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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111911

CVE-2026-111911: phpMyFAQ Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-111911 is an authentication bypass flaw in phpMyFAQ that allows attackers to register forged passkeys and take over accounts without passwords or TOTP. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111911 Overview

CVE-2026-111911 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in phpMyFAQ versions 4.0.0 through 4.1.8. The flaw resides in the WebAuthn registration endpoints, which attach credentials to any account without requiring authentication or validating a cryptographic challenge. An unauthenticated attacker can stage a target username, submit a forged fmt=none attestation to register a passkey against that account, and then log in as the victim. The resulting access bypasses both passwords and Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) multi-factor authentication, enabling full account takeover including administrator accounts. The issue is tracked under [CWE-287: Improper Authentication].

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated attackers can register their own passkey against any phpMyFAQ account, bypassing passwords and TOTP to achieve complete account takeover.

Affected Products

  • phpMyFAQ 4.0.0 through 4.1.8
  • Fixed in phpMyFAQ 4.1.9
  • All deployments exposing WebAuthn registration endpoints

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-17 - CVE-2026-111911 published to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111911

Vulnerability Analysis

phpMyFAQ implements WebAuthn passkey registration through endpoints that are intended for authenticated users enrolling a new authenticator. The vulnerable code paths accept credential registration requests without verifying that the submitted username matches an authenticated session. Attackers can therefore target any account on the installation, including administrators, by simply naming the victim in the registration request. Because the resulting passkey counts as a first-class authentication factor, successful login via that passkey bypasses the account's password and any TOTP second factor.

Root Cause

The root cause is missing authentication and missing cryptographic challenge validation on the WebAuthn registration endpoints. Challenge binding is the mechanism that ensures a WebAuthn attestation is produced in response to a server-issued nonce by a legitimate authenticator. In the vulnerable builds, neither session binding nor challenge verification is enforced, allowing arbitrary clients to inject attacker-controlled credentials into an arbitrary account record.

Attack Vector

Exploitation is remote and requires no privileges or user interaction. An attacker crafts a WebAuthn registration request specifying the victim's username and submits a forged attestation using the fmt=none attestation format, which omits a verifiable authenticator signature. The server stores the attacker's public key as a valid credential for the victim account. The attacker then initiates the standard WebAuthn login flow and signs the authentication challenge with their own private key to assume the victim's identity. See the VulnCheck Advisory on phpMyFAQ and GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-g6cq for technical details.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111911

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected WebAuthn credential records attached to administrator or privileged user accounts.
  • Successful logins using passkeys for accounts that never enrolled an authenticator.
  • POST requests to WebAuthn registration endpoints from unauthenticated sessions or unusual source IP addresses.
  • Attestation submissions with fmt=none originating from clients outside normal enrollment workflows.

Detection Strategies

  • Audit the phpMyFAQ user and credential tables for passkey entries added since deployment of a vulnerable 4.0.x or 4.1.x version.
  • Review web server access logs for requests to WebAuthn registration routes that lack a corresponding authenticated session cookie.
  • Correlate credential creation events with subsequent successful authentications for the same account to identify takeover chains.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose authentication logging in phpMyFAQ and forward events to a centralized log platform.
  • Alert on any new WebAuthn credential registration for administrative accounts.
  • Monitor for anomalous login geolocations or user agents immediately following credential enrollment events.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111911

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade all phpMyFAQ instances to version 4.1.9 or later without delay.
  • Enumerate and delete any WebAuthn credentials that cannot be attributed to a legitimate user enrollment.
  • Force password resets and re-enrollment of multi-factor authentication for all administrator accounts.
  • Review authentication logs for the vulnerability window and investigate any suspicious logins.

Patch Information

The vendor fix is released in phpMyFAQ 4.1.9. Details of the remediation are published in GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-g6cq and GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-rg9h. The patch enforces authentication on the WebAuthn registration endpoints and validates the server-issued challenge before accepting an attestation.

Workarounds

  • If immediate upgrade is not possible, restrict access to WebAuthn registration endpoints via web server access control lists or a reverse proxy.
  • Temporarily disable WebAuthn passkey functionality in phpMyFAQ configuration until the patched version is deployed.
  • Place the phpMyFAQ application behind a web application firewall rule that blocks unauthenticated requests to the credential registration routes.
bash
# Example nginx restriction for WebAuthn registration endpoints
location ~ ^/api/.*/webauthn/register {
    allow 10.0.0.0/8;      # internal admin network only
    deny all;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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