Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB
CVE-2026-111998 Overview
CVE-2026-111998 is a default credentials vulnerability in Vanus versions 0.8.0 through 0.9.0. The event streaming platform ships with a hardcoded administrator Bearer token embedded in its source code. Unauthenticated remote attackers can send this fixed token to the gateway gRPC proxy port and obtain cluster-admin privileges. With that access, attackers manage namespaces, eventbuses, users, tokens, and role bindings, and they read or publish events across the cluster. The flaw is categorized under CWE-1392: Use of Default Credentials and carries a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.3.
Critical Impact
Any network-reachable attacker can authenticate as cluster administrator using a publicly known token, achieving full control of the Vanus event bus and all data flowing through it.
Affected Products
- Vanus 0.8.0
- Vanus 0.9.0
- All intermediate releases between 0.8.0 and 0.9.0
Discovery Timeline
- 2026-10-18 - CVE-2026-111998 published to NVD
- 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database
Technical Details for CVE-2026-111998
Vulnerability Analysis
Vanus is an open-source serverless event streaming platform that routes events between sources and sinks. The gateway component exposes a gRPC proxy that handles tenant, namespace, and token management operations. Authentication to these management APIs relies on Bearer tokens validated by the controller.
Vanus 0.8.0 through 0.9.0 ships with a hardcoded admin token defined as a constant in internal/primitive/constants.go. The tenant controller logic in internal/controller/tenant/controller.go accepts this token as a valid credential for the built-in admin user. Because the token value is static across every installation and visible in the public GitHub repository, operators who deploy Vanus without additional network restrictions expose cluster-admin access to anyone who can reach the gateway port.
Successful exploitation grants full control over the event platform. Attackers can create or delete namespaces and eventbuses, mint new API tokens for persistence, modify role bindings, and read or publish arbitrary events traversing the cluster.
Root Cause
The root cause is the use of a hardcoded credential compiled into the application binary. The token is not generated per-installation, not rotated on first run, and not documented as a value that operators must change. Any defender inspecting the Vanus source tree at the referenced Vanus constants file can retrieve the exact value an attacker would use.
Attack Vector
Exploitation requires only network reachability to the Vanus gateway gRPC proxy port. The attacker constructs a gRPC request to a management endpoint and attaches the known admin Bearer token in the authorization metadata. The controller validates the token against the hardcoded constant and authorizes the request as admin. No user interaction, prior foothold, or credential discovery phase is required.
See the VulnCheck advisory and Vanus Issue #647 for the technical write-up and reproduction details. No sanitized exploit code is reproduced here.
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Stop Identity AttacksDetection Methods for CVE-2026-111998
Indicators of Compromise
- gRPC requests to the Vanus gateway proxy port carrying the hardcoded admin Bearer token value published in the Vanus repository.
- Unexpected creation of namespaces, eventbuses, users, tokens, or role bindings in Vanus audit logs by the admin principal from unfamiliar source IP addresses.
- Outbound event publication or subscription from source IPs that do not correspond to known application tenants.
Detection Strategies
- Alert on any authentication to the Vanus gateway using the specific token string defined in internal/primitive/constants.go for releases 0.8.0 through 0.9.0.
- Baseline the set of client IPs and service accounts that legitimately call tenant and token management RPCs, then alert on deviations.
- Correlate Vanus controller logs with network flow telemetry to identify gateway access from outside the expected service mesh or namespace.
Monitoring Recommendations
- Enable verbose audit logging on the Vanus controller and forward events to a centralized SIEM for retention and query.
- Monitor Kubernetes network policies and service exposure to detect accidental public exposure of the Vanus gateway port.
- Track creation of new API tokens and role bindings as high-priority events, since attackers commonly mint tokens for persistence after gaining admin access.
How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111998
Immediate Actions Required
- Restrict network access to the Vanus gateway gRPC proxy port so that only trusted application components can reach it, using firewall rules, Kubernetes NetworkPolicies, or a service mesh with mutual TLS.
- Rotate all Vanus tokens and audit existing namespaces, eventbuses, users, and role bindings for unauthorized changes.
- Review historical gateway and controller logs for prior use of the hardcoded admin token from unexpected sources.
Patch Information
At the time of publication, no fixed Vanus release addressing CVE-2026-111998 is referenced in the NVD entry. Monitor the Vanus GitHub repository and Vanus Issue #647 for a vendor fix. Operators should treat the deployment as unpatched and apply compensating controls.
Workarounds
- Deploy Vanus only within isolated network segments and front the gateway with an authenticating reverse proxy that enforces its own credentials.
- Remove or override the hardcoded admin token at build time if operating a self-maintained fork, and regenerate a strong random token stored in a secret manager.
- Disable or firewall the tenant management RPCs if they are not required for the deployment's use case.
# Example Kubernetes NetworkPolicy restricting access to the Vanus gateway
kubectl apply -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: vanus-gateway-restrict
namespace: vanus
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: vanus-gateway
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
trusted: "true"
EOF
Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.
Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

