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Vulnerability Database/CVE-2026-111715

CVE-2026-111715: Arkon Wiki Authorization Bypass Vulnerability

CVE-2026-111715 is an authorization bypass flaw in Arkon wiki system that allows authenticated users to access unauthorized department wiki metadata. This post explains its impact, affected versions, and mitigation steps.

Published:

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

CVE-2026-111715 Overview

CVE-2026-111715 is a missing authorization vulnerability in Arkon through version 0.9.2. The flaw resides in the GET /api/wiki/graph endpoint, which fails to enforce departmental scope checks. Authenticated employees holding only the wiki:read:own_dept permission can supply a foreign slug and retrieve wiki metadata belonging to other departments. The underlying get_neighborhood() service traverses the wiki graph up to depth 3, exposing page slugs, titles, types, and link edges across organizational boundaries. The weakness is classified under CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key.

Critical Impact

Any authenticated low-privilege employee can enumerate cross-department wiki structure and metadata, undermining tenant-style separation inside Arkon deployments.

Affected Products

  • Arkon through version 0.9.2
  • app/routers/wiki.py endpoint handler (lines 621-633)
  • app/services/wiki_service.pyget_neighborhood() service (lines 200-257)

Discovery Timeline

  • 2026-10-16 - CVE-2026-111715 published to NVD
  • 2026-10-19 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2026-111715

Vulnerability Analysis

Arkon exposes a wiki graph API that returns neighborhood metadata for a given page slug. The router at GET /api/wiki/graph accepts a slug query parameter and delegates lookup to wiki_service.get_neighborhood(). The service builds a graph of related pages up to depth 3 and returns slugs, titles, page types, and edge relationships.

The route guard verifies only that the caller holds the wiki:read:own_dept permission. It does not verify that the supplied slug belongs to the caller's department. The service layer also omits any scope filter when traversing wiki links. As a result, any authenticated employee can enumerate wiki structure for other departments by iterating slugs.

The disclosure does not expose full page bodies, but the leaked metadata reveals project names, document hierarchies, and inter-page relationships. This information is typically sufficient for internal reconnaissance and targeted follow-up attacks.

Root Cause

The root cause is a missing authorization check tied to a user-controlled identifier. The handler trusts the caller's generic read permission without validating ownership of the requested resource. This pattern maps directly to CWE-639, where access control depends on an object key supplied in the request.

Attack Vector

An authenticated attacker with the lowest wiki read permission issues a request such as GET /api/wiki/graph?slug=<foreign-slug>. The server returns the neighborhood graph without comparing the slug's owning department to the caller's department. Attackers can brute-force or guess slugs, or harvest them from search endpoints, then pivot across the graph using returned edge data. See the VulnCheck Arkon Advisory and the HackMD Arkon Wiki Analysis for request-level detail.

No verified proof-of-concept code is published alongside the advisory, so a prose description is provided in place of synthetic exploitation code.

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Detection Methods for CVE-2026-111715

Indicators of Compromise

  • Repeated GET /api/wiki/graph requests from a single authenticated session targeting slugs that do not belong to the caller's department.
  • Enumeration-style request bursts with sequential or dictionary-based slug parameter values.
  • Unexpected 200 responses to /api/wiki/graph for users whose historical access is confined to a single department.

Detection Strategies

  • Compare the owning department of each requested slug against the authenticated user's department at the reverse proxy or SIEM layer.
  • Baseline the number of unique slugs each user queries per hour and alert on statistical outliers.
  • Correlate wiki:read:own_dept sessions with cross-department response payload sizes to flag broad graph traversal.

Monitoring Recommendations

  • Enable verbose request logging for /api/wiki/* endpoints, capturing user ID, department, slug, and response size.
  • Forward Arkon application logs into a centralized data lake and apply detection rules on cross-department access patterns.
  • Review audit logs for low-privilege accounts generating disproportionate graph API traffic.

How to Mitigate CVE-2026-111715

Immediate Actions Required

  • Restrict network access to the Arkon /api/wiki/graph endpoint until a scoped authorization check is deployed.
  • Audit recent access logs for cross-department slug queries and identify affected accounts.
  • Rotate or revoke sessions for users observed enumerating foreign slugs.

Patch Information

No fixed version is listed in the NVD entry at the time of publication. Monitor the upstream project at the GitHub Wiki Router Code and GitHub Wiki Service Code locations for a release that introduces department scope enforcement in get_neighborhood().

Workarounds

  • Add a middleware or decorator that resolves the requested slug's department and rejects requests where it differs from the caller's department.
  • Patch get_neighborhood() to filter neighbor nodes and edges by the caller's department scope before returning results.
  • Temporarily reduce graph traversal depth from 3 to 0 or 1 to limit metadata exposure while a full fix is prepared.
  • Apply rate limits on /api/wiki/graph per user to blunt enumeration attempts.
bash
# Example reverse-proxy guard: deny /api/wiki/graph when the slug prefix
# does not match the caller's department claim injected by the auth layer.
location = /api/wiki/graph {
    if ($arg_slug !~ ^$http_x_user_department-) {
        return 403;
    }
    proxy_pass http://arkon_upstream;
}

Disclaimer: This content was generated using AI. While we strive for accuracy, please verify critical information with official sources.

Sources: National Vulnerability Database, CISA KEV, Exploit-DB

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