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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111936

CVE-2026-111936: Sigma File Manager SSRF Vulnerability

CVE-2026-111936 is a server-side request forgery vulnerability in Sigma File Manager versions through 2.2.0 that allows attackers to access internal network resources. This post covers the technical details, security implications, and remediation strategies.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111936 Overview

CVE-2026-111936 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Sigma File Manager through version 2.2.0. The flaw resides in the validate_remote_url() function in security.rs, which fails to inspect resolved IP addresses when processing extension download commands. Attackers can supply hostnames that resolve to loopback, private RFC1918, or cloud metadata ranges such as 169.254.169.254. A malicious extension or catalog entry causes the application to fetch internal resources and persist the responses to the extension directory. This weakness maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery.

Critical Impact

Attackers can coerce the application into fetching internal network endpoints and cloud instance metadata, exposing credentials and private service responses through files written to disk.

Affected Products

  • Sigma File Manager versions through 2.2.0
  • Tauri-based desktop builds using the src-tauri/src/extensions module
  • Deployments that permit third-party extension catalog entries

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-19 - CVE-2026-111936 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111936

Vulnerability Analysis

Sigma File Manager allows extensions to be downloaded from remote URLs. The validate_remote_url() routine in src-tauri/src/extensions/security.rs performs scheme and host string checks but never resolves the hostname and inspects the returned IP addresses. The HTTP client in the extension download path also follows redirects without re-validating target hosts. These gaps enable DNS rebinding and redirect-based SSRF against private infrastructure.

Because the extension installer writes the HTTP response body into the extension directory, an attacker reads the fetched content indirectly through the files staged on disk. Targets include cloud instance metadata services, internal admin consoles, and loopback-bound debugging interfaces. Exploitation requires user interaction such as installing a malicious extension or trusting a crafted catalog entry.

Root Cause

The root cause is incomplete URL validation. validate_remote_url() treats hostname strings as safe without resolving DNS and comparing the returned addresses against blocklists for loopback (127.0.0.0/8, ::1), link-local (169.254.0.0/16), and private ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16). The HTTP client used for downloads also lacked network isolation controls, allowing time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) races between DNS resolution and connection.

Attack Vector

An attacker publishes an extension or catalog entry whose download URL points to a hostname they control. The hostname resolves to a private or metadata address on first lookup, or returns a public address and then rebinds, or redirects via an HTTP 302 to an internal target. Sigma File Manager fetches the resource and writes the response body into the extension directory, where the attacker-controlled extension logic can read it.

The maintainer addressed the issue in commit 45cedf892f800c6b140b0e3cd6e55fdbcf2cf479, which refactors the HTTP client builder and enables additional tokio features for network-level controls.

toml
 tantivy = "0.26"
 walkdir = "2.5"
 rayon = "1.12"
-tokio = { version = "1", features = ["rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync"] }
+tokio = { version = "1", features = ["rt", "rt-multi-thread", "sync", "net", "time"] }
 notify = "8"
 tauri-plugin-drag = "2"
 tauri-plugin-window-state = "2"

Source: GitHub Commit 45cedf8 - Cargo.toml

rust
 use super::archives::extract_archive;
 use super::fs_ops::{next_sibling_temp_dir, remove_dir_force};
-use super::http::{build_http_client, download_to_file_across_urls_with_retry, UrlCandidates};
+use super::http::{
+    build_remote_http_client, download_to_file_across_urls_with_retry, UrlCandidates,
+};
 use super::paths::{ensure_app_data_subdir, get_extension_dir};
 use super::security::{
     authorize_extension_caller, require_integrity, validate_binary_path_component,

Source: GitHub Commit 45cedf8 - binaries.rs

The patch replaces build_http_client with build_remote_http_client, which enforces IP address validation and safe redirect handling for extension downloads.

Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111936

Indicators of Compromise

  • Outbound DNS queries from Sigma File Manager processes resolving to loopback, RFC1918, or 169.254.169.254 addresses
  • Files written under the extension directory containing cloud metadata JSON, IAM credentials, or internal HTTP response bodies
  • Extension catalog entries referencing hostnames whose DNS records flip between public and private addresses

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect installed extensions for download manifests pointing to suspicious hostnames or redirect chains
  • Correlate process-level network telemetry from the Sigma File Manager binary with destination IPs in private or metadata ranges
  • Hunt for unexpected read access to cloud metadata endpoints originating from desktop endpoints rather than cloud workloads

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable endpoint network telemetry to capture process-to-IP connections for the file manager binary
  • Alert on any desktop process requesting the http://169.254.169.254/ instance metadata path
  • Monitor filesystem write events in the extension directory for files that are not valid extension archives

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111936

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Sigma File Manager to a build that includes commit 45cedf892f800c6b140b0e3cd6e55fdbcf2cf479 or later
  • Remove any extensions installed from untrusted or third-party catalogs until their origins are reviewed
  • Restrict outbound network access from workstations running the file manager to prevent reaching cloud metadata endpoints

Patch Information

The maintainer fixed the issue in commit 45cedf8, titled "Fix (security): SSRF via DNS rebinding and redirects in extension downloads." The change introduces build_remote_http_client, adds the net and time features to tokio, and tightens URL validation. See the VulnCheck SSRF Advisory for Sigma and GitHub Issue #552 Discussion for additional context.

Workarounds

  • Block the file manager process from reaching 169.254.169.254 and other metadata endpoints at the host firewall
  • Disable the extension system entirely in managed deployments until users are upgraded to a patched build
  • Enforce an allowlist of trusted extension catalog hostnames at the network egress layer
bash
# Example host firewall rule to block cloud metadata access from the file manager
sudo iptables -A OUTPUT -m owner --uid-owner $(id -u) \
  -d 169.254.169.254 -p tcp --dport 80 -j REJECT

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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