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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111813

CVE-2026-111813: Apache Traffic Server Magick Plugin RCE

CVE-2026-111813 is a remote code execution flaw in Apache Traffic Server that allows unauthenticated attackers to control ImageMagick arguments through the magick plugin. This article covers technical details, affected versions, security impact, and patching guidance.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111813 Overview

CVE-2026-111813 is an argument injection vulnerability [CWE-88] in the experimental magick plugin shipped with Apache Traffic Server (ATS). In its default unsigned configuration, the plugin passes attacker-controlled input to the ImageMagick convert binary without validation. An unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary convert arguments, which can lead to full compromise of the server process. The flaw affects Apache Traffic Server versions 8.0.1 through 8.1.11, 9.0.0 through 9.2.15, 10.0.0 through 10.1.4, and 10.2.0. Fixed versions are 9.2.16, 10.1.5, and 10.2.1.

Critical Impact

Unauthenticated network attackers can control ImageMagick convert arguments, enabling arbitrary command execution and full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability on affected proxy nodes.

Affected Products

  • Apache Traffic Server 8.0.1 through 8.1.11
  • Apache Traffic Server 9.0.0 through 9.2.15
  • Apache Traffic Server 10.0.0 through 10.1.4, and 10.2.0

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-21 - CVE-2026-111813 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-22 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111813

Vulnerability Analysis

The magick plugin is an experimental module distributed with Apache Traffic Server that invokes ImageMagick's convert utility to transform images proxied through the cache. In the default configuration, requests are not required to be cryptographically signed. The plugin accepts transformation parameters directly from client-supplied request data and passes them as command-line arguments to convert.

Because the plugin does not restrict which arguments may be supplied, an attacker can inject options that convert interprets as operational directives rather than image parameters. ImageMagick exposes a broad surface of coders, delegates, and file I/O options that have historically been abused to read arbitrary files, write to attacker-chosen paths, and execute shell commands through delegate handlers.

Root Cause

The root cause is improper neutralization of argument delimiters in a command [CWE-88]. The plugin builds the convert command line from untrusted request fields and does not enforce an allow-list of options or require signed requests. Without a signature requirement, there is no origin-side control validating that the arguments were produced by a trusted application.

Attack Vector

Exploitation requires only network access to a Traffic Server instance that has the experimental magick plugin enabled in its default state. The attacker sends a crafted HTTP request whose parameters are forwarded to convert. Injected flags can target ImageMagick coders and delegates to read sensitive files, overwrite content on disk, or trigger command execution through delegate processing. No authentication, user interaction, or prior foothold is required.

See the Apache Mailing List Thread for the upstream advisory details.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111813

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected child processes spawned by the Traffic Server user, particularly convert, gs, ffmpeg, or shell interpreters invoked as ImageMagick delegates.
  • Outbound network connections from the ATS host originating from ImageMagick helper processes.
  • New or modified files in cache, temporary, or web-accessible directories that correlate with proxy request timestamps.

Detection Strategies

  • Inspect ATS access logs for requests targeting URIs served by the magick plugin that contain suspicious tokens such as -write, |, backticks, @, or references to coders like ephemeral:, msl:, or url:.
  • Alert on process-tree anomalies where traffic_server is the parent of convert and convert subsequently spawns shells, interpreters, or network clients.
  • Correlate ImageMagick stderr or policy denial messages with inbound client IPs to surface probing activity.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose plugin logging for magick during triage and forward logs to a central platform for retention and search.
  • Monitor file integrity on ATS configuration, cache, and plugin directories.
  • Track egress from proxy nodes to detect data exfiltration staged through delegate execution.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111813

Immediate Actions Required

  • Upgrade Apache Traffic Server to 9.2.16, 10.1.5, or 10.2.1 as applicable to your release branch.
  • If upgrading is not immediately possible, disable the experimental magick plugin by removing it from plugin.config and reloading the server.
  • Audit ATS hosts for prior exploitation by reviewing process-tree history and recent file changes under cache and plugin paths.

Patch Information

The Apache Traffic Server project has released fixed versions 9.2.16, 10.1.5, and 10.2.1 that remediate the argument injection in the magick plugin. Operators running any affected 8.x build should migrate to a supported fixed branch, since no 8.x fix is listed in the advisory. Refer to the Apache Mailing List Thread for the official notice.

Workarounds

  • Require signed requests for the magick plugin so that only trusted upstreams can submit transformation parameters.
  • Place a restrictive ImageMagick policy.xml on the host to disable risky coders and delegates such as MSL, EPHEMERAL, URL, HTTPS, HTTP, FTP, and TEXT.
  • Restrict network reachability of ATS endpoints that expose the plugin to trusted clients only until patching is complete.
bash
# Example: disable the experimental magick plugin in plugin.config
# /etc/trafficserver/plugin.config
# magick.so

# Then reload Traffic Server configuration
traffic_ctl config reload

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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