwd value that is absolute, empty, or contains ...
  • Compare the resolved cwd of every spawned sub-agent process against the allowed workspace root using process telemetry.
  • Review audit logs for bundle uploads followed by file I/O events outside the agent's declared workspace.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable file integrity monitoring on the Omnigent host for configuration directories and user home paths of the runner account.
  • Forward Omnigent server logs, runner process execution events, and file-system telemetry to a central data lake for correlation.
  • Alert on any chdir or process spawn events from the Omnigent runner that resolve outside the workspace prefix.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-112015

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Omnigent to version 0.14.0 or later, which applies the aligned bundle validation fix.
  • Restrict bundle upload permissions to trusted operators until the upgrade is complete.
  • Audit all previously uploaded bundles for nested os_env.cwd values that escape the workspace.

Patch Information

The fix is published in Omnigent 0.14.0. The relevant changes land in commit 4a406d5, which extends validation to nested sub-agent definitions and tightens policy handler registration. See the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-p5x3-3gqh-x44g, the v0.14.0 release notes, and the VulnCheck advisory for full details.

Workarounds

  • Run the Omnigent server and runner under a dedicated, least-privileged system account with no access to sensitive host paths.
  • Place the runner inside a container or chroot whose only writable mount is the workspace directory.
  • Pre-validate bundles with an external linter that rejects any os_env.cwd that is not a relative path contained inside the workspace.
bash
# Pre-upload bundle linter example
python - <<'EOF'
import sys, yaml, os

def check(agent, path="root"):
    cwd = (agent.get("os_env") or {}).get("cwd")
    if cwd and (os.path.isabs(cwd) or ".." in cwd.split(os.sep)):
        print(f"REJECT: {path} has unsafe cwd={cwd}")
        sys.exit(1)
    for i, sub in enumerate(agent.get("sub_agents", []) or []):
        check(sub, f"{path}.sub_agents[{i}]")

with open(sys.argv[1]) as f:
    check(yaml.safe_load(f))
print("OK")
EOF

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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