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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111723

CVE-2026-111723: LingGuo-Drama Auth Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-111723 is an authorization bypass flaw in LingGuo-Drama allowing any registered user to manage all accounts. Attackers can escalate privileges and compromise the system. This post covers technical details, impact, and mitigation.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111723 Overview

CVE-2026-111723 is a missing authorization vulnerability [CWE-862] in LingGuo-Drama through commit 8a6924a. The /admin/v1/admins API is protected only by the AuthAdminJWT middleware, which validates that a request carries a valid admin JWT but performs no role or ownership checks. Any registered user can enumerate accounts, read bcrypt password hashes, reset the bootstrap administrator's password through a PUT request, raise their own authority_id, and delete arbitrary accounts. The flaw collapses the authorization boundary between standard admins and privileged administrators across the entire admin management surface.

Critical Impact

A self-registered user can seize full administrative control of a LingGuo-Drama deployment, exfiltrate every account's bcrypt hash, and delete accounts at will.

Affected Products

  • LingGuo-Drama through commit 8a6924a
  • server/app/http/controllers/admin/v1/admins_controller.go (lines 166-198)
  • server/routes/admin.go admin routes (lines 244-255)

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111723 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-20 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111723

Vulnerability Analysis

The LingGuo-Drama server exposes administrative account management under /admin/v1/admins. The route group applies the AuthAdminJWT middleware, which only confirms that a caller holds a valid admin JWT. No further check compares the caller's authority_id to the required privilege level for list, read, update, or delete operations.

Because self-registration produces a valid admin JWT, every registered user inherits the same authority as the bootstrap administrator for this controller. The admin model exposes the stored bcrypt hash alongside account metadata, so list and read endpoints disclose credential material usable for offline cracking.

Update handlers accept arbitrary field assignments on the admin struct, including password and authority_id. An attacker can elevate their own authority or overwrite the root account's password without supplying the previous credential. See the VulnCheck Advisory on LingGuo Drama and the HackMD Access Control Analysis for the full call-graph.

Root Cause

The root cause is a missing authorization check in the admin controller. The design conflates authentication with authorization: AuthAdminJWT answers "is this a logged-in admin?" but no handler asks "is this admin permitted to modify that admin?" The authority_id column exists in the model but is never consulted during request handling.

Attack Vector

An attacker self-registers against the application's admin registration flow, obtains a JWT, and issues authenticated requests to /admin/v1/admins. A GET returns every account including bcrypt hashes; a PUT /admin/v1/admins/{id} with a JSON body setting password and authority_id rewrites the target account; a DELETE removes any account. Reference the GitHub Admin Controller Code and the GitHub Admin Routes Code for the vulnerable code paths.

No verified exploit code is published. See the referenced advisories for request-level reproduction steps.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111723

Indicators of Compromise

  • Unexpected PUT or DELETE requests against /admin/v1/admins/{id} originating from newly registered accounts.
  • GET /admin/v1/admins responses sent to low-privilege sessions, especially when the response body contains password or bcrypt ($2a$, $2b$) strings.
  • Admin accounts whose authority_id value increases without a corresponding change-management record.
  • New admin registrations followed within seconds by writes to the bootstrap administrator record.

Detection Strategies

  • Deploy a reverse-proxy or WAF rule that denies /admin/v1/admins requests whose JWT claims do not map to a privileged authority_id.
  • Enable application-level audit logging on all state-changing admin endpoints and alert on self-modification of authority_id.
  • Hash and fingerprint the admin table; alert when the bootstrap record's password_hash changes outside a deploy window.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Forward application access logs and database audit events to a central analytics tier for correlation of registration-then-escalation sequences.
  • Baseline the normal callers of /admin/v1/admins and alert on first-seen principals.
  • Monitor outbound traffic from the application host for exfiltration of password-hash sized payloads.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111723

Immediate Actions Required

  • Disable public admin self-registration until an authorization fix is deployed.
  • Rotate all admin passwords and invalidate every issued admin JWT.
  • Review the admin table for unauthorized authority_id elevations and remove rogue accounts.
  • Restrict network access to /admin/v1/admins to trusted management IP ranges.

Patch Information

No vendor-released patch commit is referenced in the advisory for commit 8a6924a. Operators should track the upstream LingGuo-Drama repository for a fix that adds an authority_id-based authorization check on every handler in admins_controller.go and removes the password_hash field from list and read responses.

Workarounds

  • Wrap the admin route group with an additional middleware that verifies the JWT's authority_id matches the required privilege for each verb.
  • Serialize admin records through a response DTO that omits password, password_hash, and any token fields.
  • Enforce an application-layer allowlist so that only the account's own id is editable unless the caller is the bootstrap administrator.
bash
# Example nginx guard until an upstream patch lands
location ~ ^/admin/v1/admins {
    allow 10.0.0.0/8;
    deny all;
    proxy_pass http://lingguo_backend;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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